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CHAPI'ER I
THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF MODERNITY:

The rise

of political mass movements

comprehensive

intellectual

recognized

one

as

NATURE AND LINEAGE

of

the

systems
most

has

based upon
been

prominent

widely

features

nineteenth and twentieth century political history.
impact

of

such

movements,

along

with

their

of
The

apparent

novelty, has in fact led certain scholars to characterize
the last 150 years as the "Age of Ideology. 111

Although

the impact of ideological movements has indeed been great,
and while the ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries are certainly novel in important respects, the
suspicion has persisted among many analysts of ideology
that

these

movements

cannot

be

understood

simply

as

products of the political conditions or climate of opinion
of

the

late

Hegelianism,

modern period.
Marxism,

Since

fascism,

ideologies

such as

progressivism

and

positivism continue to attract adherents long after the
passing of the political

conditions present during the

lE.g., Henry David Aiken, The Age of Ideology:
The
Nineteenth Century Philosophers (Boston:
Houghton
Mifflin,
1957):
Karl Dietrich Bracher, The Age of
Ideology: A History of Political Thought in the Twentieth
Century (New York:
St. Martin's, 1985); Isaac Kramnick
and Frederick M. Watkins, eds., The Age of Ideology:
Political Thought 1750 to the Present (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 1979).
See also Eric
Voegelin, Anamnesis (Notre Dame, Indiana, and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), p. 146.
1

2

period of their development (and, some would argue,

long

after these ideologies have been decisively refuted),

it

is difficult to see how the generation and expansion of
ideology can be explained by factors such as the events
surrounding

the

advent

of

capitalism

or

Revolution or the breakup of feudal society.

the

French

As a broader

background seems to be needed in order to account for the
diversity and persistence of ideological phenomena, much
attention has

been

devoted

to the

"modern project"

in

general or to the various "waves" of modernity.
Yet, in works such as Norman Cohn's The Pursuit of
the Millennium,
the

patterns

one can find reason to question whether
of

thought

and

activity

typical

of

ideological movements

can be contained even within the

modern

whole.

period

similarities

as

a

Cohn's

analysis

of

the

between medieval millenarianism and modern

ideological movements suggests that the movements of our
age

are

not

manifestations

products
of

a

of

pattern

that
of

age

psychic

but,

rather,

disorientation

which may arise in widely varying cultural and political
contexts.
some

This line of thinking has been supported to

extent

by

sociological,

historical

research,

competent

theoretical

but

finds

expression

anthropological
its
in

fullest
the

work

and

and

most

of

Eric

3

voegelin. 2

In Voegelin's

last writings the origins of

ideological types of activism are traced not to modernity
but to antiquity,
particular

and are explained as reactions not to

circumstances

but

to

the

human

condition

itself.
Voegelin's

life-long

effort

to

uncover

the

historical and intellectual roots of ideological activism
was initiated by his early realization that "the academic
institutions of the Western world, the various schools of
philosophy,

the rich manifold of methodologies,

offer the

intellectual

political

movements ••. of

Socialism,

and racism,

and

did not

instruments that would make the
Communism,

Fascism,

of constitutionalism,

authoritarianism ..• intelligible."3

National
liberalism

A distinct

and

continuous theme running throughout Voegelin's voluminous
writings

is

ideological

the

movements

civilizational
scientist

can

argument

crisis.
be

that

is

the

proliferation

symptomatic
His

described

as

career
a

as

search

of
a

a

of

deeper

political

for

wellsprings of the political crisis of modernity,

(1)

the

(2) the

analytical tools required to render it intelligible, and
(3) sources for an appropriate therapy.

While Voegelin's

2see esp. Sylvia L. Thrupp, ed., Millennial Dreams in
Action:
Essays in Comparative study (The Hague: Mouton,
1962), passim.
3voegelin, Anamnesis (1978), p. 3.

4

writings were by no means confined to the modern period,
and although he was ultimately to find neither the cause
nor

the

cure

for

the

crisis

within

modernity,

he

frequently noted that his theoretical project as a whole
should

be

understood

as

a

response

to

"the

spiritual

disorder of our time, the civilizational crisis of which
everyone

so

readily

characterization

of

Given

speaks."4

philosophy

itself

as

Voegelin's
"an

act

of

resistance illuminated by conceptual understanding, n5 it
is clear that an evaluation of his analysis of ideological
phenomena must be central to any assessment of his stature
as a political philosopher.
As an introduction to Voegelin's analysis of the
political

crisis

of

modernity--and

to

the

patterns

of

consciousness from which he believed the crisis has arisen
--this chapter will be devoted to an examination of three
central

issues:

( 1)

consciousness?
consciousness
Ideology,

and,

be

What is the nature of ideological

(2)

Can

found
if

so,

equivalents

prior
what

to

the

of

so-called

characteristics

distinguish these patterns of consciousness?
the

psychological

or

ideological

experiential

Age

of

unite

or

(3) What are

foundations

of

4voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (Chicago:
Henry Regnery, 1968), p. 22.
5voegelin, Order and History, Vol. III:
Plato and
Aristotle (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1957) f p. 68.

5

disordered patterns of consciousness and how are we to
explain

their

attempt

will

during

expansion
be

the modern period?

below

made

to

provide

a

An

concise

formulation of Voegelin's argument as it pertains to these
To do so it will be necessary to introduce a

questions.

generic concept of "pneumapathological" consciousness, as
well as a conceptual framework which will help to clarify
the basic varieties of that general pattern of experience
and symbolization.

Finally,

several problems concerning

Voegelin's method will be considered, and the chapter will
close with an explication of the theoretical issues and
analytical categories to be employed in the chapters which
follow.
The nature of ideological consciousness as Voegelin
understood

it

is

somewhat

easier

to

grasp

when

distinguished from ideological systems and from disordered
consciousness
discussion

in

general.

ideological

For

the

systems

purposes

will

be

of

this

treated

as

constructs which are based upon a seemingly comprehensive
account of reality and the human's place within it,
which are

intended to provide a program for the trans-

formation of society.
recent in origin.
was

and

understood

For Voegelin they are relatively

Ideological consciousness, in contrast,
by

Voegelin

as

a

modern

variant

of

a

broader, more inclusive type of spiritually disordered or
"closed"

consciousness

which

can

be

found

throughout

6

Indeed, Voegelin found examples of this generic

history.
form

of

consciousness,

referred

to

here

by

the

terms

"pneumapathological consciousness" or "disorientation," in
several of the earliest writings known to historians. 6
Voegelin's argument does not imply that pre-modern
writings

in

which

pneumapathological

consciousness

expressed are "ideologies" or ideological systems,

is

since

he maintained that such systems were simply unknown prior
to the eighteenth century.7

Hence, it has been necessary

to develop concepts (based upon terms found in Voegelin's
writings)

which are capable of denoting pre-ideological

forms

consciousness

within

of

the

consciousness.
these

forms

general

which
category

are
of

nonetheless

included

pneumapathological

Voegelin's argument on the relationship of
("metastatic

faith,"

"prometheanism"

and

"parousiasm") to ideological consciousness represents the
center

around

which

the

major

questions

of

historical

accuracy and explanatory power regarding his treatment of
modernity revolve.

These concepts and the nature of the

6 E.g.,
"The Sumerian Kinglist," Assyriological
Studies, no. 11 (Chicago, 1939). Cf. Voegelin, Order and
History, Vol.
IV:
The Ecumenic Age (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press,
1974), pp.
65-67.
"Dispute of a Man, Who Contemplates Suicide, With his
Soul," Anon., Egypt, circa 2000 B.C.
Cf. Voegelin,
"Immortality: Experience and Symbol," Harvard Theological
Review (vol. LX, 1967, pp. 235-79), pp. 241-48.
7 voegelin, Conversations with Eric Voegelin (R. Eric
O'Connor, ed.) (Montreal:
Thomas More Institute,· 1980),
pp. 13-18, 147.

7

distinctions among them will be explored more fully below.
At

this

juncture

understanding

of

it

is

modern

sufficient
ideological

to

note

politics

that

our

would

be

greatly enhanced if it could be shown that the types of
thought and activism which characterize the present era
are not simply the results of present circumstances or of
the

idiosyncrasies of

these

forms

of

influential

thought

and

individuals.

activism

are

For if

rooted

in

a

general pattern of consciousness which is an historical
constant, as Voegelin argued, important implications would
be suggested for an appropriate response to the political
crisis of modernity.
in the final chapter.

These implications will be discussed
On the other hand, the helpfulness

of Voegelin's analysis must be called into question if
ideological consciousness cannot persuasively be related
to

the

other,

orientation.
Voegelin

older

forms

of

Should

this

turn

would

appear

(as

pneumapathological
out

William

to
C.

be

the

Havard,

discase,
Jr.

speculated he must appear to partisans of this or that
ideology) as "a sort of intellectual anachronism trying to
apply the outmoded internecine arguments of the Christian
Middle Ages to a modern secular world in which they have
no place."8
8william c.
Havard, Jr.,
"Notes on Voegelin's
Contributions to Political Theory," in Ellis Sandoz, ed.,
Eric Voegelin's Thought:
A Critical Appraisal (Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1982, pp. 87-114),

8

Voegelin's attempt to provide a broader theoretical
context for the understanding of ideological phenomena was
founded upon a more formidable base than can be furnished
Rather than simply tracing the

by a history of ideas.

development of specific ideas which eventually came to be
expressed in ideological

forms,

Voegel in structured his

analysis in the form of a philosophical anthropology which
is informed by a theory of consciousness and a philosophy
of history.

As a result, it was possible for Voegelin to

conceptualize

the disordered

consciousness

of

the

or

ideologue

"pathologically closed"
by

reference

ordered or "open" patterns of consciousness.

to

well-

Voegelin's

analysis of the relationship between these most general
patterns of (disordered or well-ordered) consciousness is,
however, much more subtle than a comparison of "true" and
"false"

doctrines,

since

consciousness arise from

closed

fundamental

as

well

as

open

experiences of the

human condition which cannot, as such, be simply false:
The conflict of Truth and Delusion, thus, is not a
conflict between true and false propositions.
In
fact, the Delusion is quite as true as the Truth if by
truth we mean an adequate and consistent articulation
of an experience.
Truth is the philosophy of the
realissimum that we experience if we follow the way of
immortalization in the soul; Delusion is the
philosophy of the reality that we experience as men
who live and die in a world that itself is distended
in time with a beginning and an end.
The
characterization of this philosophy of reality as a
Delusion derives its justification from the experience
p. 98.

9

·of a superior reality. 9
Ideological
religious

thought,
thought,

no
is

less

than

engendered

philosophical

or

experiences

of

by

uncertainty and contingency, incompleteness and suffering
in a world where all things pass away .10
symbolism

of

imprisonment

in

darkness

The Platonic

also

ideological and proto-ideological symbolism.
of

the

ways

of

philosophy

and

ideology

appears

in

The parting
first

becomes

evident in characteristically different reactions to this
condition.
For

Voegelin,

philosophical

consciousness

is

exemplified by the Platonic periagoge, the turning-around
of the soul in loving openness toward transcendent reality
and

the

ground

consciousness
transcendent

of

is

being .11

typified

ground

in

contingent existence.
taken

many

forms,

By

by

a

revolt

contrast,

ideological

turning-away
against

the

from

tension

the
of

In the modern era this revolt has
all

of

which

are

expressive

of

dissatisfaction with the degree of certainty afforded by
faith,

trust

and

hope

as

sources

of

knowledge

and

9voegelin, Order and History, Vol. II: The World of
the Polis (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1957) I P• 216.
lOcf. Voegelin, "History and Gnosis, 11 in Bernard
Anderson, ed., The Old Testament and Christian Faith (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1969, pp. 64-89), p. 82.
llvoegelin, Plato and Aristotle
Anamnesis (1978), pp. 183-85.

(1957),

pp.

115-17;

10

existential orientation.

According to Voegelin, the great

ideologists sought to displace classical Greek philosophy
and

Judea-Christian

revelation

by

(mis)placing

the

transcendent ground within an immanent hierarchy of being,
identifying

the

productive

essence

of

human

historical

relations,

existence

as,

progress,

e.g. ,
racial

composition, libidinous drives, scientific rationality or
the

will

to

constructed

Within

power.
around

these

the

intellectual

misplacements

humanity appears as an autonomous,

of

the

systems
ground,

self created species

capable of assuming control of its destiny through the
self-conscious
Thus,

on

the

application
level

of

of

new

individual

forms

of

knowledge.

experience,

Voegelin

regarded ideological consciousness as a form of existence
in

rebellion

against

human

imperfection

and

the

uncertainties of life in a world grounded in an ultimately
mysterious order of being .12

It is in this sense that

Voegelin attributed the ideological impulse not to modern
conditions but to the human condition as such.
historically on the political level,

Viewed

ideological systems

12voegelin's one, relatively early definition of
ideology runs as follows:
"Ideology is existence in
rebellion against God and man. It is the violation of the
First and Tenth Commandments, if we want to use the
language of Israelite order; it is the noses, the disease
of the spirit, if we want to use the language of Aeschylus
and Plato." Voegelin, Order and History, Vol. I:
Israel
and Revelation (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University
Press, 1956), p. xiv.

11
of

thought

represent

a

series

of

(counter)

movements

against the philosophical and revelatory traditions of the
west,

movements which

seek to transform the nature

of

humanity and society beyond their divinely set parameters.
Yet

pneumapathological

disorientation

cannot

be

limited to the modern form of ideological consciousness,
because paths of escape from the tension of contingent
existence

are

not

Evidence

ideologists.
dominandi,

limited

closure

and

of

to

those

taken

alienation,

other

consciousness

can

be

found

Ideol.ogy.

The

emergence

symptoms
long
of

by

modern

hubris,

libido

of

before

ideological
the

Age

of

pneumapathological

consciousness can be fixed in time because awareness of
the

tensions

arising

from

existence

between

the

transcendent and mundane poles of reality was itself an
epoch-marking discovery in history. 13
reality,

symbolized

by

Plato

as

the

This area within
metaxy

or

"In-

Between," was unknown prior to what Voegelin called the
"de-divinization" of the world.1 4

Whereas mythological or

"cosmological" accounts of reality could speak of human
activity as occurring within a world "full of gods, 11 the
authors

of

the

Old

Testament

and

the

philosophers

of

13voegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), pp. 1-16;
The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 1-13.
14p1ato, Symposium, 202a-203; Voegelin, The Ecumenic
Age (1974), pp. 183-87; Conversations with Eric Voegelin
(1980), pp. 44-45, 81.

12
ancient Greece located the divine creative forces of the
universe beyond the mundane realm of human activity in the
world. 15

tensions

which

disorientation

first

The

pneumapathological

lie
arise

behind
from

the

awareness that one exists in a de-divinized world that is
incomplete
becomes

and

imperfect

in

essence;

especially problematic when

this

its

condition

recognition

is

accompanied by the experience or promise of participation
in a transcendent realm of being.16
disorientation

complex

of

experiences Voegelin frequently turned to Gnosticism,

in

which

which

the world was

may

stem

As an example of the

from

regarded as

a

this

demonically created

prison which restricts the divine spark within humanity.
More

generally,

attempts

to

artificially

relax

the

tensions associated with the de-divinization of the world
tend to assume two characteristic forms:

disregard for

the re-quirements of existence in the world, or a turningaway

from

alone. 1 7

transcendent
This

reality

distinction

is

to

live

of

great

15voegelin, Israel and Revelation
Anamnesis {1978), pp. 75, 159.

in

this

world

importance

(1956), pp.

in

9-13;

1 6voegelin, The New Science of Politics:
An Introduction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp.
107-110.
1 7voegelin, Order and History, Vol. V:
In Search of
Order {Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press,
1987), p. 37. On this distinction see also Gregor Sebba,
"Order and Disorders of the Soul:
Eric Voegelin's
Philosophy of History," Southern Review ( n. s. , vol. III,

13
voegelin's

work

on

disordered

political

consciousness.

Both forms of "escapism" from the tensions of existence in
the

metaxy

can be

observed

in

all

periods

of

history

subsequent to the "leaps in being" identified by Voegelin
in the ancient world.
As an example of the former type of disorientation,
voegelin noted a tendency toward chiliastic expectation of
the "Kingdom of God" among those who gave credence to the
promise

of

salvation

but

chafed

impatiently

corruption of life in worldly society.
pneumapathological

disorientation

may

under

the

This variant of
be

expressed

in

either a profound disregard for mundane necessities and an
all-consuming desire for eternal perfection, or a longing
for an apocalyptic transformation of the worldly vale of
tears.

Voegelin found evidence of this general type of

pneumapathological consciousness (which will be subdivided
below

into

metastatic

faith

and

parousiasm)

in

the

apocalyptic strains of Old Testament prophecy and early
Christianity,

the Gospel of John,

the Epistles of Paul,

ancient Gnostic and Manichaean writings,
"heresies"

of

evil

times

and

the

the millennial

tracts

of

militant

Puritanism.
The

other

path

of

escape

from

"existence-in-

1967, pp.
282-310), pp.
301-302; Eugene Webb, Eric
Voeqelin: Philosopher of History (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1981), p. 201.

14
tension" is to eclipse the transcendent dimension of human
experience by

establishing man

This

things.

consciousness

general
(which

as

type

will

the

of

be

measure

of

all

pneumapathological

subdivided

below

into

prometheanism and ideological consciousness) may take the
form

of

hatred

of

the

gods

or,

among

more

ambitious

moderns, of attempts to usher in an era of human autonomy
through

a

redirection

of

humanity's

perfection of the "estate of man."

energies

toward a

Voegelin argued that

the ideological form of this type of pneumapathological
consciousness
prominence,

can

be

found,

in

varying

in virtually every movement of

degrees

of

note within

modern political thought:l8
Marxism

Fascism

18Marxism: From Enlightenment to Revolution (Durham,
North Carolina:
Duke University Press, 1975), pp. 240302.
Fascism: Anamnesis (1978), p. 3; Ellis Sandoz, The
Voegelinian Revolution:
A Biographical Introduction
(Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1981),
pp.
50-60.
Progressivism:
From Enlightenment to
Revolution (1975), pp. 110-35.
Positivism:
Ibid., pp.
136-94.
Anarchism:
Ibid., pp. 195-239.
Biologism:
Ibid., p. 69; Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xii.
Psychologism:
Ibid.
Utilitarianism:
Ibid., p. 52.
Liberalism:
"Liberalism and Its History," Review of
Politics (vol. XXXVII,
1974, pp.
502-20, passim.
Behavioral ism:
Anamnesis
(1978),
p.
146.
Constitutionalism:
Ibid., p. 3.
Scientism:
"The
Origins of Scientism," Social Research (vol. XXVI, 1948,
pp. 462-94), pp. 462-64, 484-94. Hegelianism: "On Hegel:
A Study in Sorcery," Studium Generale (vol. XXVI, 1971,
pp. 335-68), passim.
Existentialism:
"The Eclipse of
Reality," in Maurice Natanson, ed., Phenomenology and
Social Research (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, pp.
185-94), passim.
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Hegelianism

Existentialism

Progressivism

Psychologism

Positivism

Anarchism

Behavioral ism

Scientism

Utilitarianism

Constitutional ism

Liberalism

Biologism

common to all these movements, in one form or another, is
what Voegelin identified as a hubristic revolt against the
limitations of the creaturly nature of human beings.
Contrary

to

those

who

distinctly modern phenomenon,
form

of

consciousness

and

regard this

revolt

as

a

Voegelin argued that this

its

pathological

dimensions

(although not its systematic, quasi-scientific trappings)
were far from unknown to the ancients:
In fact the Greek thinkers diagnosed it as a disease
of the psyche from the time they had occasion to
observe it in the embattled polis.
Heraclitus and
Aeschylus, and above all Plato, speak of the nosos or
nosema of the psyche; and Thucydides speaks of the
expansion of the disease into the disorders of the
Peloponnesian War as a kinesis, as a feverish movement
of society .•.. The Stoics, especially Chrysippos, were
intrigued by the phenomenon, and Cicero, summarizing
the findings of the preceding centuries, deals with
the disease at length •... He calls it the morbus animi,
the disease of the mind, and characterizes its nature
as an aspernatio rationis, as a rejection of reason.19
Insofar

as pneumapathological

disorientation

in general

can be traced to an alienated dissatisfaction with the
human condition as such,

its origins appear not simply

19voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme:
Meditation" (1981), p. 243.

A

16

modern but universal and perennial .

Moreover,

since we

have seen that this dissatisfaction becomes potentially
radical only with the advent of doctrines which hold out
the possibility of redemption in a transfigured reality
beyond history, the necessary conditions for the expansion
of

pneuma-pathological

antiquity

rather

than

disorientation

within

arise

modernity.

within

Among

these

traditions Christianity has proven to be the most powerful
accelerant in the expansion process.

Voegelin attributes

the "popularization" of disordered consciousness in modern
society not
Christianity,

to

a

decline of the cultural

influence of

but rather to the spread of its influence

during the late Middle Ages:

"The more people are drawn

into the Christian orbit, the greater will be the number
among them who do not have the spiritual stamina for the
heroic

adventure

of

the

soul

that

is

Christianity. n20

Those who regard the excesses of the Age of Ideology as
the logical consequence of a fall from Christianity will
be no more pleased with Voegelin's argument than those who
consider the Age a triumph over the Christian past:
Considering

the

history

of

Gnosticism,21

20voegelin, The New Science of Politics:
duction {1952), p. 123.

with

the

An Intro-

2lvoegelin's use of this term, which roughly
parallels the generic usage of "pneumapathological
consciousness" in these pages, will be discussed below.
Voegelin's most extensive discussions of the concept {and
the historical tradition) are in Science, Politics and
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great bulk of its manifestations belonging to, or
deriving from, the Christian orbit, I am inclined to
recognize in the epiphany of Christ the great catalyst
that made eschatological consciousness an historical
force both in forming and deforming humanity.22
Although certain forms of pneumapathological consciousness
precede the epiphany of Christ
faith

of

Isaiah2 3

and

the

(such as the metastatic

disorders

diagnosed

by

the

ancient Greeks), Voegelin held that "explicit persistence
in the state of alienation [characteristic of parousiasm
and

ideological

consciousness]

is

possible

only

after

Christianity has differentiated the problem of existence-a relation of man to the unknown God who is not intracosmic (as the polytheistic type is) but extra-cosmic. 11 24
The epiphany of Christ thus represents the break
which

periodizes

the

history

of

pneumapathological

consciousness, rather than the distinction between modern
and

pre-modern

identification

eras.
of

this

If

we

break

incorporate
in

Voegelin's

history

with

the

distinction he has drawn between the two characteristic
Gnosticism (1968), pp. 3-12, 53-59, 83-103, and The New
Science of Politics:
An Introduction (1952), pp. 107-32.
See also James L. Wiser, "From Cultural Analysis to
Philosophical Anthro-pology: An Examination of Voegelin's
Concept of Gnosticism," Review of Politics (vol. XLII,
1980, pp. 92-104), passim.
22voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 20.
23see Voegelin, Israel and Revelation
476-501; The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 25-27.

(1956),

pp.

24voegelin, Conversations with Eric Voegelin .(1980),
p. 80.
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paths of escape
possible

to

from "existence-in-tension,"

construct

distinguish

the

a

major

diagram
forms

which

of

it becomes

will

help

to

pneumapathological

disorientation:

B.C.

A.D.

Eclipse
of
Worldly
Reality

Metastatic
Faith

Parousiasm

Closure
against
Transcendent
Experience

Promethean
Revolt

<

Pneumapathological
Disorientation

Ideological
Consciousness

It should be emphasized that not every thinker in whom
Voegelin discerned pneumapathological tendencies will fall
neatly into one or another of the cells in this diagram.
Voegelin' s

distinction along the vertical axis,

diagram as

a

whole,

suggestions.

The

"imbalanced"
experience

should be thought of as heuristic
two

characteristic

consciousness--closure
and

and the

eclipse

of

worldly

observable in a single writer.

against

patterns

of

transcendent

reality--are

often

It could be argued,

for

example, that an ideologist such as Marx has fallen into
either

or

contempt

both

for

all

patterns

of

imbalance.

His

speculation on transcendent

manifest
realms of

being would seem to place him in the lower right cell,
whereas a parousiastic disregard of worldly reality would

19
seem to underlie his vision of a communistic future in
which humanity will "succeed in ridding itself of all the
muck of ages.n25
to

be

The horizontal axis will also not prove

inflexible,

parousiastic

except

writers

in

borrowed

a

formal

heavily

sense,

from

the

since
Jewish

apocalyptic and messianic traditions,2 6 just as the symbol
of a chosen people reappears in modern fascism and Marx
makes Prometheus "the foremost saint and martyr in the
philosopher's calendar.n27
Since

pneumapathological

manifestation

of

disorientation

"existence-in-revolt"

is

against

a
the

spiritual demands of "existence-in-tension," it is perhaps
not

surprising

efforts
developed

to

that

ideologists

symbolize

for

the

the

revolt,

expression

of

Voegelin argued that this is a
symbolism.

For

example,

have

the

turned,
to

that

in their

those
very

symbols
tension.

constant in ideological
Christian

symbol

of

the

"approaching Kingdom" is transposed and hypostatized into
the

Hegelian

"end

of

history,"

the

25Marx and Engels, The German
Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 60.

Marxism
Ideology

"realm

of

(Moscow:

26see Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium:
Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the
Middle Ages (Revised and Expanded Edition, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1970), pp. 19-36.
27Marx,
"Preface," to doctoral thesis,
"The
Difference Between Democritus' and Epicurus' Philosophy of
Nature, 11 in David McLellan, ed., Karl Marx:
Selected
Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 13.

20

freedom," the National Socialist "Drittes Reich," or the
comtean "positivistic age of Mankind."

Similarly,

the

"redemption of man" is transposed into a politically or
altered

scientifically

human

nature,

and

philosophical/theological searching for the order of being
is transposed into a scientific knowledge of the laws of
nature and history.
Of course, the identification of symbolic parallels
does not

lay to rest the question of whether Voegelin

succeeded in establishing a

relationship between modern

ideological

the

activism

and

disordered consciousness.
a

prominent

place

in

pre-modern

forms

of

This question must be accorded

any

comprehensive

Voegelin's diagnostic analyses,

evaluation

and although a

of

detailed

examination must be reserved for the fourth chapter,

it

may be helpful at this point to identify several of the
central

issues.

It is likely that,

as Voegelin' s work

becomes more widely known, criticism will revolve around
the

difficulties

particular

involved

thinkers

as

in

his

attempt

spiritually

to

diseased

diagnose
and

the

further difficulty of relating such an analysis to ancient
forms of disease.
been

suggested

example,

in

These lines of criticism have already
the

literature

on

Voegelin.

For

to speak of thinkers of the stature of Hegel,

Marx and Nietzsche as spiritually diseased, as sorcerers

21
and magicians,28 is a step that even some of Voegelin's
most sympathetic commentators are unwilling to take.29
It

may

seem

as

though

Voegelin

fell

into

an

enormous error by applying age-old categories of analysis
to

distinctly

modern

phenomena.

However,

far

from

betraying uneasiness over the apparent antiquity of his
basic thesis, Voegelin regarded this as the surest form of
corroboration.

For

the

only

significant

test

of

philosophical propositions concerns not their originality
but their truth, and for Voegelin "the test of truth, to
put it pointedly, will be the lack of originality in the
propositions: 11 30
The validating question will have to be:
Do we have
to ignore and eclipse a major part of the historical
field,
in order to maintain the truth of the
propositions, as the fundamentalist adherents of this
or that ideological doctrine must do; or are the
propositions recognizably equivalent with the symbols
created by our predecessors in the search of truth
about human existence?31
If

this,

then,

is

the

standard

to

which

Voegelin's

28voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A
Meditation" (1981), esp. pp. 243-44; "On Hegel:
A Study
in Sorcery" (1971), passim.
29For example,
Dante Germino,
"Eric Voegelin's
Framework for Political Evaluation in His Recently
Published Work," American Political Science Review (vol.
LXXII, pp. 110-21), p. 118, 29n.
30voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience and Symbolization in History," Eternita e Storia, I valori
permanenti nel divenire storico (Florence: Valecchi, pp.
215-34), p. 222.
31rbid.
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diagnosis of modernity should be held, it is nevertheless
far

from

simply

clear

because

that
the

a

positive

test

was

evaluation

of his

is

assured

own making.

The

central issues can be framed in the terms of Voegelin' s
test:

Has he ignored and eclipsed the modern part of the

historical

field

by

"de-modernizing"

voegelin's

propositions

regarding

ideology?

modern

Are

ideologies

in

fact recognizably equivalent with the symbols created by
those

he

referred to as

his

predecessors?

Is modern

ideological consciousness recognizably equivalent with the
phenomena

described

equivalence

so

theoretical

virtue,

in

strong

their

that

or has

writings?

Is

"unoriginality"
Voegelin

made

a

this

becomes

a

virtue

of

necessity?
The strength of this claimed equivalence must be
measured by reference to the original sources, but in a
manner

which

experience
writings

takes

and

into

account

symbolization.

expressive

of

Voegelin's

According

spiritual

to

theory

Voegelin,

disorientation

whether modern or pre-modern, to incorporate:

of

tend,

(a) symbols

engendered by distorted reactions to experiences of the
world

common to

all

mankind32

and

(b)

deformations

of

symbols engendered by experiences of transcendent reality

32voegelin, The New Science of Politics:
An Introduction (1952), p. 167; The World of the Polis (1957), p.
216; "History and Gnosis" (1969), p. 82.
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Voegelin argued that an

not shared by the deformers. 3 3
equivalence

can

be

detected

among

patterns of their deformation,
which they are engendered.

these

symbols,

the

and the experiences from

Yet it should not be expected

that equivalence will take the form of strict doctrinal
reproduction, because experiences and symbols of the world
and

of

transcendent

"compactness"

and

reality

vary

in

terms
For

"differentiation."

of

their

example,

the

Christian symbol of "God" is more differentiated than the
intra-mundane

"gods"

consciousness

which

Prometheus)

and

of
hates

seeks

ancient
the

Greece.

gods

to make man

(e.g.,
the

Thus,

the

Aeschylus'

measure

of

all

things will express itself somewhat differently than the
atheistic consciousness characteristic of modern ideology,
which revolts against a more differentiated background.
That a certain equivalence may be present nevertheless is
suggested by Marx's praise of Prometheus:
The proclamation of Prometheus--"in a word, I hate all
the gods"--is [philosophy's] own profession, her own
slogan against all the gods of heaven and earth who do
not recognize man's self consciousness as the highest

33voegelin, The New Science of Politics:
An Introduction ( 1952) , pp. 64-65:
"Theory as an explication of
experiences is intelligible only to those in whom the
explication will stir up parallel experiences as the
empirical basis for testing the truth of the theory.
Unless
a
theoretical
exposition activates the
corresponding experiences at least to a degree, it will
create the impression of empty talk or will perhaps be
rejected as an irrelevant expression of subjective opinions."

24
divinity.

There shall be none other beside it.34

voegelin persuasively maintains that Marx has transposed
the Prometheus symbol of Aeschylus by failing to note the
response

of

Hermes

("it

strikes

me

as

no

small

madness 11 35), and Marx clearly felt a certain affinity with
the Prometheus of his own making.

Yet there remains the

question of how Voegelin can demonstrate that disorders
such as those known to Aeschylus are related to those he
finds in the ideological activism of our own time.

His

attempt was premised upon the possibility of discovering
the

experiences

(e.g.

alienation,

I

hubris,

libido

dominandi, chiliasm, etc.) which lie "beneath" the symbols
utilized

for

expression

of

disordered consciousness.
hermeneutical

task,

results

be

can

and

a

particular

pattern

This is, at best, a difficult
neither

vindicated

the

apart

procedure

nor

from

extended

an

presentation of Voegelin's theory of consciousness,
philosophical

anthropology,

and his

relation of history to theory.
chapter
problem,
reduced

of

this

since
to

an

of

dissertation

Voegelin's

perspective

his

on the

A section of the fourth
will

be

diagnostic

untheoretical

the

mash

of

devoted

lexicon

to

could

invective

if

the
be
his

34Marx, "Preface" to doctoral thesis, in McLellan,
ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
35Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 977.
Cf. Voegelin,
The World of the Polis (1957), pp. 253-64; Conversations
with Eric Voeqelin, pp. 80-81.
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exigetical procedure cannot be justified.

While I am not

of the opinion that so harsh a conclusion is warranted,
there is a very real danger that less cautious polemicists
will

invoke

Voegelin's

categories

without

troubling

themselves over the difficulties involved in establishing
the presence of spiritual disease in the objects of their
Note

ridicule.

Voegelin's

awareness

of

these

difficulties:
I
am speaking cautiously of a
suspension of
consciousness because it frequently is difficult, if
not impossible, to determine in the case of an
individual activist whether the suspension is an act
of intellectual fraud or of persuasive self-deception,
whether it is a case of plain illiteracy or of the
more sophisticated
illiteracy imposed by an
educational system, whether it is caused by a degree
of spiritual and intellectual insensitivity that comes
under the head of stupidity, or whether it is due to
various combinations of these and other factors such
as the desire to attract public attention and make a
career.36
The possibility of misuse of Voegelin's diagnostic
categories is enhanced by their eminent suitability for
polemical

purposes.

Since

thinker's

work

be

could

a

detailed

considered

analysis

superfluous

of

a

after

pathological disorders are found lying behind his thought,
reference

to

Voegelin's

conclusions

might

easily

be

considered a convenient substitute for careful criticism.
In light of the

large

investment of time required for

careful criticism of figures such as Marx or Hegel, the
36voegelin, Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme:
Meditation (1981), p. 236.

A
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attractiveness of such a short-cut for those not enamored
of Marxism or Hegelianism is apparent.
seem

justifiable,

as

Voegelin

This tack may even

himself

intentionally

avoided point-by-point refutations of ideologists, largely
because he viewed the errors which vitiate their work as
deliberate: 37
If we were to accept the activist's counter-image as
the "theory" it claims to be, as a theory to be
verified or falsified on the positivistic level, we
would play the activist's game, even if our evaluation
of the details should turn out to be devastatingly
negative •.•. [P]henomena of this class must certainly
not be neglected in specialized studies of such
counter-images •... Nevertheless,
they
are of
symptomatic importance only and must not analytically
obscure the intended analytical obscurity of the
activist dreamer.
Only if we disengage the dream
story from the complicated counter-image can we bring
the truly theoretical issue of reality and imaginative
dreaming into focus.38
37voegelin, science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968),
pp. 23-28; "The Eclipse of Reality," in Maurice Natanson,
ed.,
Phenomenology and Social Reality
(The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff,
1970, pp.
185-194), pp.
188-89;
"Remembrance of Things Past," in Anamnesis (1978), pp. 39; "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme:
A Meditation"
(1981), pp. 235-39.
38voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A
Meditation" (1981), p. 239. The point is also made, less
reservedly, in Anamnesis:
"A true scholar has better
things to do than to engage in futile debate with men who
are guilty of the aspernatio rationis.
The revel t at
large has not become vociferous enough, and perhaps never
will, to match the paranoiac aggressiveness of the mental
cases, but it has become extensive enough to leave no
doubt that the restrictivist movements have maneuvered
themselves out of the empirical advance of the historical
and philosophical sciences." Pp. 8-9. Compare with, "On
Debate and Existence," Intercollegiate Review (vol. III,
1967, pp. 143-52), p. 144, where Voegelin argues that
debate is a philosophical obligation.
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The inevitable result of this decision to disengage the
consciousness of the dreamer from the particulars of the
dream is that the seriousness of the charges occasionally
seems incommensurate with the thoroughness of the analyses
This problem is, in Voegelin's case,

that support them.

often more apparent than real.

For example, only after a

section of the manuscript of Voegelin's massive History of
western Political

Thought written during the

1940s was

published in 1975 under the title, From Enlightenment to
Revolution did it become clear that the almost cryptic
reflections on certain modern figures in The New Science
of

Politics

based upon
writers
points

and
a

Science,

thorough

in question.
at

Voegelin

which

Politics

referred

Gnosticism were

familiarity with the period and
There are,

the

and

problem
in

is

nevertheless,
indeed

passing

to

real,

certain
as

"biologism"

when
or

"psychologism" as ideological inversions of human order.39
Those

who

are

versed

probably know what

in

the

is meant

uninitiated could hardly be

Voegelinian

corpus

in such passages,
faulted

for

will

but the

wondering what

thinkers Voegelin had in mind or how deeply ideological
elements had,

in his view, penetrated the disciplines of

psychology and biology.
theoretical

framework

One of the virtues of Voegelin's
is

that

it

helps

39voegelin, Israel and Revelation
From Enlightenment to Revolution, p. 69.

to

draw

(1956),

p..

into
xii;

28

clearer

relief

the

underlying

similarities

various

and

diverse

ideologies

of

the

among

age.

the

However,

there is reason to question whether the patterns of revolt
and disorientation highlighted
even

remotely

listed above.
J.

J.

equivalent

in his

prominence

framework are of
in

the

movements

Although there is some substance to Thomas

Altizer's

charge

that

"Professor Voegelin

finds

everything to be Gnostic, 11 40 it is hoped that, by getting
down to the specifics of Voegelin's analyses,
shown

that

together

his
and

approach
dismiss

should
modern

not

be

used

it can be
to

lump

intellectual/political

movements on grounds of their being all of one piece.
Voegelin's

intention

was

to

bring

into

focus

an

experiential unity often obscured by the "dogmatomachy" of
inter-ideological
Voegelin

not

squabbles.
only

experiential unity,

It

succeeded

but also,

will
in

be

argued

clarifying

that
this

by basing his analysis of

ideology on a theory of consciousness and human nature,
made it possible to account for the motivations underlying
the construction of such systems as well as the extremes
to which the rank and file have gone in order to actualize
them.
closed

Moreover,

Voegelin's

consciousness

can

be

concept

of

persuasively

pathologically
applied

to

a

40Quoted by John William Corrington in "Order and
History:
The Breaking of the Program," Denver Quarterly
(vol. X, 1975, pp. 115-22), p. 122.
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remarkably wide range of phenomena across cultures, across
time,

and

across

differences

such

as

those

between

ideological theoreticians, epigones and functionaries.
Yet, just as Voegelin's diagnostic analyses may be
prone to misuse, his conceptual innovations may give rise
to some measure of confusion.

From his first writings to

his last, Voegelin complained of the lack of a developed
terminology for dealing with the phenomena associated with
pneumapathological
experimented
adjectival

with

consciousness.41
a

terms.

wide

variety

Somewhat

Accordingly,

he

conceptual

and

of

distressingly,

however,

voegelin never settled upon a particular framework.

As a

result, the theoretical distinctions implied by his use of
terms

are

in

unarticulated.

certain
For

important

example,

when

instances

vague

or

Voegelin

refers

to

Isaiah and modern ideologues as "brothers under the skin,"
and of the latter as "descendants of the prophetic faith
in

a

transfiguration

important

distinction

of

the

between

world, 11 42

the

pre-

post-Christian

patterns of revolt becomes obscure.

and

otherwise

Also obscured is the

difference between the expectation of divine intervention
4lvoegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975),
p.
263; Review:
Hannah Arendt,
The Origins of
Totalitarianism (with a reply by Hannah Arendt and a
concluding remark by Voegelin), Review of Politics (vol.
XV, 1953, pp. 68-85), p. 68; "Wisdom and the Magic of the
Extreme: A Meditation" (1981), p. 261.
42voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xiii.
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in political events, on the one hand, and modern attempts
to

"murder

other.

God 11

and

"immanentize the

eschaton"

on

the

An Isaiah and a Marx are "brothers under the skin"

only in the sense that both seem to have lost the "balance
of consciousness;" the direction and consequences of their
respective
Finally,

we

imbalance
might

are,

wish

however,

vastly

know

what

to

in

different.

sense

modern

ideologues are "descendants" of the prophetic faith in a
metastatic transfiguration of the world.
or unwitting descendants?
had in mind,

Are they witting

If the latter is what Voegelin

as is presumably the case, but the sources

and nature of their expected metastases are poles apart,
is it not misleading to describe their relation in terms
of kinship?
While Voegelin's basic argument is relatively free
of

inconsistencies,

his

use

often surprisingly indefinite.

of

terms

and

analogies

is

Concepts announced in one

work fail to appear in the next,43 distinctions drawn at
one point are not developed or applied at others, 44 and
terms which arise

in differing contexts are often used

4 3 E. g., "modern Prometheanism," from =T=h=e"--'N'-'-e=w....._-=s....c=i:..;e=n=c=e
of Politics:
An Introduction (1952), p. 254; "social
Satanism," from From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975),
pp. 71, 195.
44E.g., those between teleological, axiological and
activist immanentization, and intellectual, emotional and
volitional gnosticism from The New Science of Politics:
An Introduction (1952), pp. 124, 175, which do not,. to my
knowledge, reappear in any subsequent work.
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interchangeably. 4 5

One is forced to wonder why Voegelin,

who was a very careful writer, would not have been more
rigorous

in the specification of his conceptual tools--

especially in light of his frequent references to the need
Not having an answer at

for a diagnostic terminology.

hand, and at the risk of violating some hidden intention,
I

submit

that

both

the

strengths

and

weaknesses

of

voegelin's argument will be easier to discern when treated
within the conceptual

scheme presented

in diagram form

above.
The

most serious terminological

problem presents

itself with Voegelin's use of the concept of gnosticism,
which was usually employed in the same generic fashion
that I have used "pneumapathological consciousness."
siderable
adjective

confusion
"gnostic"

has

resulted

means

that

as
a

to

whether

thinker

has

conthe
been

influenced by historical Gnosticism or merely thinks along
analogous

lines.

introduced

with

Further
the

discovery

complications
of

the

have

Coptic

been

Gnostic

45 For example, the following terms are among those
utilized as apparent synonyms for ideology or gnosticism
at
various
points
in
Voegelin's
writings:
Pneumapathology, activist dreaming, egophantic revolt,
metastatic faith, activist mysticism, demonic mendacity,
Prometheanism,
parousiasm, political religion, .social
Satanism, magic pneumatism, eristics.
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library at Nag Hammadi in Egypt, 46 which suggested that
the classical form of Gnosticism tended toward rejection
of the world rather than its transformation.47
had

previously

used

tendencies, and thus,
strand
alchemy

in

Unfortunately,

magic

to

denote

both

in order to account for the latter

modernity,

and

"gnosticism"

Voegelin

as

however,

recently

spoke

being

comparable

of

of

hermeticism,
importance.

Voegelin had yet to make fully

clear his views on the influence wielded by these elements
at the time of his death in January,

1985.

The works

which Voegelin cited in this context (by Frances Yates and
Mircea Eliade 48 ) do not in and of themselves clarify the
46English translation, The Nag Hammadi Library in
English (James M. Robinson, ed.) (San Francisco:
Harper
and Row, 1977).
47stephen A. McKnight, "Understanding Modernity:
A
Reappraisal of the Gnostic Element," Intercollegiate
Review (Spring, 1979, pp. 107-117), pp. 107-109; Eugene
Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History, op. cit., p.
201.
48Mircea Eliade, The Forge and the Crucible (Stephen
Corrin, trans.) (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1962);
Frances A.
Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic
Tradition (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964).
Voegelin makes brief mention of these works on pages 193
and 194 of his "Response to Professor Altizer' s 'A New
History and a New But Ancient God?'" in Ellis Sandoz, ed.,
Eric Voegelin's Thought:
A Critical Appraisal, op. cit.
Voegelin concludes his comments on the books of Eliade and
Yates by stating "their obvious implication:
the
contemporary disorder will appear in a rather new light
when we leave the 'climate of opinion' and, adopting the
perspective of the historical sciences, acknowledge the
problems of 'modernity' to be caused by the predominance
of Gnostic, Hermetic and alchemistic conceits, as well as
by the Magic of violence as the means for transforming
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reasons

why

alchemy

Voegelin

and

magic

would
so

have

thought

important

ideological consciousness.

for

hermeticism,
understanding

Yates and El iade do indeed

suggest that these traditions may have been important in
the development of the worldview characteristic of modern
science,

but

this

thesis

is

not

without

its

informed

detractors,49 and the connections between modern science
and modern ideology are not explicitly drawn by Voegelin
(or Yates or Eliade).

In any event, it is clear that none

of these traditions can serve as a replacement for the
overarching uses to which Voegelin once put the concept of
gnosticism, i.e., as including both rejection of the world
and insistence upon its trans-formation.
Eugene Webb has proposed,
problem,

capitalizing

the

movement

while

the

movements

based

using
on

claims

name
term
to

as a

way out of this

of the

ancient

"gnosticism"
gnosis

of

any

Gnostic

for

"all

sort. 11 50

Leaving questions of (over) inclusiveness aside, along with
the confusion this practice might occasion, Webb gives us
reality."
49cf., e.g., Roberts. Westman, "Magical Reform and
Astronomical Reform:
The Yates Thesis Reconsidered," and
J.
E. McGuire, "Neoplatonism and Active .Principles:
Newton and the Corpus Hermeticum," in Hermeticism and the
Scientific Revolution (Los Angeles:
Clark Memorial
Library), 1977.
5 0 Eugene Webb , =E=r'""'....i c~_V-'-""o'""e;...;;g""'e""'l""'1=·n="'-:---'P;..h=i=l:...:o'""s::;.;:o::;.,ip;::;.:h=e=r---'o::;..:.f
History, op. cit., p. 201.

,.

'
,

·,

'

''·' \
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reason to doubt the helpfulness of his distinction less
than a page later when he argues for a link between Marx
and Gnosticism.

He points out that Marx was an admirer of

Thomas Muntzer and that Muntzer was an admirer of Joachim
of Fiore, who in turn is said to have been influenced by
Gnostic texts. 51
Gnostic?
of

the

So is Marx a gnostic or an historical

Moreover, it would seem that a case such as that
metastatic

faith

of

Isaiah

could

be

termed

"gnostic" only by invoking a very liberal notion of poetic
There is certainly something problematic about

license.
speaking

of

historical

gnostic

tendencies

Gnosticism,

and

if

prior to

the

advent

the

of

suggesting

game

of

chains of literary influence can be made to work with Marx
it will certainly not work with Isaiah.

Any attempt to

patch-up the concept of gnosticism as a generic term by
dispensing with pre-Gnostic phenomena would not only have
to

ignore

Voegelin's

comments

significance of metastatic

faith, 52

on

the

continuing

but would

also run

contrary to the basic thrust of Voegelin's argument, viz.,
that disordered consciousness arises not from Gnosticism
but from the tensions inherent in the human condition.
Since Voegelin mentioned late in life that he would
probably not use the

concept of gnosticism if he were

51Ibid., pp. 201-202.
52voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956),
454; The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 26-27.

pp.

xiii,
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starting over again, 53 I
break

with

the

pathological

term

think it best to make a clean

and

use

consciousness

or

the

concept

of

disorientation

incorporate the entire set of Voegelin' s

pneuma-

so

as

to

While

terms.

these are admittedly rather inelegant neologisms, they are
nevertheless more faithful to Voegelin's basic thesis than
any alternative of which I am aware.

"Psychopathological"

would be somewhat easier on the contemporary ear, but that
is precisely the problem, since "psyche" has come to mean
something
ancient

quite
Greek

(Freudian

or

different

in

common

Since

connotations.

otherwise)

was

parlance

itself,

than

its

psychoanalysis

for

Voegelin,

an

ideologically-charged symbol, 54 "psychopathological 11 will
clearly not suit our purposes.
replace

psyche

without

ideological baggage.

"Pneuma," or spirit, can

bringing

in

its

wake

similar

"Consciousness" must be appended to

avoid the misimpression that physiological or ontological
states are in question,
stress

on

disorder

experience
in

"consciousness"

human
could

as well as to retain Voegelin's

as

the

source

of

existence.
appear

to

both

Since
lack

order
the

content

if

and
term
used

repeatedly in this context, "disorientation" will also be
53Quoted in Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin:
of History, op. cit., p. 200.

Philosopher

5 4 voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968),
p. 83; Conversations with Eric Voegelin (1980), pp. 28-9.
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employed

to

emphasize

consciousness

we

the

are

departure

examining

of

the

forms

from

the

of

balanced

orientation of consciousness in the "In-Between" of the
metaxy.
The

following

chapter

will

open

with

an

introduction to Voegel in' s understanding of well-ordered
consciousness, which will provide a point of departure for
our analysis of disordered patterns of consciousness.

The

patterns which have been categorized as metastatic faith
and Prometheanism will also be discussed in the second
along

chapter,

with

Plato's

search

for

a

socially

effective remedy for the noses, or disease, of the soul.
Chapter

three

analysis

of

will

the

be

devoted

relationship

spiritual disorientation.

to

parousiasm

between

and

Christianity

an
and

Voegelin's attempt to establish

an essential equivalence among ideologies will be examined
in the

fourth

chapter,

along with his

argument

for

a

continuity between ideological consciousness and earlier
patterns of disorder.
to

"furnish

the

remedy"

modernity

"through

undertaken

in

the

An assessment of Voegelin's effort
for

the

therapeutic

fifth

and final

political
analysis"55
chapter,

crisis

of

will

be

which will

conclude with an evaluation of Voegelin's project as a whole.

55voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968),
p. 83.

CHAPrER II
THE ETIOLOGY OF PNEUMAPATHOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

For Voegelin the movement toward truth starts from
a person's awareness of his or her existence in "untruth."
Yet the process through which one gains an awareness of
modes of existence in untruth is not a "given" in human
experience;

it is raised to the level of consciousness

only during the movement toward truth.
of

pneumapathological

consciousness

Thus, the origins
are

difficult

to

distinguish from the origins of healthy or well-ordered
consciousness.
would

be

as

On

the

correct

to

basis of Voegelin' s
say

that

the

thought

disordered

it

soul

"discovers" the patterns of spiritual order as to say that
the

well-ordered

soul

discovers

the

nature

of

its

disordered former existence (or its unhealthy counterparts
in the surrounding environment).

These are probably not

distinct events so much as correlative insights from a
single experience:
From the depth of the psyche wells up life and order
when historically, in the surrounding society, the
souls have sunk into the depth of death and disorder.
From the depth comes the force that drags the
philosopher's soul up to the light, so that it is
difficult to say whether the upper There is the source
of his truth, or the nether There that forced him up.1

lvoegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 62
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The disordered soul cannot be recognized as such prior to
the

emergence

of

its

opposite.

Its

existence

can

be

retrospectively postulated from accounts of the "leaps in
being," which portray ignorance and disorientation as the
background for new differentiations of the truth of the
soul.

But it cannot be analyzed until the differentiation

is achieved, and the diagnosis cannot be justified except
by

comparison

to

the

soul

which

is

reformed

by

the

achievement.
It was shown in the preceding chapter that Voegelin
considered pneumapathological consciousness an historical
constant which can be related to certain aspects of the
human condition.

This is, however, a conclusion and not a

Only rarely did Voegelin stray from analysis of

premise.

historical materials to off er general observations of this
kind,
forth.

and

then

only

after the materials

had

been

set

His writings have a strongly empirical flavor, 2

2Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution:
A Biographical Introduction, p. 194:
"Voegelin's noetic
science rests squarely on reality experienced not as an
abstract position or principle, but as a necessity
dictated by the facts themselves.
The reality of the
discussion is the comprehensive reality of science,
delimited by the insight that the only reality is the one
known experientially or imaginatively extrapolated from
direct experience.
The symbols of noesis, he repeatedly
stresses, are not something found floating in thin air.
Rather they are tied to (engendered by) specific events
reported by specific men in whom the experiences
occur ..•. For this reason Voegelin's work is laden with the
historiographic materials through which his "experiential
analysis" (which contrasts with phenotypical analysis)
proceeds in the back-and-forth zigzag of reiteration and
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which would be lost if we were to treat the varieties of
pneumapathological consciousness apart from the historical
conditions in which they appear.

Voegelin's method offers

no encouragement to those who would like to get at the
origins of spiritual disorder per se.

He did not, and we

shall not, attempt to push the search for the origins of
pneumapathological
time

when

superior

disorientation

diagnoses
orientation

from

a

emerge.

beyond

position

the
of

Metastatic

points

in

purportedly
faith

and

prometheanism will therefore be analyzed in this chapter
against

the

background

of

the

specific

tensions

which

occasioned these forms of existence-in-revolt.
With these caveats having been stated, some general
comments are in order regarding Voegelin's reflections on
healthy
the

(or open or balanced)

particular

understood
particular

varieties

by Voegelin

as

symbolizations

of

consciousness.

existence-in-revolt

spiritual
of

For while

truth,

rebellions
the

were

against

Israelitic,

Hellenic and Christian symbolizations need not be strictly
isolated.

one of Voegelin's most important theses is that

these symbolisms are essentially equivalent, despite their
phenotypical differences, because they refer recognizably

reflective reconsideration of texts and problems."
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to the same structures in reality. 3

There is only one

reality, but it may be symbolized in a manifold of forms,
none of which is ever fully adequate to or exhaustive of
its

rich

and mysterious

nature.

Myth,

philosophy and

revelation are examples of such symbolic forms.

They vary

in terms of differentiation, and arise at different times
in history, but the latter and more differentiated do not

3voegelin,
"Equivalences of Experience and Symbolization in History" (1970), passim; The Ecumenic Age
(1974), pp. 7-11, 188-92, 249-55. It is important to note
at this point that "equivalence" does not imply identity
in voegelin's work. Something is gained--and lost--in the
historical sequence that leads from cosmogonic myth to
revelation to philosophy to Christianity, and it would be
a grave error to assume that, since these symbolic forms
are for Voegelin structurally equivalent, they are also
interchangeable.
This point is made most forcefully in
voegelin' s comparison of the alethes logos in Book I of
Plato's Laws with the "saving tale of divine Incarnation,
Death and Resurrection" from the Gospels:
"It [the
'saving tale'] is richer by the missionary fervor of its
spiritual universalism, poorer by its neglect of noetic
control; broader by its appeal to the inarticulate
humanity of the common man, more restricted by its bias
against the articulate wisdom of the wise; more imposing
through its imperial tone of divine authority, more
imbalanced through its apocalyptic ferocity, which leads
to conflicts with the conditions of man's existence in
society; more compact through its generous absorption of
earlier strata of mythical imagination, especially through
the reception of Israelite historiogenesis and the
exuberance of miracle-working, more differentiated through
the intensely articulate experience of loving-divine
action in the illumination of existence with truth." "The
Gospel and Culture," in D. Miller and D. G. Hadidian,
eds., Jesus and Man's Hope (Pittsburgh:
Pittsburgh
Theological Seminary Press, 1971, pp. 59-101), p. 77. See
also "On Chris-tianity," (reply to a letter from Alfred
Schutz, January 1, 1953) in Peter J. Opitz and Gregor
Sebba, eds., The Philosophy of Order: Essays on History,
Consciousness and Politics (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1981,
pp. 449-57), pp. 450-51.

41
simply supercede the earlier and more compact.

Mythical

patterns

part

of

symbolization

play

an

important

in

Platonism and Christianity, 4 and should not be regarded as
regressive or untrue since certain types of experiences
And just as late truths

cannot otherwise be expressed.

may be expressed in early forms of symbolization,

early

symbolisms may contain, in germinal form, a truth which is
differentiated in subsequent symbolisms.5
The constraints imposed by the scope of the present
study

will

not

permit

an

extended

treatment

of

this

controversial line of argument, but two points should be
noted.

First, the argument for essential equivalence will

allow us to summarize Voegelin' s perspective on balanced
consciousness

without

historiography.
decisively

violating

the

principles

of

his

Second, the argument for equivalence is
(a)

the

generic concept of pneumapathological consciousness,

(b)

the thesis

important

that

such

for

the

justification of

consciousness

is grounded in the

human condition rather than transitory circumstances, and
(c) the proposition that the history of such consciousness
4voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp.
Conversations with Eric Voegelin, (1980), p. 27.

224-27;

5 For example, Voegelin argued that "one has to
recognize, and make intelligible, the presence of Christ
in a Babylonian hymn, or a Taoist speculation, or a
Platonic dialogue,
just as much as in a gospel."
"Response of Professor Altizer's 'A New History and a New
but Ancient God?'" in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's
Thought: A Critical Appraisal, p. 191.
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is characterized by an unbroken continuum of movements.
For

if

no

equivalence

revelation

and

exists

between,

Greek philosophy,

say,

patterns

Israelitic

of

rebellion

against these traditions would have to be treated as sui
generis and the principles underlying this
rightly

be

deemed

arbitrary.

Although

study could

this

potential

problem must be acknowledged it cannot be resolved with
anything short of a book-length examination.

Yet a modest

contribution will nevertheless be possible if we adopt an
alternative strategy, assuming some measure of equivalence
in the traditions and searching for equivalence in the
corresponding patterns of revolt.
According to Voegelin,

the truth of the soul,

or

what we have ref erred to as open,

heal thy or balanced

consciousness,

definite

was

"discovered"

at

points

in

history by particular individuals in certain societies.
It is not part of the human birthright, to be retained or
squandered, nor is it created through ingenuity.
Voegelin

noted

"materially

too

theoreticos, 1t6
emergence

of

he
the

that

a

cramped
did

primitive
to

not

epochal,

leave
attempt

tribal
room
to

is

village

for

account

differentiating

Although

the

bios

for

insights

reference to material or cultural preconditions.

the
by

In fact,

there is a sense in which he did not attempt to "explain"
6voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. 217.
also The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 306.

See
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their emergence
mystery

in

the

at all,

since he

structure

questions are referred to

of

regarded this as the
The

history.

following

in The Ecumenic Age as "the

Question":
(1) Why should there be epochs of advancing insight at
all? why is the structure of reality not known in
differentiated form at all times?
(2) Why must the insights be discovered by such rare
individuals as prophets, philosophers and saints? why
is not every man the recipient of the insights?
(3) Why when the insights are gained, are they not
generally accepted? why must the epochal truth go
through the historical torment of imperfect
articulation,
evasion,
skepticism,
disbelief,
rejection,
deformation,
and of renaissances,
renovations,
rediscoveries,
rearticulations,
and
further differentiations? 7
These questions,

Voegelin argued,

"are not meant to be

answered; on the contrary, they symbolize the mystery in
the structure of history by their unanswerability. 11 8
cannot

be

answered because the

They

insights gained by the

prophets, philosophers and saints were not the result of
autonomous
"theophantic

projects

of

action

but

events"

or

"spiritual

responses

to

outbursts"

or

"hierophantic events" (or the persuasive communication of
such

events

by others) . 9

The human

participant

in

a

theophantic event can respond by questioning or searching,
but the revelatory movement from the divine ground is not
7 voegelin, The Ecumenic Age
"History and Gnosis" (1969), p. 76.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., pp. 5, 11, 217.

(1974).

See

also

44

Thus, the accounts we possess of such

at one's command.
events

do

not

spell

out

methods

of

rather, experiences of participation.
paul were

preparation

but,

Moses, Socrates and

acutely sensitive to their

own unworthiness.

Their special merit was that of openness, not of personal
achievement.
since the symbols and engendering experiences of
prophets,
voegelin,

philosophers

and

saints

structurally equivalent,

are,

according

to

it should be possible

to turn to any of these three human types as exemplars of
balanced consciousness.

Yet,

Voegelin argued that "the

adequate articulation and symbolization of the questioning
consciousness is the epochal feat of the philosophers, 11 10
and thus we will concentrate upon philosophical symbols of
health,
and

openness and balance,

Aristotle.

Voegelin

especially those of Plato

found

within

Platonic

and

Aristotelian thought a coherent body of language symbols
that signify the various stages in the development of the
philosopher's consciousness.
of

symbols

which

express

There is,
the

restless wondering:

wondering

searching

search

(aporein,

(zetein),

diaporein).11

lOvoegelin, "Reason:
Anamnesis (1978); p. 93.
11 Ibid.

initial

and

philosopher

The

Classic

the group

experience

(thaumazein) ,

(zetesis),

The

first,

of

seeking or
questioning

feels

himself

Experience,"

in
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moved (kinein) by some unknown force to ask the questions
of

which

the

(belkein)

search

into

the

consists;
search.

he

feels

This

is

himself
the

drawn

experience

recounted in the famous cave allegory of Plato's Republic,
where the prisoner is forced by an unknown force to turn
around (periagoge) and begin his ascent to the light.
Aristotle's account seems to place somewhat greater
emphasis

on

ignorance,

the

philosopher's

but in Voegelin' s

perception

of

his

own

reading this perception is

not the first of a number of pieces of information but a
restless stirring within the soul.
argued,

For a person, Voegelin

"could not know that he does not know, unless he

experienced
ignorance
knowledge

an

existential

(pheugein

ten

(episteme). nl2

unrest

to
and

agnoian)

escape
to

from

the

search

for

Aristotle, no less than Plato,

finds the origin of the movement toward knowledge outside
the seeker:

"The mind (nous)

object (noeton).13
philosopher

is

is moved (kineitai) by the

The object which moves the mind of the

not an object

in

the external world of

things, but the transcendent ground of those things and of
the philosopher's own existence.
the

lover

of

wisdom

constitutes his nature,

And the ignorance that

perceives,

which

in

a

sense

is not an ignorance about things

12voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 190.
1 3Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1072a30; Voegelin's translation from The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 190.
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but of his own origins:
The search from the human side,
it appears,
presupposes the movement from the divine side:
without the kinesis, the attraction from the ground,
there is no desire to know, no questioning in
confusion, no knowledge of ignorance. There would be
no anxiety in the state of ignorance, unless anxiety
were alive with man's knowledge of his existence from
a ground that he is not himself.14
The

movement

from

the

divine

side

mentioned

in

this

passage--the pull from the ground that induces a search
for the ground--is the philosophical equivalent of the
"call 11 answered by the prophet and the saint.
repeatedly

inveighed

against

the

medieval

Voegelin

distinction

between natural reason and supernatural revelation, which
in his

view was

based upon

a

misunderstanding

of

the

mystical character of Platonic-Aristotelian noesis.15
Although

theophantic

events

are

mysteriously

reserved for prophets, philosophers and saints, rudiments
of the experiential complex which initiates the search for
the ground are bestowed upon all people by virtue of the
14voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 190.
15voegelin,
"Toynbee's History as a Search for
Truth," in Edward T. Gargan, ed., The Intent of Toynbee's
History (Chicago:
Loyola University Press, pp. 181-98),
pp. 196-98; "The Gospel and Culture" (1971), pp. 75, 77,
82; The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 48; Conversations with
Eric Voegelin (1980), p. 104; "Wisdom and the Magic of the
Extreme:
A Meditation" (1981), p. 256; "The Meditative
Origin of the Philosophical Knowledge of Order, 11 in F.
Lawrence, ed., The Beginning and the Beyond: Papers from
the Gadamer and Voegelin Conferences. Supplementary issue
of Lonergan Workshop, vol.
IV (Chico,
California:
Scholar's Press, pp. 35-39), pp. 44-47; In Search of Order
(1987), p. 43.
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natural powers of reasoning and questioning.

As Aristotle

stated in the first line of the Metaphysics, "all men by
nature desire to know, "

and paramount among the things

they wish to know about is their origin.
of contingency,
development

of

The experience

which is of decisive importance in the
philosophical

consciousness,

is

not

the

exclusive preserve of philosophers:
Man is not a self-created, autonomous being carrying
the origin and meaning of his existence within
himself.
He is not a divine causa sui; from the
experience of his life in precarious existence within
the limits of birth and death there rather arises the
wondering question about the ultimate ground, the
aitia or proto arche, of all reality and specifically
his own ..•. [T]his questioning is inherent in man's
experience of himself at all times .... 16
As was shown in the first chapter, Voegelin's distinction
between "open"

and

"closed"

consciousness

is

not based

upon the assertion that the ideologist is closed to this
class

of

experiences.

reactions

to

uncertainty.

such

Disorder is
experiences

evinced

of

contingency

and

If ignorance of the question of the ground

were the condition of most of humanity,
participants

in certain

in

theophantic

excepting only

events,

disordered

consciousness would be so widespread that it could not
really be called disordered.

And if the great majority of

humanity were held culpable for not being prophetic or
philosophical

or

saintly,

these

16 voegelin, "Reason:
The
Anamnesis (1978), pp. 92-93.

concepts
Classic

would

become

Experience,"

in
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meaningless as designations of distinct human types.
concept

of

exposure,

ideological
and

criticism

for

closure

Voegelin
those

presupposes

reserved

who,

like

his

Marx,

most

display

a

The
prior

strident
both

an

awareness of the problem of contingency and the requisite
facility for pursuing it.17
The

experiences

which

orient

humanity

to

the

immanent and transcendent poles of existence in the "InBetween"

of the metaxy,

and

from which the balance of

consciousness may be gained or lost, are thus not beyond
the

ken

of

the

majority

of

human

beings.

Although

adequate symbolization of these experiences can only be
achieved

by

those

possessing

extraordinary

gifts,

and

while the experiences are an existential precondition for
penetration of the symbols created by those who possess
such gifts,
we find ourselves referred back to nothing more
formidable than the experiences of finiteness and
creaturliness in our existence, of being creatures of
a day as the poets call man, of being born and bound
to die, of dissatisfaction with a state experienced as
imperfect, of apprehension of a perfection that is not
of this world but is the privilege of the gods, or
possible fulfillment in a state beyond this world, the
Platonic epekeina [Beyond], and so forth.18
Ideologues,

and

pneumapaths

in

general,

have

these

17cf. Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism
(1968), pp. 23-28; Marx, "Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts of 1844," in Early Writings (T. B. Bottomore,
ed. and trans.) (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963), pp. 165-67.
18voegelin, "On Debate and Existence" (1967), p. 146.
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experiences

but

revolt

against

their

finiteness

and

creaturliness, cannot adjust to the imperfection of their
seek

state,

perfection

without

regard

for

divine

privilege, and seek it not in a state beyond this world
but rather within this world.
According
tending

beyond

perfection

of

to

Voegelin,

his

the

human

divine

man

experiences

imperfection

ground

that

himself

toward

moves

him.

the
As

Plato's Socrates observes in the Symposium, the spiritual
man,

the daimonios aner, as he is moved in his quest of

the

ground,

ignorance.

moves

somewhere

between

knowledge

and

"The whole realm of the spiritual (daimonion}

is halfway indeed between (metaxy) god and man. 11 19

Thus,

Voegelin argued,
the in-between--the metaxy--is not an empty space
between the poles of the tension but the 'realm of the
spiritual'; it is the reality of 'man's converse with
the gods'
(Symposium,
202-203],
the mutual
participation (methexis, metalepsis)
of human in
divine, and divine in human, reality.20
The balance of consciousness is a balance between
participation in the divine and respect for the needs and
limitation of the "merely" human.

The balance is what

Voegelin called existence in the metaxy, and may also be
symbolized as a balance between ignorance and knowledge,
19p1ato, Symposium, 202a; Voegelin's translation from
"Reason: The Classic Experience," in Anamnesis (1978), p.
103 .·
2°rbid.
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imperfection and perfection, time and timelessness, matter
and spirit,

life

consists in a

"Heal thy"

and death.21

consciousness

simultaneous attunement to the divine and

worldly

realities

arise.

Human beings are more than animals and less than

gods,

and

may

from

(perhaps

which

these

dichotomous

understandably)

be

symbols

dissatisfied

with the ambiguity involved in establishing their identity
in a negative manner by reference to realities in which
they

participate

dissatisfaction
For example,

only

partially.

emerge various

forms

of

From

such

disorientation.

in Gnosticism the world and the body were

regarded as demonically created prisons which restrict the
divine spark in humanity.22
fundamentally

ambiguous

The tensions arising from the

condition

of

human

beings

have

also been expressed in modern intellectual efforts to make
a god of man, or to explain humanity solely in terms of
animality, or to explain God as a projection of the human
psyche, etc.
Those who would make a god of man or who seek to
explain conceptions of divinity as projections of humanity
have not

simply

fallen

into an

erroneous philosophical

21voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience and Syrobolization in History" (1970), p. 220; "The Gospel and
Culture" (1971), pp. 62-63; The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp.
184-88.
2 2voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968),
pp. 8-11.
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anthropology.

The

anxiety

which

springs

from

the

ambiguity of the human condition cannot be alleviated by
developing ever more sophisticated models of human nature,
because human nature is only one element within the human
condition.

For Voegelin, the human condition can only be

understood within the comprehensive matrix of
man, world and society. 11 23

"God and

No single element within this

matrix can be fully understood unless all of its elements
are fully understood.

Since a full understanding of the

nature of divinity is beyond the powers of humanity, and
since

humanity

cannot

be

fully

understood

without

understanding that which is the ground of its existence,
the human condition must always remain mysterious at its
core.
For Voegel in it was the tensions associated with
the mysterious relationship between God and humanity which
lay behind spiritual disorientation.

Consequently,

the

earliest evidence of such disorientation is nearly as old
as the awareness of such a relationship to a transcendent
God.
faith

The first patterns of spiritual disorder, metastatic
and

prometheanism,

discovery

of

spiritual

Voegelin,

the

earliest

follow
order

in

the

itself.

conception

of

this

wake

of

the

According

to

order

a

as

relationship to a transcendent (i.e., fully differentiated

23voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. 1.
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from the immanent realm of existence) God arose with the
Israelites, and was made explicit in the Decalogue.
voegelin

held

that

the

Prophets

interpreted all

types of offensive conduct--including spiritual disorder-This was

as ultimately a violation of the Commandments.

possible because the Decalogue, according to VOegelin, was
not only a

collection of substantive rules but also an

exemplification
assertiveness
consequence,

of

the

with

injunctions

regard

Voegelin

to

will be your . God,
consistently
7:23).

restrain

and

its

man.

As

meaning

can

way

that

a
be

"Listen to my voice and I

and you shall be my people;

the

self-

I

command you"

and walk
(Jeremiah

The violations can, therefore, be correspondingly

concentrated
1 istened,

their

in

God

maintained,

concentrated in one command:

to

own

in

the

one

offense:

"Yet

nor inclined their ear to me,
counsels

and

hearts" (Jeremiah 7:24).

the stubbornness

they

neither

but walked in
of their evil

Voegelin concluded that:

Disorder in Israel thus was measured by the
comprehensive order of the Decalogue.
As far as
persons were concerned, the rich and the poor, the
king and the priests, the sage and the false prophets
were equally judged by the standard of antidivine or
antihuman self-assertiveness .... 24
It should be emphasized that the spiritual disorder of
antidivine and antihuman self-assertiveness (known to the
Greeks as hubris and to Christians as the sin of pride)
24.L_!_.,
b'd
p. 433.
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has often been identified as the core of the ideological
impulse

in

modern

politics.25

Voegelin

once

defined

ideology itself as "existence in rebellion against God and
man."26
Voegelin found evidence within the Old Testament of
both of the basic patterns of

imbalanced consciousness

introduced in the preceding chapter.

The metastatic faith

of Isaiah as well as the periodic prometheanism of the
Israelites were engendered,
unique

historical

maintaining

a

according to Voegelin,

dilemma.

balance

The perennial

between

openness

to

by a

problem

of

transcendent

experience and sober attentiveness to the necessities of
mundane existence was especially acute for the people as a
whole.
people,

Cognizant
but

of

their

continually

unique

forced

to

status

confront

realities of worldly political existence,
were involved in a

continual

as

a

Chosen

the

harsh

the Israelites

struggle to reconcile the

potentially conflicting demands of spiritual and political
2 5Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essav on Man in Revolt
(Anthony Bower, trans.)(New York:
Vantage, 1956); Henri
de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism (Edith M. Riley,
trans.) (Cleveland:
World Publishing, 1963); Karl Lowith,
Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1949); J. L. Talmon, The origins of Totalitarian Democracy
and Political Messianism:
The Romantic Phase (New York:
Praeger, 1960), Romanticism and Revolt:
Europe 1815-1848
(New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967) ; Gerhart
Niemeyer, Between Nothingness and Paradise (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1971); Hans Jonas, The
Gnostic Religion (Boston: Beacon, 1972).
26voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xiv.
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life.

Admonished by the prophets to entrust their fate to

Yahweh, and by the Kings to take fate into their own hands
like

other

peoples,

"existence-in-tension"

was

an

historical reality for the Israelites.

The admonitions of

the

against

prophets

were

clearly

directed

forms

of

promethean hubris:
You have plowed iniquity, you have reaped injustice,
You have eaten the fruit of lies,
in that you trusted in your chariots,
and the multitude of your warriors.
Hosea 10:13
Let not the wise man boast of his wisdom,
Nor the strong man boast of his strength,
Nor the rich man boast of his riches.
But if he boasts, let him boast of this,
that he understands and knows me,
How I, Yahweh, exercise mercy,
justice, and righteousness on earth.
Jeremiah 9:23-24
For Yahweh of the hosts has a day
Against all that is proud and high,
and against all that is lofty and tall:
Against all the cedars of Lebanon, high and lofty,
and against all the oaks of Bashan;
Against all the high mountains,
and against all the lofty hills;
Against every tall tower,
and against every fortified wall;
Against all the ships of Tarshish,
and against all the gallant craft.
Isaiah, 2:12-17
Although

the

prophets

were

acute

analysts

of

the

promethean strain in the desire of the people for military
strength and self-aggrandizement, Voegelin argued that the
prophets were also prone to excess in their disregard of
worldly necessities.

While there may be something impious

about a Chosen People entrusting their fortune to weaponry
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rather than the God of the Covenant, the intensity of the
prophets'

experiences of partnership with Yahweh carried

the

of

risk

obscuring

the

fact

that

a

Chosen

People

remains, under its mundane aspect, a people like others.
AS

such, the Israelites had need of an administration and

an army like any other people, barring the appearance of a
miraculous situation in which their spiritual assets could
be

directly

converted

into

the

is

not

currency

of

political

power.
Such
momentary

a

situation

suspension

political struggle.
very

structure

history

is

of

soon

of

the

merely

conceived

vicissitudes

of

war

as

a

and

Metastatic faith is a faith that the
pragmatic

to

undergo

existence
a

in

decisive

society

and

transformation.

Thus it is also not merely a conversion of spiritual into
political assets which is anticipated, but rather a total
and permanent devaluation of the currency

of political

power, after which those who are rich in spirit will have
the field of worldly existence to themselves.

The gravity

of the expected transformation, and the belief that it is
within

one's

power

to

bring

it

about,

is

what

distinguishes metastatic faith from the simple hope that
one's burdens or those of one's society will be lightened.
Voegelin's writings contain only one analysis of a
case that is explicitly termed
Will be argued below,

11\etastatic," although, as

11

it is clear that he understood the
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basic experience as a perennial and widespread phenomenon.
The tensions which lie in the background of this one case,
that of Isaiah in the eighth century B.C., are both social
and personal.

On the social level we have encountered the

tensions confronting the Israelites as a people bound by
the necessities of mundane existence, like other peoples,
but

nevertheless

chosen

People

cognizant

living

in

of

its

historical

unique
form

status
under

as

a

Yahweh.

ouring the wars with Syria of 734 and with Assyria toward
the

end

of

the

century,

the

potentially

conflicting

demands imposed by this dual role came to a head, as did
Isaiah's sense of contradiction between the order of faith
in Yahweh and the apparently senseless order of power in
political existence.

According to Voegel in,

"it became

clear, in brief, that Israel, while it did not mind being
a Chosen People, did not care to be chosen at the price of
ceasing to be a people like the others. 11 27

Here was the

occasion for a prophet to say what a people should do in
an emergency, whether it was an insult to Yahweh to rely
on an army and even to have a king and an administration.
Isaiah, at the command of Yahweh, approached King
Ahaz

and

counseled

that

the

King

take

no

defensive

27Ibid.,
p.
442.
See also Voegelin's brief
discussion of this incident in 11 Autobiographical Memoir"
(transcript of a series of tape recorded interviews of
Voegelin in 1973 by Ellis Sandoz), quoted in Ellis Sandoz,
The Voegelinian Revolution:
A Biographical Introduction
(1981), pp. 134-35.
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measures,

for Yahweh had said that

and it shall

not be"

11

it shall not stand,

that the designs of the enemy be

crowned with success (7:9).

As Voegelin interpreted it,

this formula implies that "you will last, if you trust."28
on the occasion of the Assyrian threat and the alliance
with

Egypt,

oavid, "

i.e. ,

the

prophet

demanded

that

the King and his court,

army or the Egyptian auxiliaries,

the

"House

of

not trust in the

but "consult Yahweh."

This voegelin took to mean, "consult Isaiah," who offered
the advice that the King "trust in the ruach [spirit] that
lived in him. 11 29

In response to the "crucial question how

the prophetic charisma can be considered by anybody an
effective

substitute

for

weapons

on

the

battlefield,"

Voegelin argued that:
An aura of magic undeniably surrounds the counsel: It
is due to the fact that the divine plan itself has
been brought within the knowledge of man, in as much
as Isaiah knows that God wants the survival of Judah
as an organized people in pragmatic history.
With
that knowledge is given the trust,
not in the
inscrutable will of God that must be accepted however
bitter it tastes when it does not agree with the plans
of man, but in the knowable will of God that conforms
with the policies of Isaiah and the Chosen People.
That knowledge of the divine plan casts its paralyzing
spell on the necessity of action in the world .... 30
Action in the world continues to be a necessity because
the immanent structure of worldly existence is unaffected
2srbid., p. 451.
29Ibid., p. 449.
Joibid., pp. 450-51.
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in any decisive way by the discovery of the transcendent
Voegelin held that the leap in being is not a

ground.

leap out of existence;
autonomous,
ultimate

even
source

history.31

the order of this world remains

when

the

one

of

order

God

in

is

revealed

humanity,

as

the

society

and

An enduring recognition of this sobering truth

almost seems to define what Voegelin termed the balance of
consciousness.
The autonomous workings of the political realm may
appear senseless to one who has participated in the leap,
and

they

may

perspective,
extra-worldly

at
but

times
they

means.

be
are

senseless

from

not therefore

Voegelin

found

an

any

rational

manipulable by
aura

of

magic

surrounding Isaiah's counsel because Isaiah "has tried the
impossible:
existence
laws

of

to make

into a
mundane

the

leap

in being a

leap out of

divinely transfigured world beyond the
existence. n32

simple neglect of these laws,

This

is

not

a

case

of

but of "rebellion against

the nature of things as ordained by God, "3 3 and hence a
case

of

bears a

pneumapathological

consciousness.

As

such,

it

resemblance to cases with which we have a more

31see Voegelin,
Introduction (1952),
(1956), pp. 11, 452.
32Ibid., p. 452.
33Ibid., p. 453.

The
pp.

New Science of Poli tics:
An
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immediate familiarity, and thus it is not surprising that
Voegel in could argue that "the prophetic conception of a
change in the constitution of being lies at the root of
our

contemporary

beliefs

in

if

is

the

perfection

of

society .••. 1134
Nevertheless,

there

a

resemblance

between

this case and modern cases of ideological consciousness,
there

is also an important dissimilarity.

To be sure,

metastatic faith and ideological consciousness both arise
from rebellion against the nature of things as ordained by
God, but the faith that God himself will set things aright
is vastly different from the declaration of an ideological
project which purports to enable human beings to transform
the world through their own efforts and according to their
own preferences.

The advice of Isaiah may represent, as

Voegelin maintained,

a

"gnosis of transmutation, n35

but

it does not represent a human knowledge of a purportedly
immanent ground as in ideology.

For this reason there are

problems involved in Voegelin's identification of Isaiah
and modern ideologues as "brothers under the skin," and,
as we shall see,

metastatic faith is much more akin to

parousiasm as a form of imbalanced consciousness.
It

seems

34Ib
'd
__
1_.

I

p.

that

Voegelin

did

not

make

'''
Xl.l.1.

35voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 27.
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distinction when examining the case of Isaiah in Israel
and Revelation because "metastatic faith" was then being
used

in

roughly

"gnosticism"
writings.
voegelin's

the

same

generic

sense

in

which

increasingly came to be used in subsequent
Consequently,
application

discussed above,
faith as well.

the

of

problems

the

which

concept

of

attend

to

gnosticism,

attend to his reflections on metastatic
That Voegelin was employing the term in a

generic sense is apparent from the Pref ace to Israel and
Revelation, where he observed that,
Metastatic faith is one of the great sources of
disorder,
if not the principal one,
in the
contemporary world; and it is a matter of life and
death for all of us to understand the phenomenon and
find remedies against it before it destroys us.36
surely he did not mean that the expectation of a divine
intervention in Old Testament style was a massive force in
our day.

If we employ the somewhat more differentiated

terminology introduced in the first chapter, we can see
that Voegelin was arguing that modern

ideological con-

sciousness

a

can

only

be

understood

as

variant

broader pattern of psychic disorientation,

of

a

and that the

evidence of pneumapathological consciousness extends deep
into antiquity.

This important contribution to twentieth

century political science is not diminished by problems
Voegelin

encountered

while

struggling

to

develop

36voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xiii.
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adequate diagnostic vocabulary.
passage

in

Israel

demonstrated both a
history

and

an

and

There

Revelation

is

a

remarkable

where

Voegelin

brilliant grasp of continuities in

unfortunate

tendency

to

group

under

a

provisional rubric movements which are best kept distinct:
... (T]he recognition of the metastatic experience is
of importance for the understanding not only of
Israelite and Jewish order but of the history of
Western Civilization to this day.
While in the main
development of Christianity,
to be sure,
the
metastatic
symbols
were
transformed
into
eschatological events beyond history, so that the
order of the world regained its autonomy, the
continuum of metastatic movements has never been
broken.
It massively surrounds,
rivals,
and
penetrates Christianity itself through the Old
Testament, as well as through the Revelation of st.
John.
Throughout the Middle Ages, the Church was
occupied with the struggle against heresies of a
metastatic complexion; and with the Reformation this
underground stream has come to the surf ace again in a
massive flood--first,
in the left wing of the
sectarian movements and then in the secular political
creed movements which purport to exact the metastasis
by revolutionary action.37
Insofar as a longing for the transformation of reality can
be identified within each of these figures and movements,
Voegelin was justified in drawing such broad parallels.
Yet this passage reflects a lack of discrimination
with regard to the subordinate levels of experience which
distinguish those who conceive of the metastasis as an
inrush

of

the

divine

humanity by human means.

from

those

who

454.

transform

Thus Voegelin was rightly taken

to task by Old Testament scholar Bernhard
37 ~.,
b'd
p.

would

w.

Anderson, who
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defended Isaiah by noting that:
Clearly there is no basis anywhere in prophecy for the
modern illusion that man can build the kingdom of God
on earth, either through technological planning or
revolutionary zeal.
This notion is completely alien
to the prophetic understanding of history.38
As a criticism of Voegelin's handling of the relationship
between metastatic faith and ideological consciousness (at
least in Israel and Revelation) ,
founded;

yet

it

is

not

this argument is well

sufficient

to

establish

a

contention that Isaiah was not moved by metastatic faith.
It

is

indeed

obvious

that

the

prophet

did

not

regard

technological planning or revolutionary zeal as the means
by which the kingdom of God could be built on earth.

But

it does not follow that Isaiah regarded any such earthly
kingdom

as

expectations

impossible,
bears

anticipations of a

no

or

that

the

resemblance

pattern
to

of

more

his

recent

fundamental reordering of the world.

Neither Anderson nor James M. Rhodes (who also expresses
reservations
question
passages

about

Voegelin's
in

question.

Voegelin's

"attack"

interpretation
It

of

on
the

Isaiah39)
scriptural

is only the 1 ink to modern

38Bernhard w.
Anderson,
"Politics and the
Transcendent:
Voegelin' s Philosophical and Theological
Exposition of the Old Testament in the Context of the
Ancient Near East, " in Stephen A. McKnight, ed. , Eric
Voegelin's Search for Order in History (Lanham, Maryland:
University Press of America, 1987, pp. 62-100), pp. 88-89.
3 9James M. Rhodes, "Voegelin and Christian Faith,"
Center Journal (Summer, 1983, pp. 55-105), pp. 58-60, 6768, 101.
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ideological movements that is disputed, and the gravity of
this objection decreases markedly when metastatic faith
and ideological consciousness are treated as variants of a
broader

pattern

of

psychic

imbalance

rather

belonging to a single, undifferentiated class.

than

as

Moreover,

when the roots of this broad pattern are located in the
very structure of the human condition rather than in a
chain of literary influence it becomes clear that Voegelin
was not intending to imply that, as Rhodes puts it, "the
errant prophet was a protototalitarian. 11 40
It was noted at the outset of this chapter that
disorders of the soul can only be adequately diagnosed by
reference to the order of the soul which was achieved in
what Voegelin called the leap in being.

As we turn to the

diagnoses of the ancient Greeks we shall therefore focus
on the analyses of Plato, but it is important to stress
that the complex of disorders with which we are working
was

"compactly"

understood

scrutiny became possible.
to

be,

among

other

long

before

philosophical

Voegelin took the Homeric epics

things,

studies

of

the

causes

of

personal and social disorder in the Aegean-wide Mycenaean
civilization.

The Iliad and the Odyssey contain a study

of the pathology of heroes41 but not of the disorders of
40ib'd
__1_., p. 59 .
4lvoegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), p. 83
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souls,

because,

seventh

according to Voegel in,

century

B.C.

had

no

the

soul,

"men of the
immortal

or

otherwise.n42

The terms mortal and immortal simply meant

gods

and there

and men,

epics.43
prior

is no word for

"soul"

in the

Since the "gods" are not self-contained entities

to

the

leap

in being but

power

complexes

in

a

compactly experienced order of being that also embraces
man,

the specifically human origins of psychic imbalance

in the metaxy could not be adequately symbolized.

Yet it

was possible for the author or authors of the epics to
recognize

that

the

surrounding

society

was

because its members were guided by passion

disordered

(ate)

rather

than by reason and the common good.
The Homeric ate means the blindness of passion that
makes a person transgress the law in the turmoil of anger,
frustration,

righteous

pride,

guilt,

or

anxiety.44

Voegelin credits Homer with having created, without the
aid

of

an

adequate

conceptual

apparatus,

a

tentative

psychology which could identify the symptoms of spiritual

42Ibid., p. 192.
See also The New Science of
Politics: An Introduction (1952), p. 67. Presumably this
refers only to Greeks of the seventh century B. C. , as
Voegelin recognized an earlier leap in being in Israel.
43voegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), p. 103.
44Ibid., pp. 80, 87.
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disease by reference to a transcendent order.4 5

Although

the divine and the human are too closely intermingled in
the world of Homer for a diagnosis such as that of the
prophets to have been possible,

it seems that the epics

reflect a developing awareness that symptoms such as pride
and

uncontrollable

antihuman

wrath

spring

self-assertiveness.

from

Voegelin

antidivine

and

summarizes

the

Homeric analysis of disorder as follows:
(1) Man is in the habit of making the gods responsible
for his misdeeds, as well as for the evil consequences
engendered by his misconduct.
(2) Theoretically, this habit implies that the gods
are the cause of the evil which men do and suffer.
This assertion is wrong. It is man, not the gods, who
are responsible for evil.
{ 3) Practically, this habit is dangerous to social
order.
Misdeeds will be committed more easily if
responsibility can be shifted to the gods.
(4) Historically, a civilizational order is in decline
and will perish, if this habit finds general social
acceptance. 46
Homer's observation that the disorder of a society could
be

traced to

members

the

disordered behavior of

(especially

the

ruling

class)

Platonic analyses of the fourth century.

its

component

prefigures

the

Despite "the

45Ibid., pp. 108-109.
Darrell Dobbs, who does not
appear to have been influenced by Voegelin, has recently
argued that Homer's principal intention in the Odyssey was
to highlight the disordered nature of mundane rationalism
when untempered by reverence before the sacred.
See
"Reckless Rationalism and Heroic Reverence in Homer's
Odyssey," American Political Science Review (vol. LXXXI,
1987, pp. 491-508).
46voegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), pp.
108.

107-
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great difference which is due to the fact that Homer wrote
before,

while

psyche, 11

Plato

Voegelin

remarkable

wrote

regarded

achievement

in

after
the
view

symbols which were available.47

the

discovery

Homeric
of

the

of

diagnosis
"rather

the
as

a

crude"

With the development of

more sophisticated symbols in the intervening centuries
Plato was able to penetrate much more deeply into psychic
and social disorder, but surprisingly few of the eminent
thinkers of the fourth and fifth centuries were to surpass
Homer.

For example, Voegelin maintained that the Homeric

etiology

of

destruction"

disorder

was

subjected

to

at the hands of Herodotus,

"rationalist

who disbelieved

Homer's account of the Trojan War and preferred that of
the Egyptians "because nobody would have been so foolish
as to ruin a city for such a cause. 11 48

This dispassionate

coordination of means and ends represented, in Voegelin's
view,

a decline from Homer's subtle attempts to explain

precisely why such foolishness had happened.

Moreover,

Herodotus' great popularity in Athens only a few decades
after the generation of Aeschylus and Marathon indicates
that "the spiritual and intellectual decline" of Hellenic
civilization itself "must have been as rapid as it was

__l._., p. io0 .
47rb'd
__
]._., p. 40 •
48rb'd
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terrific. 114 9
when

The decline became still more precipitous

Thucydides,

in

conformity with the

temper of his

time, turned to the brute facts of political power as the
standard of action.50
By the latter years of the fifth century the strict
rationality of a struggle for power without regard for the
order

of

Hellenic

society

had

apparently

become

general standard of action in political practice.

the
When

pragmatic rationality displaces a sense of participation
in

right

dangerous

order

it

becomes,

indulgence

that

force destructive of order.

may

according
grow

ambassadors

to

into

Voegelin,
an

a

irrational

Such a situation is described

in the Melian Dialogue of Thucydides.
Athenian

to

the

Melians

The speeches of the
suggest

that

the

libidinous logic of power and conquest had eclipsed all
sensitivity for justice and compassion:
You know as well as we do that in human discussion
justice enters only where the pressure of necessity is
equal. For the rest, the powerful exact what they can
and the weak grant what they must.51
The ambassadors open the negotiations with the request to
dispense

with

all

pretenses

of

justice

and

honorable

conduct, which no one can any longer take seriously.

They

49rbid.
5orbid., p. 41.
51Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (New
York:
Penguin, 1954), V, 89, p. 402.
Voegelin's
translation from The World of the Polis, p. 373.
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do not attempt to derive a

right of empire

from their

victory over the Persians, nor do they accuse the Melians
As Voegelin summarized their

of having done any wrong.
"empire

justification,
reality. 11 52

is

just

empire,

the

ultimate

Their course of action, which will ultimately

result in the butchering of all the men of Melos and the
selling of the women and children into slavery, is said to
proceed from the "necessity" imposed by nature on men and,
perhaps, on the gods as well:
Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a
necessity of nature they rule whenever they can.
We
neither made this law nor were we the first to act on
it; we found it in existence before us and shall leave
it to exist forever after us; we only make use of it,
knowing that you and everybody else, if you were as
strong as we are, would act as we do.53
This is more than simple political "realism"; the passage
suggests that the libido dominandi has begun to fashion
for

itself a

philosophy of existence detached

divine limitation.

Such a philosophy will appear,

blown, in the speeches of Plato's Callicles.
the

passage

from any

signified

a

fictitious

full

For Voegelin

identification

of

conquest with reality, which was achieved by "identifying
reality

with

a

humanity

contracted

to

its

libidinous

52voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 182.
53Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, V,
105, pp. 404-405.
Voegelin's translation from The World
of the Polis (1957), p. 373.
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self. n54
needs

Modern parallels come easily to mind, but what

emphasis,

ideologists

the

Voegelin stated,
Athenians

were

is

that

still

unlike modern

conscious

of

the

horror of this process:
For the Athenian negotiators admit, and even stress,
the horror in its starkness; they do not make the
slightest attempt at smearing it over with idealisms,
ideological verities, or speculative systems.
It is
true, they have deformed their existence and created
an imaginary reality that will allow them to "do their
thing," but in the background of this imaginary
reality there is still the tragic consciousness of the
process.
They have not sunk to the untragic vileness
of the ideologist who cannot cornrni t the murder he
wants to cornrni t in order to gain an "identity" in
place of the self he has lost, without moralistically
appealing to a dogma of ultimate truth.55
If

the

Athenians

straightforward

about

of

their

the

time

lust

for

were

at

power,

least

Thucydides

nevertheless found it necessary to turn to the models of
the Hippocratic school in order to describe the behavior
of his contemporaries.
was

invoked

to

Peloponnesian

The medical conception of disease

relate

War

in

the

terms

events
of

a

now

known

kinesis,

a

as

the

feverish

movement of society and a disease of political order.

It

is interesting to note that although we now accept it as a
fact that there was such an event as the "Peloponnesian
War" from 431 to 404, the contemporaries of Thucydides did
not

share

his

perception

that

such

a

great

54voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 182.
55Ibid.

war

had
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occurred. 56

They only knew of an Archidaman or Ten Years

war, lasting from 431 to 421, and of a Decelean or Ionian
war, lasting from 414 to 404.

The seven intervening years

were punctuated by no more violence than was considered
usual

in

12oleis,

what

the

Hellenes

called

peace

among

their

and the expedition of Athens against Sicily in

415-413 was not a war against the Peloponnesians.

The

great

of

his

When

his

war

creation

described

based

upon

by
the

Thucydides

was

a

unit

Hippocratic model.

contemporaries said war they meant, according to Voegelin,
a

series

of

battles

and

campaigns

that

had

a

formal

beginning with a declaration of war and a formal end with
a treaty of peace.

But "when Thucydides said war, " he

meant:
a movement that was more than a series of diplomatic
and military actions in so far as, beyond physical
clashes and conflicts of passions, it had a dimension
of meaning extending into the regions of moral
breakdown and transfiguration.57
It was the pressure of this pervasive moral breakdown,
exerted upon the soul of Plato in the aftermath of the war
and

the

execution

attributed

the

of

Socrates,

founding

to

experiences

which
of

Voegelin
political

philosophy.

56voegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), pp. 350,
358.
57rb'd
__
1_.

I

P• 358 •
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Voegelin, who has often been labeled a Platonist,58
flatly stated that he was "not concerned with a 'Platonic
philosophy' or 'doctrine'" for the basic reason that the
propagation of a

doctrine was simply not,

The dialogues were rather a symbolic

Plato's intention.
medium

for

in his view,

Plato's

resistance

to

the

disorder

of

the

surrounding society and his effort to restore the order of
Hellenic civilization through love of wisdom.

Thus,

for

Voegelin,
[Plato's] philosopher does not exist in a social
vacuum, but in opposition to the sophist. Justice is
not defined in the abstract but in opposition to the
concrete forms which injustice assumes.
The right
order of the polis is not presented as an "ideal
state," but the elements of right order are developed
in concrete opposition to the elements of disorder in
the surrounding society. And the shape, the Eidos, of
Arete in the soul grows in opposition to the many eide
of disorder in the sou1.59
One would search in vain for a distinction in Voegelin's
writings
because

between
he

philosophy

regarded

all

and
true

political

philosophy

philosophizing

as

an

historically rooted act of resistance to the disordering
of the soul and society by spiritual disease.
this

to

have

been

He takes

Plato's conception of philosophy

as

well, and the importance of Voegelin's diagnostic efforts
58E.g., Hannah Arendt,
Between Past and Future
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England:
Penguin, 1977), p.
127; Frederick o. Wilhelmsen, Christianity and Political
Philosophy (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press,
1978), p. 201.
59voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 63.
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within his thought as a whole should be understood in this
light.

It is not as though Voegelin simply digressed from

time to time in his writings on ancient conceptions of
order

to

present;

off er
the

an

observation

historical

search

on

the

crisis

itself

was

of

the

expressly

intended as part of his own act of resistance.60
It
voegelin's

was

noted

career

in

as

the

a

previous

political

chapter

scientist

that

can

be

described as a search for the wellsprings of the political
crisis

of

modernity,

render

it

intelligible,

therapy.
philosophy,

the

analytical

and sources

This set of projects,
clearly

appears

to

tools
for

required

to

an appropriate

like his conception of
have

been

derived

from

Plato:
Philosophy ••. has its origin in the resistance of the
soul to its destruction by society.
Philosophy in
this sense, as an act of resistance illuminated by
conceptual understanding, has two functions for Plato.
It is first, and most importantly, an act of salvation
for himself and others, in that the evocation of right
order and its reconstitution in his own soul becomes
the substantive center of a new community which, by
its existence,
relieves the pressure of the
surrounding corrupt society.
Under this aspect Plato
is the founder of the community of philosophers that
lives throughout the ages.
Philosophy is, second, an
act of judgment .••• Since the order of the soul is
recaptured through resistance to the surrounding
disorder, the pairs of concepts [in the Republic]
which illuminate the act of resistance develop into
the criteria (in the pregnant sense of instruments or
standards of judgment) of social order and disorder.
60voegelin, Israel and Revelation {1956), p. xiv;
Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 302; The Ecumenic Age
(1974), p. 38; Anamnesis (1978), pp. 137-38.
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Under this second aspect
political science.61

Plato

is

the

founder

of

Just as Voegelin's diagnostic, conceptual and therapeutic
projects

are

analysis,

in

a

sense

restorations

of

the

Platonic

Plato drew upon the symbols and methods of his

own predecessors.
Heraclitus
distinction

of
of

He incorporated the characterization by

conceit

as

a

Xenophanes

"sacred diseasen62
between

representations of the gods.63

proper

and

and the
improper

The medical models of the

Hippocratic school as adapted by Thucydides were utilized,
along

with

madness

or

shameless,

Aeschylus'
disease
conceited,

understanding

(noses)

of

authadia

characterized

self-reliant

by

as

a

"brazen,

self-satisfaction."64

Building upon the Aeschylean understanding of society as
an order of the soul, and of the soul as a social order of
forces,

Plato

could

formulate

the

principles

of

the

Republic that social disorders are traceable to psychic
disorders and that the right order of the soul

is the

source of order in society.
For Plato justice and injustice are

in the soul

61voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), pp. 68-69.
62Ibid., p. 260.
63voegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), pp.
180, 184-88; Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 67.

171-

64Aeschylus,
Prometheus Bound,
977,
1012,
1037;
Voegelin, The World of the Polis (1957), pp. 258-60. See
also The New Science of Politics: An Introduction (1952),
p. 66.
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what health and disease are in the body. 65

Bodily health

is defined as the establishment of a natural order among
the

parts

of

the

organism,

whereas

disease

is

a

disturbance of the natural order of rule and subordination
among the parts.

Similarly, the condition of justice in

the soul is conceived as a natural,
the

parts

interfering

in which
with

each

those

fulfills

of

the

harmonious order of
its

function

others.

justice is contrasted to polypragmosyne,
understood as

"the readiness

to engage

without

Dikaiosyne

or

which Voegelin
in multifarious

activities which are not a man's proper business. 11 66

When

applied to the soul polypragmosyne refers to the tendency
of appetites and desires to dictate human action and claim
the

rulership

wisdom.

of

the

soul

which

properly

belongs

to

The rulership of wisdom consists in the ordering

of one's life toward contemplation of divine being and the
preparation
life.

of

the

soul

for

its

existence beyond this

Injustice is a diseased inversion of this order,

manifested in hybris and pleonexia (unjust will to power),
which are the basic characteristics of the complex we have
termed pro-metheanism.
The specifically political dimension of justice and
injustice is expressed in the principle of Republic 368d-e
65p1ato,
The Republic of Plato
(Allan Bloom,
trans.) (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 444c-d, p. 124.
66voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 64.
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that society is man written in larger letters.

Although

the Republic begins as a dialogue on the just life of the
individual,

it could be broadened into an

inquiry

into

order and disorder in society because of Plato's awareness
that the state of the individual psyche manifests itself
in the corresponding state of society.
Socrates asks,

At 435e Plato's

"Isn't it quite necessary for us to agree

that the same forms and dispositions as are in the city
are in each of us?" and answers that "surely they didn't
get there from any other place. n67

At 544d-e Glaucon is

told that "it is necessary that there also be as many
forms of human character as there are forms of regimes"
and is asked,

"or do you suppose that the regimes arise

'from oak and rocks' and not from the dispositions of men
in the cities, which,

tipping the scale as it were, draw

the rest along with them?"68

Thus it is not only the good

polis which is man written large, but every polis writes
large the type of person that is socially dominant in it.
As Voegelin succinctly summarized the thesis derived from
this

"anthropological

principle,"

"a polis

is

in order

when it is ruled by men with well-ordered souls; it is in

67p1ato, The Republic of Plato, p. 114.
68 L.:1._.,
b'd
p. 2 2 2.
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disorder when the souls of the rulers are disordered.n69
In

keeping

with

this

anthropological

principle,

Plato analyzed the concrete disorders of his time on both
the

individual

relate

a

and social

sophisticated

level,

and thus was able to

understanding

of

the

reciprocal

causal relationships involved in the corrupting process.
The sophists, poets and politicians are cast as both the
corruptors of society and also as mere creatures of an
already corrupted society.
the

famous

knowledge

sophist
of

the

to

In the Gorgias Socrates takes

task for

health

of

empowering men without

the

polis

with

persuasive

techniques that can make them politically powerful.
it

becomes

clear

that

the

effectiveness

of

Yet
these

techniques is dependent upon the debasement of the public
at large, which prefers sophistic flattery to the sobering
critical

inquiry

of

philosophers.

Socrates

grants

to

Gorgias that one trained in rhetoric by a sophist will
overcome a physician in public competition for a post like
that of our Surgeon General, but notes that this is only
the case when the competition takes place before a public
which is ignorant of the art of medicine and which prefers
the

plea~ant

the

painful

but ineffective remedy of a confectioner to
treatment

of

a

physician.

The

medical

69voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 70.
on
Plato's anthropological principle see The New Science of
Politics: An Introduction (1952), pp. 61-63, 67-70; Plato
and Aristotle (1957), pp. 67-70, 85-88, 124-29.
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metaphor emerges again at 519, where Socrates accuses the
"great"
"bloated"

politicians
the

of

city with

Athenian
docks

history

of

having

and harbors and tribute

money while leaving no room for justice and temperance.
For this Themistocles, Pericles, Cimon and Miltiades are
held

culpable,

"success"

of

but

by

these

the

figures

same
is

token

the

attributed

political
to

their

willingness to deliver at the behest of a populace shot
through with hubris and pleonexia.
Plato

avoids

a

blurring

of

the

lines

of

responsibility in this situation--without losing sight of
the pervasiveness of the disorder--by clearly defining the
essential task of the statesman, who is again likened to a
physician.

A statesman is good if under his care the

citizens become better; he is bad if under his rule the
citizens become worse,

in terms of existential order. 7 O

Socrates declares this to be the true art of politics, of
which he is the only practitioner.71

With this standard

7 0Plato, Gorgias, 504e.
In Edith Hamilton and
Huntington Cairns, eds., The Collected Dialogues of Plato
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 277.
See also Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 38.
71p1ato, Gorgias, 521d, in The Collected Dialogues of
Plato, p. 302.
Voegelin interprets this striking passage
as a claim on the part of Plato--not Socrates--to the
moral authority for which the corrupted public realm of
Athens was no longer fit. Given the decidedly un-Socratic
tone of the section, this seems plausible as an
interpretive point.
See Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle
(1957) I PP• 36-39.
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set,

it

becomes

statesmen

of

apparent

Athens

that

were

not

the

supposedly

statesmen

at

all

great
but

exemplars of polypragmosyne or dilettantish meddlesomeness
in

matters

for

which

they

were

radically

unsuited.

suitability for founding or ruling a political community
is not a function of mundane political "know-how" but of
the

order

established

in

the

soul

through

the

transformative vision of the Agathon or Good-in-itself.
And as the Republic makes clear, the goodness of a polis
originates not from its institutional pattern but from the
psyche of the founder or ruler who will stamp the pattern
of his soul on the institutions.

Thus Socrates is quite

elaborate in his description of the education that will
form the souls of the guardians in his good polis, but, as
Voegelin observed, Socrates
roundly refuses to go into details, not only of
customs and mores, but even of civil, commercial, and
criminal law, because such matters will take care of
themselves if only the souls of the legislative rulers
are in good order ( 425a-d) .
Moreover, he restrains
himself deliberately at this point in order not to
give the false impression that good order in a polis
can be created through institutional devices.
He
considers it, on the contrary, a symptom of disease in
a polis when the citizens are feverishly active with
patching up this or that gap in the law, but do not
dare to touch the well-known source of the multitude
of minor evils.72
Since it is the animating spirit of a regime and

72voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 87. This
is,
in essence, the reason why Voegelin considered
"constitutionalism" an ideology.
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not its institutional form which will determine the nature
of political

order,

Plato

can speak of a

sophistic or

philosophic polis according to the nature of the ruler
The philosophic

whose psyche determines its character.

polis is constituted by the rule of a philosopher king or
a

number

of

philosophers,

and

it

is

a

matter

indifference to Socrates whether the institutional
will

in

fact

be

monarchical

or

aristocratic.73

of
form
The

sophistic polis may also take on a variety of forms, none
of which are strictly dictated by the nature of sophistry.
Thus the problem with democracy for Plato is not technical
or

structural,

except

in

the

restricted

sense

that

sophistic flatterers are somewhat more likely to rise to
power,

for the same reason that the dubious art of the

sophist works best in a crowd.

In this case, which was of

course the case in Athens at the time of the composition
of the Republic, the blame for the resulting degradation
of politics must be shared between the sophists and the
crowd--rather than being ascribed to procedural problems.
The blame must be shared because the sophists, like
politicians of the type encountered above,
the

products

society.

as

the

causes

of

a

were as much

spiritually

corrupt

It is less likely that Protagoras corrupted the

73Plato, The Republic of Plato, 445c-e,- p. 125. See
also Voegelin, The New Science of Politics:
An Introduction (1952), p. 62; Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 70.
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Hellenes by declaring man to be the measure than that he
became

famous

for

articulating an orientation to which
In Book VI of the

they had gradually become accustomed.

Republic Socrates argues that it is not the sophists who
corrupt the youth but society, which is described as "the
greatest
likened

of
to

all

sophists. 11 74

a man who learns

Individual
by heart

sophists

are

the desires

and

dislikes of a great beast that he is rearing.

Having

learned which sounds indicate ferocity or tameness in the
beast, and which stimuli bring forth these states, the man
organizes

his

observations,

calls

them

wisdom,

and

Knowing nothing of what is

proceeds to teach others.

actually good or bad for the beast but only what pleases
or displeases it, the man is obviously a charlatan at the
art of animal husbandry.
to society.
satisfies

Such is the relation of sophist

The sophistic politician merely observes and
the

desires

of

the

"many-headed

beast,"

as

Socrates had stated to the great discomfiture of Callicles
in the Gorgias.75
the

tune;

sophists."
individual

in

Men such as Callicles only seem to call

truth

they

But again,

mimic

"the

greatest

of

all

the blame must be shared because

sophists

and

their

students

74rbid., 492b;
(1957), p. 70.

cf.

Voegelin~

Plato

have,
and

like

the

Aristotle

75p1ato, Gorgias, 513, in The Collected Dialogues of
Plato, pp. 294-95.
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allegorical handler of the beast, unjustly taken it upon
themselves to practice an art for which they are wholly
unsuited.
Neither
Plato's

the

diagnosis

greatness
can

be

nor

fully

the

limitations

appreciated

unless

of
we

depart from Voegelin's analysis to consider Plato's search
for forms of personal and social therapy.

This topic will

also prove to be of great importance when we turn, in the
final
What

chapter,
is

to

most

development

Voegelin's

noteworthy

of

an

own

about

awareness

therapeutic

Plato's
that

unlikely (although not impossible)

project.

search

it

was

is

the

profoundly

that the transcendent

pattern of order experienced in his soul could me made
authoritative in the order of society.

We know from the

Seventh Letter and other sources that Plato, like Isaiah,
was

acutely

sensitive

to

the pressures

corruption of the surrounding society.76

exerted by the
We are also told

that he was the recipient of mystical insights into the
transcendent source
they

could

language. 7 7

not
Yet,

be

of order of such magnificence that
distilled
even

in

into

this

the

structure

extraordinary

of

tension

between the horror of the mundane and the beauty of the
transcendent,

Plato was able to maintain the balance of

76p1ato, Letter VII, 324c-326b,
Dialogues of Plato, pp. 1574-76.

in

The

77Ibid., 341b-e, 343a-344c, pp. 1588-91.

Collected

82
consciousness.

This is the existential tension which gave

rise to the metastatic faith of Isaiah and,

as we shall

see, the parousiasm of the millenarian sects of the Middle
Ages.

Voegelin regarded the Platonic response to this

tension as a model of "noetic control," and contrasted it
favorably to the Isaianic response:
When Plato lets his analysis of right order in society
culminate in the symbols of the Philosopher King and
the Royal Ruler, he is fully aware of the obstacles
presented by human nature and the course of pragmatic
history to the event of a paradigmatic polis ever
becoming the ins ti tu ti on of a society; he stresses
both the improbability of its establishment and the
inevitability of its decline if it ever should be
established.
When Isaiah lets his faith culminate in
the vision of the Prince of peace who will set the act
of faith which the pragmatic king rejects, he believes
in the magic power of an act that will transmute the
structure of reality, as well as in his own advice as
a Gnosis of transmutation.78
The Seventh

Letter indicates

that even

as

a

young man

Plato was aware that the poleis of his time could only be
redeemed by an "effort of an almost miraculous kind. n79
But unlike Isaiah, Plato seems never to have thought such
a

miracle

forthcoming,

nor did he

power to bring about a metastasis.

think

it within his

This is shown by his

perception that even such a miraculous effort would have
to be "accompanied by good luck.n80
78voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 27.
79p1ato, Letter VII, 326a, in The Collected Dialogues
of Plato, p. 1576.
8 0ibid.
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A reform of the Hellenic world along the lines of
the

Republic

or

Statesman

variety of reasons.
the

possibility

was

not

anticipated

for

a

We have seen that Plato discounted
that

a

restructuring

of

political

institutions could penetrate to the spiritual roots of the
crisis

of

the polis.

Thus

there

is

little reason to

believe that the Republic was intended as a blueprint for
the

institutional

reform

of

the

polis.

Indeed,

the

unnatural and outlandish practices which are contemplated
in

the

dialogue

may

have

been

intended

as

a

warning

against attempts to embody the Idea by means of social
The hypothetical necessity of measures such

engineering.
as a

program of eugenics and a

thoroughgoing communism

would seem to suggest that there is an inherent resistance
in the matter of political life to the imposition of the
form of transcendentally-grounded order.

In addition it

must be remembered that even these measures would not long
maintain the order of the good polis against the flux of
Becoming.
A reform at the level of institutions would be of
no avail unless the spiritual authority of the philosopher
could

set

the

pattern

for a

general

spiritual

This second option is also highly problematic,
shows

with

great

subtlety.

It

is

reform.
as Plato

conceivable

that

philosophers might have been able to effect such a reform
in at

least

four ways:

( 1)

by means of the

forcible

84
isolation and education of the uncorrupted youth,
means

of

the

propagation

of

a

new

religious

(2) by

dogma

to

replace the corroded cults popularized by epic and tragic
poetry,

(3)

by

means

of

a

general

appeal

from

the

authority of philosophy to the populace, or (4) a reform
of

individual

leaders through the cathartic effects of

Socratic dialectic.

These possibilities will be taken up

in order.
At the end of Book VII of the Republic Socrates
suggests that in the event that true philosophers should
come to power in a polis, the whole population over ten
years of age should be sent out to the countryside.
and Glaucon

He

agree that this would be the quickest and

easiest way to institute the regime.
philosophers established,

With the rule of the

they could raise the children

under ten years of age according to their own manners and
laws.81

Voegelin agreed that the program is ingenious and

eminently practical, with the one flaw that it cannot be
executed by true philosophers.
seen,

For as Plato had also

"any attempt to realize the order of the idea by

violent means would defeat itself.

The authority of the

spirit is an authority only if, and when, it is accepted
in freedom. 11 82

While Plato evidently did not intend that

8lp1ato, The Republic of Plato, 541a, p. 220.
82voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, p. 135.

85

the program be put into practice, Voegelin observed that,
we see it followed almost to the letter in our own
time when bands of sectarians gain power in a country
and begin to reconstruct the people according to their
own manners and character by eliminating the older
generation from public life and bringing up the
children in a new creed.83
There is ample evidence of this in the Hitler Youth of
Nazi

Germany,

the

Komsomol

and

Young

Pioneers

of

the

soviet Union, the Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution,
and in the wholesale slaughter of the older generation in
Cambodia
Rouge.

by

children under

the direction of the Khmer

Each of these grotesque attempts at the forcible

embodiment of a creed has proven what Plato already knew:
The disorder of the polis cannot be repaired by
descending to the level of disorder, by adding a new
faction to the existing ones.
The tyranny of the
rabble cannot be transformed into freedom by
countering it with a tyranny of the spirit.84
Even if

it is recognized that a

forcibly embodied,

creed cannot be

it would still be conceivable that a

restorative creed could be publicized in such a way that
through peitho or existential persuasion the souls of the
citizens would be reordered.

The problem here is that

philosophy, as understood by both Plato and Voegelin, can
issue

in

no

communicable

such creed,
results

of

political

philosophizing

experience, not dogmas or doctrines.
8 3Ibid.
84Ibid., p. 143.

or

religious.
are

symbols

The
of

In fact, the latter

86
are produced by hypostatizing philosophical symbols, which
in simpler terms means transforming them into something
they are not--for purposes to which they should not be
put.85

We

can

again

consult

the

Seventh

Letter

for

Plato's assessment of public doctrine as a medium for the
transmission of philosophical experience:
I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor
shall I ever do so in the future, for there is no way
of putting it in words •... If I thought it possible to
deal adequately with the subject in a treatise or a
lecture for the general public, what finer achievement
would there have been in my life than to write a work
of great benefit to mankind and to bring the nature of
things to light for all men?86
Thus Voegelin simply denied the existence of anything that
could rightly be called a religious "doctrine" in Plato's
work,

and

insisted with

regard to political

"doctrine"

that "if Plato's evocation of a paradigm of right order is
interpreted as a philosopher's opinion about politics, the
result will

be hopeless

nonsense,

not worth a

word of

debate. 11 87
85The problem of the hypostatization of philosophical
symbols will be taken up in the final chapter.
This is
precisely the fate which befell Plato's philosophy at the
hands of Dionysius.
Cf. Plato, Letter VII, 341b, in The
Collected Dialogues of Plato, p. 1588.
For a brief
overview of Voegelin's views regarding hypostatization see
Barry Cooper, "The Concept of Historiogenesis, 11 in The
Political Theory of Eric Voegelin (Lewiston:
The Edward
Mellen Press, 1986, pp. 125-60), pp. 129-34.
86p1ato, Letter VII, 341c-d, p. 1589.
See also
Phaedrus, 275c-e, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, pp.
520-21.
87voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 70.

87
This is not to suggest that Plato did not attempt a
reform of Hellenic theology.

Such a

reform was indeed

attempted in the myths of Gorgias, Republic and Timaeus,
and

throughout

competition

the

with

dialogues

the

epic

Plato

and

representations of the gods.

is

tragic

clearly
poets

in
over

But an alethinos logos or

"true story" can only provide orientation to those with
experiences of truth; the disoriented soul must be told a
gennaion pseudos, a "Big Lie. 11 88

Plato did not attempt to

slip such a lie past his contemporaries.
lie.

Tale

in

Republic III is the truth that all men are brothers.89

It

is

The

called

content

a

translates, 90

of

"big"
because

the

lie
it

lie

or

a

was

or

He called it a

Phoenician

"whopper,"
so

Plato's disordered environment.

little

as

Voegelin

appreciated

in

Voegelin suggested that

"the introduction of the supreme truth as an unbelievable
Big Lie is one of the bitterest passages in a work that
heaps so much scorn on Athens.n91
Thus Plato rejected the possibility of effecting a
spiritual reform by means of a dogmatic, public theology.
88p1ato, Timaeus, 26e, in The Collected Dialoques of
Plato, p. 1160; The Republic of Plato, 414c, p. 93.
89p1ato, The Republic of Plato, 414b-415b, pp. 93-94.
Cf. Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 105.
90voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 105, 17n.
91Ibid., pp. 105-106.

88

concrete

spiritual

At

disorder.

Rebublic

365d-e

and

throughout Book X of the Laws Plato calls attention to a
contrary

set

of

propositions

which

apparently

were

commonly forwarded at the time:
(1) It seems that no gods exist:
Even if they do exist, they do not care about
humanity:
(3) Even if they care, they can be bribed with gifts
and sacrifices.93
(2)

To these Plato opposes the propositions that the gods do
exist,

that they do care about humanity,

cannot be appeased with bribes.

and that they

In the Laws the creed is

to be enforced by the Nocturnal Council.
suggestion

that

the

creed

can

serve

by

There is no
itself

as

an

adequate theology, or that it will even be effective as an
antidote against the nosos when it has taken root in a
soul.
a

If we may pursue the metaphor, the creed represents

purely preventive prescription.

As

creeds go it is

certainly not very detailed--in keeping with the dim view
taken

by

Plato

of

doctrinal

representations

of

transcendent truth for mass consumption.
A

direct

philosophers

would

appeal

for

pose

equally

spiritual
intractable

reform

by

problems.

There is first the difficulty that it is impossible for a
multitude to be philosophic,

as Socrates asserts in the

93p1ato, The Republic of Plato, 365d-e, pp. 42-43;
Laws X, passim.
Cf. Voegelin, The World of the Polis
(1957), p. 274: Plato and Aristotle (1957), pp. 263-67.
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a

purely preventive prescription.

As

creeds go it is

certainly not very detailed--in keeping with the dim view
taken

by

Plato

of

doctrinal

representations

of

transcendent truth for mass consumption.
A

direct

philosophers

appeal

for

pose

equally

would

spiritual

reform

intractable

by

problems.

There is first the difficulty that it is impossible for a
multitude to be philosophic,

as Socrates asserts in the

Republic, and that those who do philosophize are therefore
necessarily blamed by them.94

In the Statesman the young

Socrates agrees with the Eleatic Stranger that no large
group of men will indeed be capable of acquiring any art,
much less the art of ruling.95
does

not

come

within

the

range

Since the political art
of

their

personal

ex-

perience, they cannot recognize it even when it is being
practiced before

their

eyes.

If

a

ruler

appears

who

wishes to reform the polis, the people cannot know whether
he

is

a

true

rejected as

a

ruler

or

a

tyrant;

his

appeal

will

be

dangerous pretention because they cannot

believe that anybody is able to rule in the spirit of
wisdom and virtue.96
94p1ato, The Republic of Plato, 494a, p. 173.
9 5 Plato, Statesman, 300e, in The Collected Dialogues
of Plato, p. 1071.
96Ibid., 301c-d, p. 1072.
Aristotle (1957), p. 163.

Cf. Voegelin,

Plato and

90

The tone

of these passages

than misanthropic.

is

empathetic rather

That the people cannot recognize the

authority of the philosopher is disastrous but it is not,
according to Plato, simply the fault of the people.

When

Socrates proposes that the city should be turned over to
philosophers

at

Republic

487d,

Adeimantus

balks,

apparently out of fear that he has been led to an absurd
conclusion

by

dialectical

Adeimantus suggests,
in

philosophy

trickery.

become

is

after

all,

everyone says that those who linger
queer

and useless

surprisingly, Socrates agrees,
show that this

For

not the

to

the

cities.

although he then tries to

fault of true philosophers.

Philosophers are useless to the cities because the people
have no good reason to believe that the practices of the
philosopher have anything to do with ruling.

Acquainted

as they are with the daily activities of rulers, they find
it difficult to believe that one who spends his time in
contemplation of eternal being will be very well equipped
for such tasks.

This is perfectly sensible on their part.

The pilot of a ship must appear quite mad to a passenger
who

is unaware that the art of navigation requires the

pilot to look toward the heavens.

Both the pilot and the

philosopher will be called stargazers.
The situation is complicated further by the fact
that most of those who purport to be philosophers are mere

91
imitators of the philosophic nature. 9 7
true philosophers,

The result is that

who seem odd enough as things stand,

are innocently associated with a genuinely contemptible
lot.

That

the

people

are

innocent

in

making

this

association can be shown by returning to the perspective
of the passenger aboard ship.

If pilots were widely known

to be quacks who continually run their ships aground, we
could not help but sympathize with a passenger who would
prefer someone at the helm who concerned himself with what
The people cannot be

lies immediately before the ship.

blamed for pref erring politicians who concern themselves
with what lies immediately before the polis.

The people

can recognize the need for docks and harbors and revenues
but have not an inkling of the journey of the soul beyond
death,

and

thus

they turn to

a

Pericles

(if they

are

lucky) and not to the philosopher who could prepare their
souls for that ultimate voyage.
The
corruption
(and

to

politicians
of

some

character.

society
extent
This

is

who
are

preside

over

formidable

because

of)

grudgingly

the

spiritual

opponents

their

despite

infirmities

admitted

even

in

of
the

sharpest of Plato's attacks:
He acquires a tense and bitter shrewdness; he knows
how to flatter his master and earn his good graces,
but his mind is narrow and crooked. An apprenticeship
in slavery has dwarfed and twisted his growth and
97p1ato, The Republic of Plato, 49la, p. 170.
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robbed him of his free spirit, driving him into
devious ways,
threatening him with fears and
dangers .•.. [S]o, turning from the first to lies and
the requital of wrong with wrong, warped and stunted,
he passes from youth to manhood with no soundness in
him and turns out, in the end, a man of formidable
intellect--as he imagines.98
The philosopher is no match for such a person in political
struggle,

at

least not as

long

as

techniques of combat are disdained.

the

most

efficient

Plato seems to have

studied this character type intently, and it is probably
safe to

assume that he articulated the worldview of a

Thrasymachus

or

a

Callicles

with greater

their historical counterparts,
have done.

clarity than

if such there were, could

Plato could easily have exposed such men to a

devastating critique, not in writing but in the Assembly
prior to a public appeal for reform,
this potentially fruitful.

if he had thought

But the moral

appeal would

likely be publicly ridiculed because the philosopher tends
to cut a ridiculous figure in public.
In

the

Apology

Socrates

denies

the

charge

of

Aristophanes that he is engaged in the study of things
below the earth and in the sky, yet he does not deny that
philosophers are as bizarre from the perspective of the
uninitiated as the Clouds had suggested.99
98Plato,
Theaetetus,
Dialogues of Plato, p. 878.

173a-b,

in

In Theaetetus
The

Collected

99Plato, Apology, 18a-19d, in The Collected Dialogues
of Plato, pp. 4-6; Aristophanes, Clouds, in The Complete
Plays of Aristophanes (Toronto:
Bantam, 1962), pp. 101-

93

socrates admits that although the philosopher spends all
of his time inquiring into human nature he is hardly aware
of whether his next-door neighbor is man or animal. 100
The inattentiveness which landed Thales in the legendary
well was not a

quirk limited to an individual.

It is

characteristic of philosophers as a type, and the laughter
of the Thracian maidservant will be raised to a din if the
philosopher enters the public arena:
•.• [O]n a public occasion or in private company, in a
law court or anywhere else, when he is forced to talk
about what lies at his feet or is before his eyes, the
whole rabble will join the maidservants in laughing at
him, as from inexperience he walks blindly and
stumbles into every pitfall.
His terrible clumsiness
makes him seem so stupid.101
If

Plato's

disputation
laughter;

if

philosopher
of
he

the

Cave

actively

is
he

forced
will

to

join

become

attempts to

a

free

in

the

source
others

of

from

their bonds and to take the lead on the way of assent,
they will kill him when an opportunity is presented.102
As Allan Bloom has argued,
difficulties
knowledge

confronting

stands

Plato's understanding of the
the

public

dissemination

of

in stark contrast to the view of the

leading figures of the Enlightenment:
141.
lOOp1ato,
Theaetetus,
Dialogues of Plato, p. 879.

174b,

in

The

Collected

101Ibid., 174b-c.
102p1ato, The Republic of Plato, 517a, p. 196.

94
The Enlightenment, taken literally, believed that the
light could be brought into the cave and the shadows
dispelled •.•• This Socrates denies; the philosopher
does not bring light to the cave, he escapes into the
light and can lead a few to it; he is a guide, not a
torchbearer .... The Enlightenment teaches that the cave
can be transformed; Socrates teaches that it must be
transcended and that · this transcendence can be
accomplished only by a few.103
Thus

a

public

appeal

for

spiritual

reform

would

be

ineffective at best.
One final possibility remains.
can guide

at

orientation

least
which

a

few

could

Since a philosopher

souls

toward

a

permit

them

to

transcendent
resist

the

attractions of power and passion, it seems that the reform
of

a

number

of

important

citizens

corruption of the general public.
Socratic

educator

whole soul"

is

"the

art

could

mitigate

the

At the disposal of the
of

toward knowledge and

turning

around .•• the

justice .104

Although

Socrates insists in the Republic that it is impossible for
a multitude to be philosophic,

it is also asserted that

the potential for reorientation exists in the soul of each
individua1.105

Moreover, this potential is not exhausted

when the malleability of youthful behavior hardens into
the habits of adulthood.

Thus it would not be necessary

to expel the older generation from the city in order to
103Allan Bloom, "Interpretive Essay," in The Republic
Qf Plato, op. cit., p. 403.
l04Plato, The Republic of Plato, 51·ac-e, p. 197.
105rbid., 518c, p. 197.
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perform the art of turning around individual souls.

Even

the hardest cases, such as the sophistic politician just
described,

are susceptible to the cathartic effects of

Socratic dialectic.

Shortly after the soul of this man is

described in Theaetetus as "dwarfed and twisted, .•• warped
and

stunted,"

Socrates

acknowledges

that

a

public

exhortation to avoid evil "will sound like foolishness to
such strong and unscrupulous minds. 11 106

Yet this outcome

is not inevitable in all situations:
But there is one thing about them; when you get them
alone and make them explain their objections to
philosophy, then, if they are men enough to face a
long examination without running away, it is odd how
they end by finding their own arguments unsatisfying.
Somehow their flow of eloquence runs dry, and then
they become as speechless as an infant.107
In public the politician can reduce the philosopher to an
object of laughter, but in private philosophical inquiry
the situation is reversed:
Now it is he who is dizzy from hanging at such an
unaccustomed height and looking down from mid-air.
Lost and dismayed and stammering, he will be laughed
at, not by maidservants or the uneducated--they will
not see what is happening--but by everyone whose
breeding has been the antithesis of a slave's.108
The superior cunning of the sophists and rhetoricians can
be overcome in private.

The pride which encases their

l06p1ato,
Theaetetus,
Dialogues of Plato, p. 881.

177a,

in

The

Collected

l07rbid., 111b.
108rbid., 175d.
See also Gorgias,
Collected Dialogues of Plato, p. 306.

527a,

in

The

96

souls can be pierced by dialectical questioning, and if
their souls can be opened it is possible that the pattern
within the souls could be changed.
held

that

the

pattern

of

As we have seen, Plato

public

order

is

largely

a

function of the pattern which exists in the souls of the
leading citizens,

and thus it would appear that reform

could be brought about by means of inquiry and persuasion.
The problem is that the closed soul can and will
resist philosophical therapy,
array

of

rhetorical

usually with an impressive

tricks,

with

support

from

the

surrounding environment, and with ultimate success.
for

long

will

subjected

to

the
an

inquiry

One

stammering.

proud

can

public
which

simply

person

be

induces
refuse

Not

willingly

dizziness
to

enter

and
into

discussion, or enter with such prolixity that nothing is
accomplished.
politicians

In the Protagoras Socrates complains that
and

orators

are

only willing

to

speak

in

endless disquisitions:
Ask them the smallest thing supplementary to what they
have said, and like a gong which booms out when you
strike it and goes on until you lay hand on it, so our
orators at a tiny question spin out a regular Marathon
of speech.1o 9
Voegelin

recognized

rational discussion,

that,

given, the

fragile

nature

of

this tactic is likely to meet with

success:
l09p1ato,
Protagoras,
Dialogues of Plato, p. 324.

329a-b,

in

The

Collected

97
It is impossible to pin the speaker down to the
subject; it is submerged in a f load of amusing but
quite irrelevant digressions,
of authoritative
quotations,
of aptly chosen examples,
and of
pretentious verbiage. Scrutiny of an idea, discussion
in the form of terse argument and counter-argument,
which necessitates perhaps fifty exchanges of
assertion and retort before the issue is settled,
becomes impossible if one of the protagonists replies
to every argument with a speech lasting half an
hour.110
If the philosopher is nevertheless able to unsettle an
unwilling partner, resort can still be had to other tricks
exposed by Voegelin.

One can use "back-stair psychology"

to ascribe a sinister intention to others, or dismiss them
by

invoking

pejorative

labels.

Retreating

into

a

systematic dogmatism or skepticism is another effective
means of evasion.111

If one is backed into a corner it

can be claimed that trickery has made the weaker argument
the stronger, and if all else fails one can admit defeat
but later claim to have been insincere in doing so.112
In brief,

Plato recognized both the potential and

the inherent limitations of rational discussion as a means
for spiritual reorientation.

His Socrates is often able

to lead other characters into embarassing admissions, and
llOvoegelin, "On Readiness to Rational Discussion, 11
in Edward T. Gargan, ed., Freedom and Serfdom (Dordrecht,
Holland: D. Reidel, 1961, pp. 269-84), p. 276.
lllibid., pp. 279-81.
See also Plato and Aristotle
(1957), pp. 26, 29-30, 43-44.
112cf. Gorgias,
Plato, p. 288.

505c,

in The Collected Dialogues of

98
occasionally into a
into

humility

and

deeper anxiety which might blossom
reverence.

Yet

instances

of

deep

existential conversion are conspicuously absent from the
dialogues.

Thrasymachus is charmed into docility in the

Republic, but one suspects that the spell will wear off
quickly and that, like Alcibiades, a reversion to old ways
In the Gorgias Callicles is drawn to

is almost assured.
admit

that,

"I

don't

attract me, Socrates.

know

how

preceding

because

pages

is

that

your words

Yet I feel as most people do:

can't quite convince me. nll3
illuminating

it

at

This passage is especially

three

Socrates

You

had

distinct
stated

points
that

in

his

the
only

objective in the discussion was to obtain the personal
assent of Polus and Callicles:
But for my part, if I fail to produce you yourself as
my sole witness to testify to the truth of my
statements, I shall think that I've accomplished
nothing of importance toward solving the matter under
discussion •••• 114
It is made abundantly clear in the dialogue that Socrates
fails to meet his own standard of success.
and

Callicles

are

indeed

defeated

at

Gorgias, Polus
the

dialectical

level; each is drawn into a sulky admission which involves
a contradiction of their initial argument.
l13p1ato, Gorgias,
of Plato, p. 269.
114rbid., 472b-c,
486e-487b, p. 269.

513c,
p.

Socrates is

in The Collected Dialogues

254.

See also 474a,

p.

256;
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able

to

do

this

by

showing

the

monstrous

conclusions to which their positions lead.
chooses to

contradict himself

logical

Each character

rather than

embrace such

conclusions before an audience, but these choices are not
dictated

by

positions.
of

the

a

recognition

of the monstrosity of their

All three are exposed as deliberate deceivers

people

whose

single

personal power and pleasure.

aim

is

to

enhance

their

If they were to admit this,

and avoid the embarassment of self-contradiction, the game
would be over; better to accept defeat in one of Socrates'
little quibbles and live to plunder on the morrow.
three

maintain

a

consistency

on the

existential

All
level

which is unaffected by their dialectical inconsistency.115
Socrates seems to recognize that his purpose has
not been fulfilled.

After Callicles has decided to cut

his losses through self-contradiction and to make Socrates
proceed on his own, Plato has Socrates change tactics and
tell a story of the judgment of the dead.
discussion

has

failed

to

penetrate

Since rational
to

the

deeper

consciousness of his patients, Socrates can only attempt

115This interpretation of the dramatic structure of
the Gorgias is largely owed to James L. Wiser.
See
"Philosophy as Political Action:
A Reading of the
Gorgias," American Journal of Political Science (vol. XIX,
1975, pp. 313-22; "The Force of Reason:
On Reading
Plato's Gorgias," in Francis Canavan, ed., The Ethical
Dimension of Political Life:
Essays in Honor of John H.
Hallowell (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press,
1983, pp. 49-60).
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to

find

common

dreadful

pathos

death.
knows

experiential
which

ground

attaches

to

by

the

eliciting

the

apprehension

of

Callicles cannot otherwise be shaken because he
the

way

to what he

wants within

the

contracted

reality of worldly struggles for power and pleasure, and
he is sure that he will not be called to account for his
actions.

This is assured by his rhetorical training and

by the gullibility of his prey.

Only the prospect of

death can cast a pall over what looks like a very bright
future of power after power.

The death of the body will

entail the death of all that is real for Callicles, who
cannot even hope that he is wrong in denying the existence
of a spiritual realm.

For if the soul were to live on it

would come before judges in Hades who are not as gullible
as

Athenian

reputation,

jurors:

stripped

of

his

eloquence

and

the rottenness of his soul would be exposed

and justice would finally be done.
The beautiful exhortation to virtue which closes
the dialogue goes unanswered, but there is little suspense
as to the outcome.

Socrates began the story with the plea

that it is a true one, but he acknowledges that Callicles
wil 1 take it for a myth.
character such as

We can safely assume that a

Callicles would have

found a

way to

quell whatever disturbance the story might have caused in
his soul.

The moment of dread will almost always pass and

be forgotten, with the soul left unreformed.

Owing to the
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persistent corruption of
will

also

eminent

go

its dominant element the city

unreformed.

citizens

to

a

Socrates
life

of

does

not

reverence

lead
and

the

self-

examination: he drives them to murderous anger.
Plato would seem to have led us to an impasse.

As a

physician of the soul and society he was able to diagnose
and conceptualize the sources of psychic nosos
and

ataxia

(disorder)

as

hybris,

(disease)

pleonexia,

epithymia, amathia and polypragmosyne.

thymes,

He was also able

to set forth patterns for the right order of the soul and
society.

Yet remedies that patients cannot stomach are

not cures, regardless of their hypothetical effectiveness.
It is surely to Plato's credit that during his passionate
search for a cure in the midst of a profound social crisis
he could calmly instruct his readers about the intricate
difficulties which confront such a project.

It must also

be remembered that a diagnosis is not invalidated because
the remedy for which it calls turns out to be unworkable
in

practice.

unworkable:

The

remedy

of

periagoge

is

not

simply

the turning around of the soul is a symbol

developed to recount an actual experience of Plato and
possibly of others in his circle as well, but the remedy
cannot be socially effective because the periagoge cannot
be compelled at the behest of the philosopher.
the

eminent

citizens

were

less

unwilling

remain the problem that the periagoge

Even if

there

would

is not merely a
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matter of will.

As Plato describes the experience in the

Republic, it is by the agency of some external force that
a person is "released and suddenly compelled to stand up,
to turn his neck around, to walk and look up toward the
light.n116

The Platonic philosopher does not know the

force which compelled his own assent,

and does not know

why he was chosen rather than the others.
of

Christianity

it

is

as

though

the

In the language
periagoge

is

mysteriously granted by grace, and the recipient of grace
does not also receive the capacity to extend it to others.
According to Plato's Socrates,
You should be well aware that, if anything should be
saved and become such as it ought in regimes in this
kind of condition, it won't be bad if you say that a
god's dispensation saved it.117
Plato ultimately recognized that only divine dispensation
could

save

conviction

his
of

contemporaries.
certain

medieval

This

was

also

the

sectarians,

with

the

difference that Plato did not think himself capable of
calling forth such a dispensation.

The impasse at which

we are left is the impasse of the metaxy.

The impasse is

set by our inability to either perfect or flee the world,
and is rich with the tensions of being in--but not of--the
world.
For Voegelin these tensions became even more acute
116plato, The Republic of Plato, 515c, p. 194.
117rbid., 493a, p. 172.
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with

the

epiphany

following chapter.

of

Christ,

as

will

be

seen

in

the

In parousiasm we will encounter the

consciousness in which worldly reality is eclipsed by an
apprehension of transcendent perfection.

In ideological

consciousness it is the transcendent which is eclipsed by
the passion for worldly perfection.

These post-Christian

mutations of metastatic faith and prometheanism stem from
the same experiential basis in the human condition--from
tensions
"solve."
for

which

Plato

could

articulate

but

could

not

Plato did not find a socially effective "cure"

pneumapathological

consciousness,

and

in

the

final

chapter we shall see whether Voegelin's similar effort met
with any greater success.
to offer.

Plato did, however, have advice

In Theaetetus the wisdom of the mature Plato is

crystallized in a speech of Socrates which simultaneously
shows the way and shows that the way is perilous.

It is

remarkable that a

stern

passage which could stand as a

warning against either basic

form of psychic

imbalance

could also be used to express either form of imbalance:
Evils, Theodorus, can never be done away with, for the
good must always have its contrary; nor have they any
place in the divine world, but they must needs haunt
this region of our mortal nature.
That is why we
should make all speed to take flight from this world
to the other, and that means becoming like the divine
so far as we can, and that again is to become
righteous with the help of wisdom.Ila

ll8p1ato,
Theaetetus,
.!l.ialogues of Plato, p. 881.

176a-b,

in

The

Collected
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with modifications no greater than a touch of reification
here and there, this passage could be cited with approval
either

by

the

gnostic

who

regards

the

world

as

the

preserve of an evil second god, or by the ideologist who
would deify humanity through systematic knowledge.
did

not,

of

course,

succumb to these temptations,

Plato
but

their presence at the center of his thought suggests that
the tensions in the field of consciousness are heightened
as one moves toward the point of balance.

This in turn

shows the ultimate reason why Platonic philosophy cannot
provide a
psyche.

socially effective cure for the nosos of the
Imbalanced consciousness of either basic variety

is a movement away from the tension of consciousness in
the

"In-Between";

Plato's

philosophy

leads

precisely

toward the tension which the pneumapath would flee.

CHA.Pl'ER III

A NEW HEAVEN AND A NEW EARTH

One of the most remarkable aspects of Voegelin' s
work was his ability to break with his own theoretical
programs.

Writers are frequently said to be their own

toughest critics, but of course we know that they are also
frequently

their

own

greatest

admirers.

This

latter

tendency was not to be found in Voegelin, whose integrity
led him to criticize the theoretical structures which he
had outgrown in the strongest of terms.
that

he

abandoned

the

History

of

Voegelin remarked
Western

Political

Thought, a four-thousand page manuscript which has yet to
be published, after "it dawned on me that the conception
of a history of ideas was an ideological deformation of
reality."l

A new program, announced in The New Science of

Poli tics and carried halfway to completion in the first
three volumes of Order and History, was in turn rejected.
Voegelin discovered that his own conception of the process

lvoegelin, "Autobiographical Memoir" ( 1973), p. 64,
quoted in Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution:
A
Biographical Introduction, p. 77.
on this initial break
see Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin:
Philosopher of History,
pp.
6-7: William c. Havard,
"Voegelin's Changing
Conception of History and Consciousness," in Stephen A.
McKnight, ed., Eric Voegelin's Search for Order in
History, pp.
14-16,
24; Gregor Sebba, "Prelude and
Variations on the Theme of Eric Voegelin," in Ellis
Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's Thought:
A Critical
Appraisal, pp. 15-17.
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of

history

was

characterized

vitiated

the

by

ideological

in Voegelin's

very

philosophies

which he had sought to surpass.2
was announced

the

flaw
of

which
history

This second major break

seventies,

History had met with lavish praise.

after Order and

Voegelin was his own

toughest critic in part because his readers could simply
not keep up.

Commentators are confronted with a body of

writings which
also

is not only intrinsically difficult but

internally

inclined

to

divided,

explore

new

and

since

Voegelin

directions

than

was

to

more

explain

precisely what could or could not be salvaged from prior
paths, great care must be exercized when pronouncing any
thesis a constant in Voegelin's work.
One such constant in Voegelin's work is the view
that

Christianity

generation

and

is

of

expansion

fundamental
of

importance

ideological

in

the

consciousness.

This view informs all of his major writings from Political
Religions

(1938)

to

The

Ecumenic Age,

despite

several

2voegelin's coinage for this flaw is "historiogenesis, " or the conception of history as a sequential,
unilinear process of advancement from a point of cosmicdivine origin to the present.
Voegelin broke with the
initial program for Order and History after realizing that
the five basic types of order with which he was working
could not be aligned in any time sequence which would
permit the conception of history as a "course."
See
Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 1-11, 57-113, and
Barry Cooper, "The Concept of Historiogenesis," in The
Political Theory of Eric Voegelin (Queenston: The Edward
Mellen Press, 1986), pp. 125-160.
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intervening

shifts

in

emphasis.3

Yet

it

is

not

immediately apparent how this fact can be squared with the
interpretation

of

the

preceding

chapters,

viz.,

that

Voegelin's last works trace the deepest roots of spiritual
disorder into the human condition itself.
special

importance

be

accorded

to

Why should such

Christianity,

which

arose in a particular place at a particular time, if the
sources of pneumapathological consciousness are held to be
universal and perennial?
We can begin to work toward an answer by recalling
the distinction between ideological and pneumapathological
consciousness from the first chapter.

The constant theme

in Voegelin's writings is that ideological consciousness
is a

post- or anti-Christian phenomenon,

one which can

only

be

background

understood

by

reference

to

the

of

3voegelin,
Die politischen Religionen (Vienna:
Bermann-Fischer, 1938.
Reprinted, 1939, with a new
Forward,
Stockholm:
Bermann-Fischer).
English
translation, by T. J. DiNapoli and E. s. Easterly III,
Political Religions (Queenston:
The Edward Mellen Press,
1986).
The principal shift in emphasis was from the view
that a series of unfortunate decisions by ecclesiastics in
the catholic Church created a vacuum in spiritual
leadership to a focus on the inherently unstable dynamics
of Christian faith itself.
On the former see John A.
Gueguen, "Voegelin's From Enlightenment to Revolution: A
Review Article," The Thomist (vol. XLII, 1978, pp. 12335), pp. 128-30.
On the latter see The New Science of
Politics:
An Introduction (1952), pp. 122-26, 129; The
Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 17-22, 239-41, 300-304.
The
former view did not disappear completely in the late
writings of Voegelin.
Cf., e.g., "Response to Professor
Altizer' s 'A New History and a New but Ancient God?' 11 in
Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's Thought:
A Critical
Appraisal, p. 191.
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Christian

consciousness

against

rebellion.

But

variant

pneumapathological

of

ideological

which

consciousness

it

arose

is

in

only one

consciousness,

just

as

Christiantiy is only one among a number of modes in which
the

tensions

of

existence

in

the

metaxy

have

been

symbolized (albeit the most fully differentiated of these
Thus it is possible to maintain that the sources

modes}.
of

pneumapathological

perennial,
which

are

universal

and

in the sense of being derived from tensions

inhere

in

maintaining that
force

consciousness

behind

the

human

Christianity

particular

condition,
is

the

while

central

manifestations

of

still

formative
spiritual

disorder.
The conditio humana (in Voegelin's very broad sense
of existence in the metaxy) has always been what it is-but

has

not

always

been

recognized

for

what

it

is.4

4This simple insight provides the key to
understanding why Voegelin sought to develop a philosophy
of consciousness within a philosophy of history.
The
principle also helps to explain how Voegelin could
maintain that human nature does not change and yet make
the statement quoted in the last chapter that the men of
the seventh century B.C. had no souls, immortal or
otherwise.
The statement serves the twofold function of
illustrating the idea that a soul is not really a soul
until
it
is experienced as the
"sensorium of
transcendence," while also criticizing those who reify the
symbol of psyche.
On human nature as an historical
discovery see Conversations with Eric Voegelin (1980), p.
81.

109
According
Yet,

to

human

change

in

Voegel in,

human

understanding
the

of

process

nature
human

that

does

not

nature

Voegelin

change. 5

does

indeed

called

the

differentiation of the truth of existence, and different
forms of self-understanding entail differing levels of the
tensions

inherent

condition per

~

in

the

human

condition.

The

human

is not a sufficient condition for the

development of pneumapathological consciousness; a variety
of

circum-stances

ranging

from

the

personal

to

the

civilizational spheres of existence must coalesce for such
a

development

to

occur.

The necessary conditions

for

spiritual disorder arise as soon as human beings become
aware of the mystery of divine presence in reality,
Voegelin's analysis

of the

and

petroglyphic symbols of the

Palaeolithicum suggests that this awareness dates from at
least

as

far

back

as

ca.

B.c.6

20,000

Yet

the

dim

apprehension that humanity does not sit atop the hierarchy
of

being

is

not

sufficient

to

bring

forth

the

consciousness which hates the gods or seeks to enlist them
in worldly struggles,
would

divinize

immanent

much less the consciousness which

humanity

reality.

One

through
need

not

the
find

manipulation
a

5voegelin, The New Science of Politics:
duction (1952), p. 165.

of

Palaeolithic
An Intro-

6voegelin, "Response to Professor Altizer' s 'A New
History and a New but Ancient God?'" in Ellis Sandoz, ed.,
Eric voegelin's Thought: A Critical Appraisal, p. 190.
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equivalent to Marx to confirm Voegelin's thesis on the
perennial
because

nature
the

of the

thesis

pneumapathological

sources of spiritual disorder,

does

not

imply

consciousness

is

that

each

somehow

type

built

the human organism and may break out at any time.

of

into

A Marx

cannot be imagined in the absence of a Judea-Christian
culture which de-divinizes nature by locating the ground
of being in a transcendent realm, thus making possible the
notion that not only nature but reality itself is without
divine

forces

of

order.

And even this

civilizational

atmosphere is not a sufficient condition which will give
rise to the advent of elaborate Second Realities such as
that

offered

by

Marx.

For

this

to

occur

the

Judeo-

Christian culture must be in a phase of decomposition so
that the symbols developed to express experiences of the
First reality can be misunderstood by a thinker as untrue
propositions about "things. 11 7

Science and technology must

also have developed to the point that a thinker could fall
into

the

illusion

that

creation of supermen.

these

are

sufficient

for

the

In addition there must appear a

deeply alienated individual with vast intellectual powers
and an absence of certain existential virtues, and if his
Second Reality is not to be a hermitage he must appear at
a time when the critical instruments of philosophy are so

7see Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age {1974), pp. 36-43.
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little known that "opinions which would have been laughed
out of court in the late Middle Ages or the Renaissance"
can attain general respectability.a
This list of necessary conditions involved in the
phenomenon of Marxism could be expanded further,

but the

Al though the sources of

point should already be clear.

pneumapathological consciousness are rooted in the human
condition,

which does not change in its essentials,

various manifestations have

a

shaped by historical events.

For Voegelin the single most

important

event

in

the

history because

its

history of

spiritual

they are

order and

disorder is the epiphany of Christ, which is not to say
that

Christianity

consciousness,

but

is

the

rather

"cause"
that

of
it

pneumapathological
has

been

the

most

salient of a broad set of catalytic factors which help to
explain the particular patterns we have termed parousiasm
and ideological consciousness.
Yet the resolution of this problem leads only to
another, more difficult issue.

Even if it is allowed that

a particular "leap in being," such as Christianity, may
stand as a

catalytic factor independent of the tensions

imposed by the human condition itself,
seen

how

certain

"leaps"

can have

a

it remains to be
greater catalytic

8 voegelin, "Autobiographical Memoir" (1973), p. 49,
quoted in Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution:
A
I!.iographical Introduction, p. 86.
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If all of the great conceptions of

effect than others.

human existence in the metaxy are held to be,
sense,

equivalent,

why

would

greater dangers than others?
essentially unchanging,

certain

in some

conceptions

pose

If the human condition is

and if the various modes of the

"opening of the soul" are openings onto the same divine
reality,

why would the balance of consciousness be more

precarious for a Christian than for a Platonist or a Jew?
These

questions

are

especially

troubling

in

light

of

voegelin's repeated assertions that Christianity at its
best provides the most fully differentiated understanding
of human existence in the metaxy. 9

Voegelin held that the

ancient search for the true order of being culminates in
the Christian recognition of Jesus as
mediator between the poles of the metaxy.

the divine/human
How, then, can

this advance in human understanding of the order of being
be seen as the great catalyst behind medieval and modern
disorders of the soul?
A direct answer is not immediately apparent in any
of Voegelin's writings, but it is possible to clarify his
argument

by

extrapolating

from

his

account

of

the

9 voegelin, The New Science of Politics:
An Introduction (1952), pp. 77-79, 164; "On Christianity," (letter
to Alfred Schutz of January 1, 1953) in Peter Opitz and
Gregor Sebba, eds. , The. Philosophy of Order:
Essays on
History, Consciousness and Politics, pp. 450ff; "The
Gospel and Culture" (1971), p. 77; The Ecumenic Age
(1974), pp. 303-304.
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experiential dynamics of the search for order.
recalled

that

for

contingency--and
experience--that
being.

Voegelin
the

it

was

anxiety

prompts

the

the

which

search

It will be

experience

attends
for

the

to

of

this

ground

of

The questions of "where-from" and "what-for" arise

from the human condition itself, and Voegelin,
Aristotle,

following

held that the search for understanding is a

constant in human history.

Voegelin's description of the

events in consciousness which initiate the search suggests
a plurality of motivations:

the seeker desires a true

understanding of the ontological structure of reality, but
also a

release from the pressure of anxious uncertainty

and the prospect of meaninglessness.

These motivations

will have been present, according to Voegelin, regardless
of whether

the

results

of the

search are

subsequently

expressed mythologically, philosophically,

theologically,

or

certainty

even

ideologically.

Both

truth

and

are

sought, but if the truth turns out to be that the order of
being

is

essentially

mysterious,

the

anxiety

of

uncertainty may be deepened rather than alleviated in the
course

of

the

search.

Thus

we

can

make

sense

of

Voegelin's observation that Christianity brought to light
the

fully

differentiated

truth

of

the

soul

while

simultaneously offering less certainty than more compact
understandings.

A particular representation of the order

of

be

being

can

both

more

accurate

than

prior

114
representations,
differentiated

when

measured

experiences

of

against

reality,

and

maximally
yet

less

assuaging of the anxiety which prompts every search for
order.
A truth which requires faith for its confirmation
Those who do not

will leave many a seeker unsatisfied.
have

or

cannot

maintain

the

capacity

for

gracefully

accepting a truth which does not slake the natural human
thirst for certainty will have ample motivation to strike
out again in search of something more tangible and less
This

trying.

ideological
post-

or

is

the

sense

consciousness

in

were

anti-Christian

which

parousiasm

regarded by Voegelin

phenomena.

The

drive

and
as
for

certainty was inflamed rather than calmed by Christianity
because "uncertainty is the very essence of Christianity."
This

well-known

observation

from

The

New

Science

of

Politics opens a passage in which Voegelin set forth his
understanding
experience
conciseness,

and

of

the

connection

spiritual

clarity,

between

disorientation

Christian

with

greater

and beauty of expression than he

achieved in any later work:
The feeling of security in a "world full of gods" is
lost with the gods themselves; when the world is dedivinized, communication with the world-transcendent
God is reduced to the tenuous bond of faith, in the
sense of Heb. 11:1, as the substance of things hoped
for and the proof of things unseen.
Ontologically,
the substance of things hoped for is nowhere to be
found but in faith itself; and, epistemologically,
there is no proof for things unseen but again this

115
very faith.
The bond is tenuous, indeed, and it may
snap easily.
The life of the soul in openness toward
God, the waiting, the periods of aridity and dullness,
guilt and despondency, contrition and repentance,
forsakenness and hope against hope,
the silent
stirrings of love and grace, trembling on the verge of
a certainty which if gained is loss [sic]--the very
lightness of this fabric may prove too heavy a burden
for men who lust for massively possessive experience.
The danger of a breakdown of faith to a socially
relevant degree, now, will increase in the measure in
which Christianity is a worldly success, that is, it
will
grow when
Christianity penetrates
a
civilizational area thoroughly,
supported by
institutional pressure, and when, at the same time, it
undergoes an internal process of spiritualization, of
a more complete realization of its essence. The more
people are drawn into the Christian orbit, the greater
will be the number among them who do not have the
spiritual stamina for the heroic adventure of the soul
that is Christianity .•.. 10
For Voegelin the truth of Christianity was essentially
mysterious,1 1

and

thus,

unlike

forms

of

lOvoegelin, The New Science of Politics:
duction (1952), pp. 122-23.

truth

which

An Intro-

11This did not become fully clear prior to Voegelin's
increasingly frequent references to "the Unknown God" in
his late work.
In a 1977 article Voegelin' s longtime
friend Gregor Sebba explained what a surprise it had been
for him to learn of the essentially mystical character of
Voegelin's philosophical activity:
"To me," Sebba wrote,
"Eric Voegelin has always been an exemplary representative
of rationality in the Greek sense, but when I argued that
against a statement calling him a mystic philosopher he
wrote back:
'This will shock you, but I am a mystic
philosopher. ' 11
"Prelude and Variations on the Theme of
Eric Voegelin," Southern Review (n.s., vol. XIII, 1977,
pp. 646-76), p. 662.
On Voegelin's references to "the
Unknown God" see Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, "Professor
Voegelin and the Christian Tradition," in Christianity and
Political Philosophy {Athens, Georgia:
University of
Georgia Press, 1978), pp. 193-208; John A. Gueguen,
"Voegelin's From Enlightenment to Revolution:
A Review
Article," op. cit., pp. 125-26; James M. Rhodes, "Voegelin
and Christian Faith," op. cit., pp. 84-89.
On Voegelin's
mysticism see Russell Nieli, "Eric Voegelin: Gnosticism,
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impose

a

finality

upon

Christian

consciousness

struggle

which

Accordingly,
inevitable

was

required

Voegelin
that

the

a

process

of

understood
great

seemed

Christian

to

questioning,

as

spiritual

an

ongoing
stamina.

take

it as

natural

or

culture

would

produce

an

almost continual stream of efforts to develop less arduous
modes of orientation.12

Although these forms vary widely

in terms of their specific content,13 two basic tendencies
can be observed:

one may dispense with the mysteries of

transcendent truth by collapsing reality into its immanent
dimension, or one may distort Christianity in such a way
as to make its truth appear to be certain, immediate and
tangible.

Out of the former tendency flow the histories

of materialism, scientism and ideology; out of the latter
tendency flow the histories of chiliasm, millenarianism,
Mysticism, and Modern Radical Poli tics, 11 Southern Review
(n.s., vol. XXIII, 1987, pp. 332-48), pp. 340-46.
12cf. Voegelin,
(1968), pp. 108-110.

science,

Politics

and

Gnosticism

13Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium:
Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the
Middle Ages (New York:
Oxford University Press, revised
edition,
1970),
second page of the unpaginated
"Introduction":
"Millenarian sects and movements have
varied in attitude from the most violent aggressiveness to
the mildest pacifism and from the most ethereal
spirituality to the most earthbound materialism. And they
have also varied greatly in social composition and social
function."
One of the central tenets of Cohn's work,
however, is that in its essentials the vision of the
millenarian is remarkably consistent from movement to
movement. See p. 117 below.

117
and apocalyptic hysteria, or the history of the phenomena
we have termed parousiasm.
The

wealth

Christian

groups

argument,

at

of

recent

would

least

to

studies

seem

to

the

extent

of

"heretical"

corroborate
that

Voegelin's

the

apparent

pervasiveness of parousiastic phenomena suggests a more
than accidental connection between the rigors of Christianity

and

a

widely
This

disorientation.

discernible

pervasiveness

pattern
is

not

of
only

geographical and chrono-logical but also social, in so far
as no segment of the population would seem to have been
immune

to

outbreaks

unimportant

point,

of parousiasm.14
despite

the

fact

This

is

not

an

that

Voegelin's

argument gives us reason to doubt that social class has
much to do with spiritual disorder, because much of the
recent literature has been produced by Marxist writers who
endeavor to show that heretical movements were actually
forms

of

class

struggle. 15

There

is

indeed

a

strong

historical correlation between various types of hardship
or catastrophe and outbreaks of parousiasm, and certain of
these

types,

such

as

famine,

are

indeed stratified

in

14rbid. See also Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End:
Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 29-30.
15cf. Norman Cohn, "Foreward," to The Pursuit of the
Millennium.
This area of Marxist "scholarship" can be
traced to Engels. See The Peasant War in Germany (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1972).
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their effects along class lines.
with

most

types

of

natural

Yet this is not the case
disaster,

nor

are

class

distinctions particularly important when plague strikes or
an empire is destroyed.

Had Voegelin deigned to join in

the controversy on the question of whether the roots of
heresy are psychic or material,

he would probably have

argued that both are important but that parousiasm

(as

distinct from simple doctrinal error) must ultimately be
recognized as a phenomenon in consciousness.
precise,

he

might

have

argued

that

To be more

purely

mundane

hardships do lead to acute forms of distress,
lead

to

spiritual

disorientation

when

these

but only
hardships

cannot be reconciled within a consciousness of the world
as providentially ordered.

The dissonance occasioned by

hardship is surely greater for one who must square the
indifference of

nature and the

empires with

providential

a

than for one who need not;

senseless

succession of

understanding of

the world

in the latter case we might

expect reactions such as cynicism or ruthlessness, but not
the

fervent

expectation

that

things

must

soon

be

set

aright by powers divine.
Christianity has from its very inception provided
fertile ground for such expectations, but it is important
to

stress

once

again

that

this

class

of

phenomena

antedates Christianity and is not a simple "effect" of a
Christian

"cause."

Al though the debate

as to how far
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Christ's

own

apocalypticism

teaching
has

was

continued

influenced
since

the

by

Jewish

problem

was

formulated over eighty years ago by Johannes Weiss and
Albert Schweitzer, 16 there is no longer much doubt that
messianism and millenarianism are prominent
Jewish history.
in

Jewish

features

of

Norman Cohn's account of millenarianism

history

dovetails

with

Voegelin's

view

that

parousiasm results from the pressure exerted by senseless
events

in history upon the consciousness

imbued with a

sensitivity to the divinely ordained nature of history:
Precisely because they were so utterly certain of
being the Chosen People, Jews tended to react to
peril, oppression and hardship by phantasies of the
total triumph and boundless prosperity which Yahweh,
out of his omnipotence, would bestow upon his Elect in
the fulness of time. Already in the Prophetical Books
there are passages--some of them dating from the
eighth century--that foretell how, out of an immense
cosmic catastrophe, there will arise a Palestine which
will be nothing less than a new Eden, Paradise
regained .... It will be a just world, where the poor
are protected, and a harmonious and peaceful world,
where wild and dangerous beasts have become tame and
harmless.
The moon will shine as the sun and the
sun's light will be increased sevenfold.
There will
be an abundance of water and provender for flocks and
herds, for men there will be an abundance of corn and
wine and fish and fruit; men and flocks will miltiply
exceedingly.
Freed from disease and sorrow of every
kind, doing no more iniquity but living according to
the law of Yahweh now written in their hearts, the
Chosen People will live in joy and gladness.17
It was expected that this paradise would be preceded by
16cf. Johannes Weiss, Jesus' Proclamation of the
Kingdom of God {Goettingen, 1892) and Albert Schweitzer,
The Quest for the Historical Jesus {Tuebingen, 1906).
17cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, pp. 19-20.
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pestilence, war, captivity, and the proliferation of every
sort of abomination.

Thus the righteous are provided with

an explanation of how such tribulations could befall the
chosen People:
of the

The tribulations can be seen as portents

day of Yahweh,

a

Day of Wrath when the wicked

within and the enemy without will be cast down, when the
sun and the moon will be darkened, when the heavens will
be rolled together and the earth shaken.
senselessness

of

worldly

catastrophe

sensible but even desirable as a

In this way the
becomes

not

only

sign that the Day of

Yahweh will soon come to pass.
This prophetic vision was to arise again and again,
at

least

in

its

Jewish history.18

essential

aspects,

throughout

ancient

The Apocalyptic "dream" which occupies

Chapter VII of the Book of Daniel was composed at the
height of the Maccabean revolt, which resulted from the
banning of Jewish religious observances by the Seleucid
monarch Antiochus IV Epiphanes.

Reflecting on the sym-

bolism of this apocalyptic vision, Cohn noted that:
Already one can recognize the paradigm of what was to
become and remain the central
phantasy of
revolutionary eschatology.
The world is dominated by
an evil, tyrannous power of boundless destructiveness-a power moreover which is imagined not as simply
human but as demonic. The tyranny of that power will
18see D. s. Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish
Apocalyptic (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1964); R. H.
Charles, Eschatology:
The Doctrine of a Future Life in
Israel, Judaism and Christianity (New York:
Schocken
Books, 1963).
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become more and more outrageous, the suffering of its
victims more and more intolerable--until suddenly the
hour will strike when the Saints of God are able to
rise up and overthrow it. Then the saints themselves,
the chosen, holy people who hitherto have groaned
under the oppressor's heel, shall in turn inherit
dominion over the whole earth.
This will be the
culmination of history; the Kingdom of the Saints will
not only surpass in glory all previous kingdoms, it
will have no successors.1~
It bears pointing out that when Cohn refers here to a
paradigm which became and remained the central phantasy of
revolutionary eschatology he refers not only to the later
apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch, nor only to that of John
or

those

of

medieval

times

inspired

by

the

Book

of

Revelation, but also to the revolutionary eschatology of
modern ideological movements.20
Difficult as it may be to disentangle the Jewish
and Christian apocalypticism of the first century A.D.,
experts generally agree that Christianity gave rise to an
independent body of apocalyptic literature.21
a considerable

number of Jewish apocalyptic

To be sure,
texts were

19cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, p. 21.
For
text and commentary see Andre Lacoque, The Book of Daniel
(David Pellauer, trans., English edition revised by the
author) (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1979).
20on the apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch,
Charles, Eschatology, op. cit., pp. 323-53.

see R.

H.

21 christopher Rowland, The Open Heaven:
A study of
Apocalyptic in Judaism and Early Christianity (New York:
Crossroad, 1982), pp. 358ff; D. s. Russell, The Method and
Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, op. cit., p. 34; Bernard
McGinn, Visions of the End, op. cit., pp. 11-16; R. H.
Charles, Eschatology, op. cit., pp. 362-400; Norman Cohn,
The Pursuit of the Millennium, pp. 23-29.
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incorporated

into

the

early

Christian

canon

with

the

adoption of the LXX translation of the Old Testament, many
of which were taken over just as they stood and continued
to

enjoy

a

widespread

century.22
who

made

popularity well

into

the

third

Other texts were revised by Christian editors
them

interpolated

more
them

suitable
with

for

new

specifically Christian doctrines.

their

material

The

popularity

of

or

expressing

Examples of this are

the Sibylline Oracles and II Esdras,
augmented.2 3

purposes

which were freely

these

writings

among

Christians is not difficult to understand, since the hopes
and claims of the early Christian Church were enhanced in
their authority by the teachings of these texts concerning
"the two ages," the imminent coming of the Messiah,

the

messianic kingdom, the woes of the last days, the judgment
of the world, the resurrection of the dead, the future lot
of the wicked and the righteous,

etc.

Yet it is well

established that many apocalyptic texts were composed by
Christians.

Although some of these are known to us only

by

in

name

or

fragmentary

allusions,

many others have

220. s. Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish
Apocalyptic,
op.
cit.,
pp.
33-35; W.
D. McHardy,
"Introduction" to The New English Bible:
The Apocrypha
(Oxford and Cambridge:
Oxford and Cambridge University
Presses, 1970), pp. xi-xiii.
23Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End, op. cit., pp.
43-50; D. S. Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish
Apocalyptic, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
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survived,

among

the

most

important

of

which

are

The

fil?ocalypse of Peter, the Shepherd of Hermas, the Epistle
Qf the Apostles, the Apocalypse of Paul, and the Ascension
It was only through a long and controversial

gf Isaiah.
process

that

canonical

authority

was

denied

to

these

apocryphal writings, which nevertheless retained influence
It seems that apocalyptic and

in Christian communities.

millenarian writings and movements sprang up as quickly as
the Patres could put them dowm.
Of these movements Montanism
known.

is the most widely

Around A.O. 156 a certain Montanus, who claimed to

be the incarnation of the Holy Ghost, began to surround
himself

with

experiences
Testament. 11 24

a

number

were

of

brought

it was

ecstatics

together

whose

to

form

visionary
a

"Third

asserted that the New Jerusalem

foretold in Revelation would soon descend onto Pepuza, an
obscure

Phrygian

town,

and

thus

all

Christians

summoned there to await the Second Coming.

were

The Montanists

were ascetical to the point of inviting martyrdom, which
probably

resulted

from

the

passage

in

the

Book

of

Revelation where it is said that those who "were beheaded
for the witness of Jesus and for the word of God" are the
ones who would reign in the new realm with Christ for a

2 4 Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, p. 25.
See also Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End, op. cit., pp.
21-27.
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thousand years.

Consequently, Cohn has written,

Nothing was so propitious to the spread of Montanism
as persecution; and when, from the year 177 onwards,
Christians were being once again persecuted in many
provinces of the Empire, Montanism suddenly ceased to
be merely a local movement and spread far and wide,
not only through Asia Minor but to Africa, Rome, and
even Gaul.
Al though Montanists no longer looked to
Phrygia, their confidence in the imminent appearance
of the New Jerusalem was unshaken; and this was true
even of Tertulian, the most famous theologian in the
West at that time, when he joined the movement.25
Cohn argues that in expecting the Second Coming from day
to day and week to week the Montanists were "following in
the

footsteps

of

many,

perhaps

most,

of

the

earliest

Christians. 11 26
This judgment appears to be supported both by the
writings of certain apocalyptically inclined Fathers of
the early Church,

such as Lactantius,

as well as by the

disparaging accounts of heretical sects written by others
such as Eusebius and st. Augustine.27

In The Unmasking

and Refutation of False Gnosis by Irenaeus there can be
25rbid., pp. 25-26.
26rbid.

I

P• 26.

2 7 Lactantius, on the Deaths of the Persecutors (De
Mortibus Persecutorum), Mary Francis McDonald, trans., in
Lactantius:
The Minor Works (Washington:
The Catholic
University of America Press, 1965), pp. 137-203; see also
Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End, op. cit., pp. 23-25.
Eusebeus, The History of the Church from Christ to
Constantine (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England:
Penguin,
1965),
esp.
pp.
149-53.
Augustine,
City of God
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1984), 20:7,
pp. 906-910.
Note Augustine's uncharacteristic approval
of the prophecies of the Erythraean Sibyl, 18:23, pp. 78891.
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found a lengthy attack on a variety of movements, along
with a telling strain of apocalypticism in Irenaeus' own
theology. 28
vast

Although the issue of the orthodoxy of the

majority

decided

in

included

of

the

in

the

apocalyptic

writings

negative,

the

Book

canon

despite

of

was

ultimately

Revelation

misgivings

about

was
its

compatibility with the idea and mission of the Church.
Additional fuel for continued millenarianism was available
in the Gospels themselves,

most notably in the parallel

passages of Matthew 24-25, Mark 13, and Luke 21, as well
as

in

the

First

(4:13-5:11).29

Epistle

of

Paul

to

the

Thessalonians

According to Voegelin,

the life of the early Christian communities was not
fixed but oscillated between the eschatological
expectation of the parousia that would bring the
Kingdom of God[,] and the understandinq of the church
as the apocalypse of Christ in history.30
The conflict between apocalyptic and eschatological
28see esp. 5:25-35.
Chapters 25-29 are concerned
with the Antichrist; ch. 30 is a bridge section, and chs.
31-35 treat of the chiliastic kingdom.
See also Jean
Danielou, The Theology of Jewish Christianity (Chicago:
Henry Regnery, 1964), pp. 386ff.
29For a close reading of other brief passages see
Christopher Rowland, The Open Heaven, op. cit., pp. 358402.
30voegelin, the New Science of Politics:
An Introduction (1952), pp. 107-108.
The comma in this sentence
(which greatly adds to its clarity) does not appear in the
original due, according to Gregor Sebba, to an error in
typesetting.
See "Prelude and Variations on the Theme of
Eric Voegelin," in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's
Thought: A Critical Appraisal (1982), p. 23, 40n.
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Christianity

was

correctly

drawn

by

Voegelin

in

this

passage, but it is helpful to reverse his usage of these
adjectives in deference to the conventions of more recent
literature.

Following Alois Dempf, Voegelin applied the

term "apocalyptic" to the doctrine that the divine will is
revealed

in history and

historical consciousness,
logical"

millenarianism

While this was

an

in the

Church,

creating a

new

in opposition to the "eschatoof

the

Book

of

Revelation.31

improvement over earlier treatments,

which often invoked the terms interchangeably, more recent
works generally regard apocalypticism as a species of the
genus eschatology.32

All Christian conceptions of history

are eschatological in the sense that history is understood
as a teleological process toward a Scripturally revealed
End, but there is a vast difference between viewing the
events of one's time in the light of the End of history
and

seeing

them

as

the

last

events

themselves.

St.

Augustine provides the classic example that it is possible
to

be

deeply

apocalyptic.

eschatological

and

yet

distinctly

anti-

The conflict between these orientations, or

what Voegelin called the "oscillation" between them, was
31Alois
Dempf,
Sacrum Imerium
(Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1962), pp.
77ff.
Voegelin's usage of the term "apocalyptic" on page 33 of
In Search of Order (1987) suggests that he ultimately
recognized the need for this reversal.
32Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End,
3-5.

op. cit., pp.
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not resolved with doctrinal finality until St. Augustine
was able

to

"de-apocalypticize"

the Book of Revelation

with his highly allegorical interpretation in City of God
Augustine

20:7-17.

dismissed

literal

imminence of the millennium as

beliefs

"ridiculous

in

the

fables"

and

declared that
The Church even now is the kingdom of Christ and the
kingdom of heaven.
And so even now his saints reign
with him ...• For those people reign with Christ
who .•. are in his kingdom in such a way that they are
his kingdom. 33
Augustine held that the Book of Revelation was not to be
understood as a prophecy of impending events, but rather
as an allegory of the struggle between good and evil in
the

present

life

of

the

Church

and

in

the

life

of

individual souls.
According to Voegelin, "the Augustinian conception
of

the

church,

without

substantial

change,

remained

historically effective to the end of the Middle Ages. 11 34
Literalist interpretations of Revelation were thenceforth
pushed

beyond

existence.
de

force

millennial,

the

pale,

but

not

by

any

means

out

of

Despite what Voegelin called Augustine's "tour
of

interpretation,"

an

unbroken

stream

of

apocalyptic and parousiastic literature was

33Augustine, City of God,
Emphasis in original.

op.

cit.,

20:9,

34voegelin, The New Science of Politics:
duction {1952), p. 109.

p.

915.
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turned out between the years 400 and 1100; that is, in the
years prior to the writings and sects which have become
widely known through Cohn's The Pursuit of the Millennium.
Much

of

this

literature

has

translated into English. 35

now

been

compiled

and

Its very existence helps to

corroborate Voegelin's assertion, quoted above, that "the
continuum of metastatic movements has never been broken"-an assertion which in turn is central to the corroboration
of Voegelin' s

phenomenology of spiritual disorientation.

The entire range of symbols engendered by the chiliastic
excitement

of

certain

early

Christians,

and

preserved

within the canon in Revelation, continued to appear in the
interim between Augustine's work and the

first

serious

challenge to it, that of Joachim of Flora in the twelfth
century.

The apocalyptic literature of the period abounds

with the setting of dates for the apocalypse, visions of a
descending
Magog,

New Jerusalem,

and

continual

symbols

strange

identifications

figure as the Antichrist.
these

the

suggests

lore of Gog
of

this

or

and
that

The persistent reappearance of
that

they

were

important

for

conveying experiences that may grow out of Christianity
itself,

and

not

merely

out

of

the

persecutions

or

prophecies of early times.

35see the texts and commentary in Bernard McGinn,
Visions of the End, op. cit., pp. 37-125, and the
bibliography.
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Al though
Ages are

the millennial

movements

simply too numerous--and the

of

the

Middle

literature about

them too extensive36 __ for it to be possible to describe
them

in

any

detail,

we

can

at

least

get

a

sense

of

voegelin's understanding of the experiential dynamics of
these movements from his analysis of why St. Augustine's
philosophy of history and doctrine of the Church could not
effectively
st.

prevent

Augustine

doctrine

senescens,
would

was

away

forwarding

continued

a

indeed

from
view

outbreaks

successful

chiliasm
of

the

in

and

of

parousiasm.

turning

apocalypticism

present

as

the

for

an

unknowable

period

of

by

saeculum

the time of waiting for the Parousia,

last

Church

time.37

which
The

present age was cast as the last of six historical epochs.
These epochs are not marked by mundane events because such
events

are,

meaningfulness.38

by

definition,

devoid

of

true

The first epoch extends from Adam to

36see the excellent bibliographies in Gordon Leff,
Heresy in the Later Middle Ages (Manchester:
Manchester
University Press, 1967) ; Walter L. Wakefield and Austin P.
Evans, Heresies of the High Middle Ages (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1969); Bernard McGinn, Visions
of the End, op. cit.; Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the
Millennium, 2nd edition, 1970, op. cit.
37Augustine, city of God, op. cit., 22:30, p. 1091.
See also Voegelin, Science,
Politics and Gnosticism
(1968), pp. 92-93; The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp. 172, 268.
38see Karl Lowith, Meaning in History:
The
Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 166.
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the Flood: the second to Abraham and the third to David.
The fourth age extends from David to the Babylonian Exile,
and the fifth to the birth of Christ.
Christ
history

the

succession

comes

to

an

of

truly

With the birth of

meaningful

The meaning

end.

of

events

in

history

as

salvation is revealed with a finality such that for st.
Augustine the

historical

task of the

Church is not to

develop the Christian truth through successive stages (as
with Joachim)

but

understanding

of

something of a

barrier against heretical

also

served,

simply
the

according

to

spread

Christian

to

it. 3 9

While

mission

Voegelin,

as

this

served

as

innovations it
a

barrier

to

creativity which could not long stand against the human
penchant for

novelty. 40

Also restricted was the still

more powerful penchant of humans to endow their mundane or
political

activity with a

sense of mission--a penchant

which is so strong that it is probably better described as
a psychological need.

Although Voegelin held that this

need can give rise to such delusions as the notion that
history culminates in one's own efforts, he also held that
the tendency to conceive of one's political activity as an
expression of a particular understanding of transcendent

39rbid., pp. 145, 166.
40see Voegelin,
(1975), p. 14.

From

Enlightenment

to

Revolution

r
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order is not, in and of itself, pathological. 4 1

Voegelin

found evidence of this tendency in the earliest historical
records of major (i.e., post-tribal) political societies:
All of the early Empires, Near Eastern as well as Far
Eastern, understood themselves as representatives of a
transcendent order .... Whether one turns to the
earliest Chinese sources in the Shu King or to the
inscriptions of Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, or Persia,
one uniformly finds the order of the empire
interpreted as a representation of cosmic order in the
medium of human society.
The empire is a cosmic
analogue, a little world reflecting the order of the
great, comprehensive world.42
When the implications of the discovery of the human soul
were finally clearly drawn in the work of Plato it was
recognized that "a political society should be not only a
microcosmos but also a macroanthropos. 11 43

With this shift

in accent the pattern for political order is found not in
the rhythms of the cosmos but rather in the pattern of the
souls

of

the

transcendent

leading

citizens.

representation

was

Yet

the

element

not

lost,

since

of
a

political order was understood to be healthy to the extent
that

the

patterns

of

these

transcendent pattern of order.
rigid

articulation

of

souls

are

attuned

to

the

But with St. Augustine's

Christian

society

into

distinct

spiritual and temporal orders the political realm was de41voegelin, The New Science of Politics:
duction (1952), pp. 27-28, 168-69.
42rbid., p. 54.
43 rbid., p. 61.
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St. Augustine

divinized to the point of being devalued.

provided a valuable corrective against the more grotesque
manifestations
transcendent

of

the

significance

human
to

tendency

mundane

to

activity,

attach
but

for

voegelin this was accomplished at the cost of virtually
obscuring the significance of political activity per se.44
The following passage from Book V of the City of God would
seem to support Voegelin's contention:
As for this mortal life, which ends after a few days'
course, what does it matter under whose rule a man
lives, being so soon to die, provided that the rulers
do not force him to impious and wicked acts?45
If

human

tendency)
as

beings have

a

need

(or at

least a

continual

to understand their worldly political activity

transcendentally

meaningful,

as

Voegelin's

analysis

suggests, then we may expect that, when a civilization no
longer leaves room for the expression of this need,
need will make room for itself.

the

In a striking passage

that Voegelin admitted was "somewhat drastic," he seems to
have drawn precisely this conclusion:
If we formulate the deepest sentiment that causes the
spiritual tensions of the West since the Middle Ages
somewhat drastically, we might say that the bearers of
Western civilization do not want to be a senseless
appendix to the history of antiquity: they want to
understand their civilizational
existence as
meaningful. If the Church is not able to see the hand
of God in the History of mankind, men will not remain
44see Voegelin, "World
Mankind" (1962), pp. 184-88.

Empire

and

the

Unity

45Augustine, city of God, op. cit., 5:17, p. 205.
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satisfied but will go out in search of gods who take
some interest in their civilizational efforts.
The
church has abandoned its spiritual leadership insofar
as it has left post-medieval man without guidance in
his endeavors to find meaning in a
complex
civilization which differs profoundly in its horizons
of reason, nature and history from the ancient that
was absorbed and penetrated by the early Church.
In
the face of this abandonment of the magisterium it is
futile when Christian thinkers accuse the superbia of
modern man who will not submit to the authority of the
Church.
There is always enough superbia in man to
bolster the accusation plausibly, but the complaint
dodges the real issue:
that man in search of
authority cannot find it in the Church, through no
fault of his own.46
st.

Augustine's

symbolization

of

the

era

after

Christ as the saeculum senescens remained effective only
on the doctrinal
ideas

and

level.

movements

were

As we have seen,
pushed

beyond

orthodoxy but not out of existence,
century the

expansion of medieval

parousiastic
the

pale

of

and by the twelfth

civilization and the

rise of monastic orders led to such reinterpretations of
history

as

the

Chronica

of

Otto

writings of Joachim of Flora. 47

of

Freising

and

the

According to Voegelin,

46voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975),
pp. 22-23.
47voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 268.
Otto
and Joachim were not alone in their unwillingness to
conceive of their own age as a mere time of waiting, nor
were they alone in regarding the rise of monastic orders
as a portent of an impending advance in an historical
process of spiritual fulfillment. In a chapter on Joachim
from Voegelin' s unpublished History of Western Poli ti cal
Thought three other writers are also mentioned in this
connection:
Rup_ert of Deutz (De sancta trinitate et
operibus eius, c. 1110); Honorius of Autun (Summa Gloria,
c. 1120); Anselm of Havelberg (Liber de una forma credendi
et multiformitate vivendi, c. 1135).
The tremendous
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both Otto and Joachim interpreted the flowering of the
monastic life as an event which indicated a meaningful
advance in the process of transfiguration after the age of
Christ and before the end of the world. 48

Joachim broke

with the Augustinian conception of Christian society by
applying

the

symbol

of

the

Trinity

to

the

course

of

history in such a way that the impending era could be
understood not as a mere time of waiting but as the time
of

ultimate

spiritual

consummation.

The

history

of

mankind was divided into three ages which were said to
correspond to the three Persons of the Trinity.

The first

period of the world, the age of the Father, was succeeded
by the

age

of the Son upon the

appearance of Christ.

According to Joachim's calculations (based principally on
Rev. 11:3 and 12:6, along with Matt. 1:17) the third age
would
Spirit

appear within
would

entail

two
the

generations.
ultimate

purpose on earth and in time,

The

age

revelation

of

of

the

God's

and since the papacy and

clerical hierarchy are institutions of the second epoch,
enthusiasm with which Joachim's writings were received by
figures such as Hugh of Digne, Gerard of Borgo San Domingo
and John of Parma suggests that the Augustinian conception
of the saeculum senescens had worn thin as a deterrent to
millenarianism.
See Gordon Leff, Heresy in the Latter
Middle Ages, op. cit., pp. 68-83.
48voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 268; The New
Science of Politics: An Introduction (1952), pp. 110-113,
119.
See also Karl Lowith, Meaning in History, op. cit.,
pp. 150-51.
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Joachim held that the existing Church would have to yield
to the coming Church of the Spirit.49
Joachim

did

not

claim

himself

to

be

the

Dux

e

Babylone who would usher in the coming era, nor did he, as
a man of the second era, criticize the contemporary Church
or draw revolutionary conclusions from his visions.

His

followers were not nearly so circumspect, and as the year
1260 drew near there broke out an unusually intense and
widespread rash of parousiastic excitement. 50
events

prophesied

materialize

does

by

not

Joachim
negate

and

the

Otto

That the
failed

importance

of

to

their

reinterpretations of history, for the pattern of three-age
conceptions of a history which leads to a final, perfected
epoch was to act as a powerful influence in post-medieval
symbolizations

of

ideological

consciousness.51

For

Voegelin these re-interpretations of history are crucial
for

an

understanding

of

the

continuity

which

binds

medieval parousiasm and modern ideological consciousness:
49cf. Karl Lowith, Meanino in History, op. cit., pp.
149-151, and Gordon Leff, Heresy in the Latter Middle
Ages, op. cit., pp. 77-79.
50Norman Cohn,
110-118, 128-131.

The

Pursuit

of the

Millennium,

pp.

5 1voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975),
pp. 11-12; The New Science of Politics:
An Introduction
(1952), pp. 111-112. Joachim's was not the only three-age
conception of history during medieval times.
See Norman
Cohn's account of the doctrines of the Amaurians in The
Pursuit of the Millennium, pp. 154-56.
~-
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Though Otto's and Joachim's metastatic expectations
were no more fulfilled than Paul's, their symbolisms
marked a decisive step in the self-interpretation of
Western society, because they created a new pattern of
expectations:
The age of perfection, the teleion,
would be an age of the Spirit beyond the age of
Christ; it would bring the free association of
spiritualists, of men of the new monastic type,
unencumbered by institutions; and it would be an age,
therefore, beyond the establishment of church and
empire.
The potentialities of the new type of
expectations became apparent in the fourteenth
century, when Petrarca (1304-1374) symbolized the age
that began with Christ as the tenebrae, as the dark
age, that now would be followed by a renewal of the
lux of pagan antiquity.
The monk as the figure
promising a new age was succeeded by the humanist
intellectual.
Hegel, finally, brought the potential
to fruition by identifying revelation with a
dialectical process of consciousness in history, a
process that reached its teleion in his own "system of
science" ••.. The Parousia, at last, had occurred.52
As

we

turn

in

the

following

chapter

to

modern

ideological consciousness we will find that expectations
of an age of perfection were as compatible with movements
stressing reason and enlightenment as with those grounded
in revelation and mysticism.

Yet the differences between

these movements must not be minimized.
millennarian

movements

consciousness

were

associated

emphatically

The apocalyptic,
with

parousiastic

religious

in

character

(regardless of the question of orthodoxy), whereas modern
ideologies
The

are uniformly and explicitly anti-religious.

perfected

envisioned

realm

either

anticipated
as

a

by

heavenly

the

parousiast

state

beyond

is
the

imperfections of the world or as a new world made heavenly
52voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 268.
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through

massive

a

the

conversely,

of

transcendent

realm

anticipated

influx

perfected

order.
by

the

ideologist is envisioned as a worldly paradise achieved
through a flowering of purely human potentialities which
have hitherto been
gods.

stunted by the worship of

imagined

Parousiasts look to God as the agent who will

transform

reality,

with

perhaps

a

bit

of

preparatory

assistance from the Elect;

ideologists look to immanent

historical

inevitable

laws

or

the

ascendancy

of

a

particular class, race or methodology.
In light of these dramatic dissimilarities, we must
anticipate

the

continuity

between

consciousness
positive

question

are

parousiasm

movements

of
to

spiritual disorientation.
this

attempt

analysis

would

were

whether

sufficiently

evaluation

ideological

of

and

strong

Voegelin's
a

the

elements

of

ideological
to

warrant

attempt

to

trans-historical

a

link

pattern of

There can be little doubt that

prove

restricted

to

be

to

unpersuasive

the

level

of

if

the

surface

manifestations, and thus we can at least say that Voegelin
was wise to couch the attempt in terms of a theory of
consciousness.
particular
apparently

A comparison of the lives and writings of
ideologists

kindred

spirits

and
such

parousiasts--even
as

Marx

and

of

Thomas

Muntzer--would likely lead one to the conclusion that any
apparent similarities are vastly outweighed by differences
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in

their

thought

demonstrated

that

and

activity.

both

had

fallen

If

it

could

be

prey

to

forms

of

disorientation, but not that these forms are intelligibly
equivalent

in some sense,

then Voegelin's objective of

finding historical precedents
time would

not

for the disorders

have been met.

individuals directly,

it

ambitious)

to

approach

is

Rather

than

a more promising

identify

broad

of our

comparing
(if

less

patterns

of

consciousness and then search the writings of individuals
for symbols and indications of experiences which fit the
general pattern.

If we could be convinced that Marx was

indeed an ideologist and that Muntzer was a parousiast,
and

furthermore

that

ideological

consciousness

and

parousiasm are intelligibly linked as variants of a more
general, pneumapathological con-sciousness, we might then
be prepared to conclude that the differences between the
two figures are not as daunting as a direct comparison
would suggest.
Thus,

as

the

focus

of

our

investigation

of

Voegelin's analysis shifts from parousiasm to ideological
consciousness,

we

would

expect

to

find

two

types

of

underlying continuity:

one which is suggestive of common

patterns

and

of experience

ideologists,

and

another

symbolization
which

is

among various

suggestive

of

a

connection between ideologists and pneumapaths in general.
If it cannot be shown that the wide variety of ideological
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movements enumerated in the first chapter are expressions
of a common pattern of consciousness, we would be forced
to question the value of Voegelin's diagnostic project as
For,

a whole.

if we cannot find good reason to equate

ideologies with each other, we cannot legitimately speak
of an ideological consciousness at all, much less locate
it

within

the

general
To

disorientation.
stage

farther,

if

category

push
we

this

find

of

pneumapathological

line

that

of

speculation one

there

similarities between metastatic faith,

are

important

prometheanism and

parousiasm but that we must stop here, we will have found
conclusions that may be interesting but which are quite
irrelevant to Voegelin's intentions.
the

history

because

this

of

spiritual

class

of

disorder

phenomena

His excursions into
were

was

particular value in its own right.

not

thought

undertaken
to

be

of

As an historian of

order, Voegelin would have been content to leave analysis
of the materials we have

encountered

to this point to

those who are interested in the history of various types
of disorder; but as a political scientist and a man of the
twentieth century, he regarded the task of understanding
the

ideological

obligation.53

disorders

of

his

age

as

a

matter

of

It was the pursuit of this objective that

5 3 voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968),
pp. 22-23, 49; From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), p.
247.
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led him to search for historical precedents.
which

must

ultimately

determine

our

The question
evaluation

of

voegelin's diagnostic project is whether earlier patterns
of

disorder

can

be

related

not

to

each

specifically to ideological consciousness.
will be taken up in the following chapter.

other

but

This question

CHAPTER IV
IDEOLOGY, CONSCIOUSNESS AND HISTORY

Since the concept of "ideology" was first used by
Antoine

Destutt

de

Tracy

at

the

time

of

the

French

Revolution it has taken on a broad array of connotations.I
Initially conceived simply as the science of ideas,

the

term has generally come to be reserved for political ideas
Contemporary political scientists utilize

in particular.

the term in a bewildering variety of contexts,
basic patterns of usage can be discerned.

but four

Students of

international politics often use the term to denote any
set of principles which serve to justify or conceal the
true aims of a nation-state in its struggle for power.2
Public

opinion

researchers

and

empirically-oriented

students of political behavior are more likely to refer to
ideology as a characteristic of the political outlook of
individuals.

In this sense,

ideology is an

consistent set of opinions and beliefs.

internally

Individuals who

exhibit greater degrees of consistency are said to possess
lFor brief histories of the concept see George
Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays (New
York:
Vintage, 1967), pp. 3-46; Karl Manheim, Ideology
and Utopia (New York:
Harvest, 1936, pp. 55-108; David
McLellan, Ideology (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota
Press, 1986), pp. 1-63.
2 E.g., Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations:
The struggle for Power and Peace (New York:
Alfred A.
Knopf, 4th ed., 1967), pp. 83-86, pp. 219-223.
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greater

"ideological

constraint"

than

those

who

adopt

conflicting views in an ad hoc fashion.3
Among political theorists the concept of ideology
is almost always used in one of two senses, both of which
are pejorative.

Marxists generally refer to ideology as a

type of false consciousness which results either from a
limited
class

historical

interest,

elite. 4

perspective,

or intellectual

distortions

imposed

domination by

a

by

ruling

In non-Marxist circles, ideology is viewed as a

form or style of political thought which is distinct from-and inferior to--philosophy.5

That the emphasis here is

more on form than on content is evinced by the fact that
mutually hostile creeds or "-isms" are grouped under one
overarching

rubric.

Since

those

whose

doctrines

are

classified in this way can easily point to elements which
differentiate their creed from others in the set, it would
seem

that

the

very

use

of

the

term

in

this

sense

3E.g., w. Lance Bennett, Public Opinion in American
Politics
(New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980),
pp. 48-56;
Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Linda J. Medcalf,
American Ideologies Today (London: Croom Helm, 1988), pp.
4-7.
4For the most extensive presentation of Marx's
concept see Marx and Engels, The German Ideology (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1976), pp. 33-83.
See also Bhikhu
Parekh, Marx's Theory of Ideology (IDndon: Croom Helm, 1982) .
5cf. , e.g. , Dante Germino, Beyond Ideology:
The
Revival of Political Theory (New York:
Harper & Row,
1967), · pp. 45-67; Elizabeth M. James, Political Theorv:
An Introduction to Interpretation (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1976), pp. 6-7.
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presupposes

an

identification of

common

elements

which

unite widely disparate bodies of thought.
Although it will not be possible here to track down
the

aspects

of

ideology

which

have

been

proposed

by

analysts other than Voegelin as these common elements, it
is

important

to

note

the

general

agreement

among

contemporary theorists that the last two hundred years
have

witnessed

a

proliferation

of

novel

political

orientations which conform to some shared pattern.
this

respect

Voegelin's

analysis

of

In

ideological

consciousness

is

situated in the mainstream of current

conceptions.

His departure from the mainstream consisted

most directly in the assertion that ideologies are not the
products of fallacious thinking on modern problems,
rather

of

a

deeper

disturbance

in

but

consciousness which

bears only an inessential connection to the specifically
modern aspects of the political world.
was

not

the

atheistic,

systematic,

For Voegelin it
quasi-scientific,

progressivist or activist tendencies of modern ideologies
which represented their common, central elements.

These

tendencies were indeed recognized by Voegelin, but only as
epiphenomena! manifestations of a revolt against the human
condition within the
perspective,

order

of being.

From Voegelin's

an ideology is less a body of propositions

about things in the world than an effort to conjure up a
new

and

improved

world.

Thus,

since

ideologies

are
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constructed

for

the

purpose

of

enacting

such

a

transformation, activism and progressivism are inherent to
their

character.

Moreover,

since

the

very

idea

of

a

transformed world would be senseless if not accompanied by
a rejection of the notion that the "old world" is divinely
created

and

sustained,

it

is

to

ideologies would tend toward atheism.
preferred

means

for

predicting

be

expected

that

Finally, since the
and

effecting

the

transformation will be those which appear most promising
at a given time, it is equally unsurprising that 19th and
20th century ideologists would at least have affected the
systematic form of the modern natural sciences.
Voegelin's late work suggests that the fundamental
motivations for a project of world transformation arise
from the human condition as such,

rather than from the

historical circumstances of a particular period. 6

This

6voegelin's late work (at least with regard to his
diagnostic analyses)
would include those writings
published after the release of vols. II and III of Order
and History in 1957.
It is clear that Voegelin had once
seen a more intimate connection between ideology and
modernity, since the first chapter of The New Science of
Politics (1952) which treats of ideological movements was
entitled, "Gnosticism--The Nature of Modernity" (p. 107).
By 1959. Voegelin was already speaking of an "essential
sameness of attitudes and motives in ancient and modern
gnosticism." Wissenschaft, Politik und Gnosis (Voegelin's
inaugural lecture at the University of Munich), English
translation, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), p.
40.
In the 1970s it appears that Voegelin came to doubt
whether modernity had any nature at all.
The essence of
gnosticism (or pneumapathological consciousness) seems to
have been completely dissociated with modernity in The
Ecumenic Age (1974).
Nowhere is this more forcefully
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does not imply,

however,

that the characteristics of a

period will play no part in determining the phenomenal
aspects or the popular appeal of such projects.

Although

voegelin's

of

analysis

modernizing"

the

does

essence

have
of

the

effect

ideology,

it

would

"debe

incorrect to state that his understanding of ideology is
ahistorical.

We

have

already seen that

the

spiritual

demands imposed by Christianity are of decisive importance
in Voegelin's account of the consciousness which searches
for comprehensive and final certainty, and this holds true
for ideologists as well as parousiasts.

The historical

axis of the typology introduced in the first chapter is
based upon an historical event, the epiphany of Christ,
and the subsequent history of the Church's struggle to
maintain

itself

through

dogmatization

and

social

compromise forms the immediate background for ideological
rejections of Christianity.7
suggested than in two rhetorical questions from that work:
"What exactly is modern about modernity .•• ?" "And what is
modern about the modern mind ..• ?"
(pp. 7, 68).
In
neither instance is an answer proposed.
Note also
Voegelin' s references to "the so-called Modern Age" and
"the so-called modern period" in "On Hegel:
A Study in
Sorcery" (1971), p. 337, and "Wisdom and the Magic of the
Extreme: A Meditation" (1981), p. 268.
7voegelin, Anamnesis ( 1978) , pp. 191, 194:
"The
Churches as social organizations ... historically did
everything that could provoke the ideological rebellion,
under which they suffer today .•.. The antiphilosophical
resentment of the ideologist thus is not directed against
the classical noes is, of which they know nothing, but
against Thomas's design of a propositional "metaphysics"
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The influences exerted by the historic advances in
the natural sciences are also of more than coincidental
significance.

Ideologies are unscientific by definition

for Voegelin,8 but in his view the relationship ammounts
to more,

as we shall see,

than mimicry on the part of

ideologists.

There can be little doubt that the successes

of

in

science

turning

natural

powers

toward

human

objectives had much to do with ideological conceptions of
a worldly paradise.
for

such

a

Voegelin recognized that the longing

paradise

is

not

simply

the

result

of

uncontrolled imagination, but rather of genuine hardship
and social trauma:
... (T)he population shifts, the deportations and
enslavements, and the interpenetration of cultures
reduce men who exercise no control over the
treating of uni versa ls, principles and substances.
The
ideological rebellion, as I already said, was indeed
strongly provoked."
See also "Siger de Brabant,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (vol. IV, 1944,
pp. 507-26), esp. pp. 523-25; From Enlightenment to
Revolution (1975), pp. 19-23; "Autobiographical Memoir,"
in Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution:
A
Biographical Introduction (1981), pp. 80-81; "Response to
Professor Altizer's 'A New History and a New but Ancient
God?,'" in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's Thought: A
Critical Appraisal (1982), p. 191; John Kirby, "Symbolism
and Dogmatism:
Voegelin's Distinction," The Ecumenist
(vol. XIII, 1975, pp. 26-31), passim.
8 However, this is not to say that ideologies are
simply untrue, or that none em.body important truths.
Voegelin repeatedly stressed the critical accomplishments
of the great ideologists.
See From Enlightenment to
Revolution (1975), pp. 299-301; "History and Gnosis"
(1969), pp. 65, 82-83; "On Hegel:
A Study in Sorcery"
(1971), pp. 343-44; "The Eclipse of Reality" (1970), pp.
189-190.
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proceedings of history to an extreme state of
forlornness in the turmoil of the world,
of
intellectual disorientation, of material and spiritual
insecurity. The loss of meaning that results from the
breakdown of institutions, civilizations, and ethnic
cohesion evokes attempts to regain an understanding of
the meaning of human existence in the given conditions
of the world.9
The broader context of this passage is a discussion of the
events in the ancient world which gave rise to Stoicism,
the

mystery

Hebrew

religions,

apocalyptic,

gnosticism.
ideological

the

Christianity,

Voegel in was
attempts

Heliopolitan

at

no
a

slave

Manichaeism,

less prepared to
recovery

tangible sources of discontent .10

cults,

of

and

connect

meaning

with

Thus, with regard to

the etiology of particular movements, Voegelin cannot be
charged with ignoring events in history in favor of events
9voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968),
p. 8.
See also the more extensive enumeration of
historical sources of pneumapathological disorientation
(which also speaks to modern sources) in In Search of
Order (1987), pp. 35-36.
lOAn important case in point, which has perhaps been
given
insufficient attention by Voegelin's more
conservative admirers, is that of Marxism: "Marx has laid
his finger on the sore spot of modern industrial society,
on the cause of serious trouble (even if the trouble
should not take the form of a general communist
revolution), that is the growth of economic institutions
into a power of such overwhelming influence on the life of
every single man, that in the face of such power all talk
about human freedom becomes futile .... That no economic
theorist after Marx was sufficiently interested in the
philosophical foundations of his science to explore this
problem further, that no modern school of economic theory
~xists
that would understand and develop the very
important beginnings of Marx, casts a significant light on
this whole branch of science."
Voegelin,
From
Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), pp. 299-300.
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in consciousness.11
Nevertheless,

while

there

is

rarely

if

ever

a

shortage of tangible sources of discontent in human life,
there

is

also

no

natural

necessity whereby

discontent

brings forth projects for transforming reality:
There is enough "darkness" in reality to provide the
grievances from which a revolt can start. The life of
man is really burdened with the well-known miseries
enumerated by Hesiod. We remember his list of hunger,
hard work, disease, early death, and the fear of
injustices to be suffered by the weaker man at the
hands of the more powerful--not to mention the problem
of Pandora.
Still, as long as our existence is
undeformed by fantasies,
these miseries are not
experienced as senseless.
We understand them as the
lot of man, mysterious it is true, but as the lot he
has to cope with in the organization and conduct of
his life, in the fight for survival, the protection of
his dependents, the resistance to injustice, and in
his spiritual and intellectual response to the mystery
of existence.
The burden of existence loses its
sense, and becomes absurd, only when a dreamer
believes himself to possess the power of transfiguring
imperfect existence into a
lasting state of
perfection.12
A cataloging of the upheavals of the past two hundred
years

would

certainly

provide

us

with

important

llThis is, in substance, the charge once levelled
11
against Voegelin by Hannah Arendt:
••• I
think that what
separates my approach from Professor Voegelin's is that I
proceed from facts and events instead of intellectual
affinities and influences."
"A Reply, 11 (to Voegelin' s
review of The Origins of Totalitarianism) Review of
Politics (vol. XV, 1953, pp. 68-85), p. 80.
For
Voegelin's response see his "Concluding Remark," esp. p.
85.
In fairness to Arendt it should be noted that her
charge was closer to the mark at the time of writing,
since Voegelin's break from the methodology of his early
studies in the history of ideas was not yet fully apparent.
12voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme:
Meditation (1981), pp. 237-38.
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information

for

understanding

modern

ideological

But if we are to penetrate to the essence of

movements.

ideology we must,

according to Voegelin,

move from the

level of pragmatic events to an analysis of consciousness.
In one sense, we find ourselves on familiar ground
in

the

analysis

of

ideological

consciousness.

The

tensions experienced in the "in-between" reality of the
metaxy

are

not

susceptible to change;

Beyond

of

reality

has

been

once the di vine

differentiated

from

the

immanent realm of human existence, the person who searches
for meaning and orientation will participate in the same
field

of

tensions

as

his

or her

predecessors .1 3

questioning con-sciousness in our time,
find that
reality

as always,

The
will

its own existence must be contingent upon a

which

Modern man

lies

beyond

its

immediate

experience.

has no more reason to believe that he has

caused himself than ancient man, and hence no less reason
to

ask

the

conceivable
changed

question

of

the

ground.

"answers"

to

the

question

since

ancient

times,

and

The
will
none

range
not
of

of
have
the

possibilities will offer much hope that the transcendent
ground can be known with certainty or compelled to do our
bidding.
Even a hard-bitten materialist like Marx recognized
13voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience
bolization in History" (1970), pp. 216-17.
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that the question of the ground will arise naturally-along with its attendant implications--out of our basic
experiences:
A being only counts itself as independent when it
stands on its own feet and it stands on its own feet
as long as it owes its existence to itself. A man who
lives by the grace of another considers himself a
dependent being.
But I live completely by the grace
of another when I owe him not only the maintenance of
my life but when he has also created my life, when he
is the source of my life. And my life necessarily has
such a ground outside itself if it is not my own
creation. The idea of creation is thus one that it is
very difficult to drive out of the minds of people.
They find it impossible to conceive of nature and man
existing through themselves since it contradicts all
the evidences of practical life.14
In this passage Marx has let his guard down long enough
for

one

to

rebellion.

glimpse

the

inner

logic

of

an

ideological

It is apparent that his problem was not simply

one of spiritual obtuseness, for he was reflective enough
to perceive that his
beyond itself.

own existence must have a

ground

One might ask why this observation did not

prompt him to inquire into the nature of the ground, or to
explore the extent to which he could know or participate
in its order, but the answer is already before us.

Marx

knows in advance that the very presence of such a ground
will

necessitate

dependent being,
point.

Humanity

the

recognition

of

and thus the revel t
cannot

be

his

status

as

a

must begin at this

independent--cannot be

the

14Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of
1844," in David McLellan, ed., Karl Marx:
Selected
Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 94.
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measure--unless Marx can find a way to depict it (however
implausibly)

as having created itself.

Perhaps Marx's

philosophical conscience as a former student of philosophy
induced a bit of anxiety at this point.

If so, he must

have found a way to quell the disturbance,
driving

the

idea

of

creation

from

possibly by

his

own

mind.

consistent with his role as the modern Prometheus, he then
sets out to save others from the anxiety by attempting,
difficulties

notwithstanding,

to

creation from their minds as well.

drive

the

idea

of

If it is objected that

we are now reading too much into the passage, and that we
have no evidence of any anxiety on Marx's part, we must
still ask why he should care whether the idea of creation
occurs to people.
in

which

Is it because he knows that his theory,

humanity

creates

itself

through

productive

activity,

begs rather than answers the question of the

ground?

If

scrutiny

when

he

believed

measured

that

against

his
"all

theory
the

could

pass

evidences

of

practical life," would he have any reason to wish that the
idea of creation might be driven from people's minds?

The

succeeding paragraph makes it abundantly clear that Marx
does

not

have

persuasion

in

mind when

speaking

of

a

"driving out," since his final response to an imaginary
critic (who pursues the Aristotelian argument for a proto
arche) is, "give up your abstraction and you will give up
your

question .••• do

not

think,

do

not

ask

me
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.
ques t ions
..•• "15

This model case of existential closure reveals the
sequence of events which, according to Voegelin, typifies
the development of ideological consciousness.1 6
terms

such

voegelin

as

sought

"revolt,"
to

stress

ideological impulse.
ideologist
phenomena,

"rebellion"
the

reactive

"closure,"

nature

of

the

In his view, it is not as though an

first

discovers

builds

and

By using

a

system

some

neglected

explaining

its

class

of

ubiquitous

effects, and then, after finding that his system conflicts
with classical and Christian writings, proceeds to rebel
against

the

latter.

It

is

rather the

confrontation with the reality depicted
and classical

philosophy comes

first;

case

that

the

in Christianity

the

system which

announces a preferable Second Reality is the product of a
prior rebellion.
believe

that

ideologists,

Voegelin's writings would lead us to

this

holds

true

for

all

since none are exempted from

characterization.

of

the

great

this general

This contention would certainly have

been strengthened if Voegelin had provided a broad set of
1sibid., p. 95.
16voegelin identifies Marx as a model case in "Wisdom
and the Magic of the Extreme:
A Meditation" (1981), p.
238.
This section of Marx's "Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts of 1844" was regarded by Voegelin as something
of a model case within a model case. For his analysis see
Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), pp. 23-28, and
~rem Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), pp. 289-91.
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particular examples of the phenomenon,

but he may have

thought

Hegel

that

sufficient

treatments

for

an

of

Marx

and

would

be

dynamics

of

in the second chapter that

the

understanding

of

the

ideological closure.17
It was
concept

of

observed

personal

closure

against

ground presupposes a prior exposure.
this

exposure

others.

will

have

been

more

the

transcendent

In some instances
authentic

than

in

For example, Voegelin credited Hegel with having

penetrated
metaphysics

beneath
of

Christianity

his

and

the

day

to

philosophy,

dogmas
the

and

propositional

experiential

whereas

thinkers

roots

of

such

as

Helvetius and Vauvenargues were said to have revolted only
against the opaque symbols of traditions which they could
not fathom. 18

Nevertheless, a certain hostility towards

Christianity and classical Greek philosophy would seem to
stand as a constant in modern ideologies.

One would be

hard pressed to think of a major ideologist who was simply
indifferent to these traditions.

We must ask, therefore,

17voegelin also refers to Hegel as a "prototypical
case."
See The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 21: Science,
Politics and Gnosticism (1968), p. 40; "Response to
Professor Altizer's 'A New History and a New but Ancient
God?'" in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Eric Voegelin's Thought:
A
Critical Appraisal, p. 196.
18on Hegel see In Search of Order (1987), pp. 48, 53,
61-62.
On Helvetius and Vauvenargues see From
Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), pp. 36-42, 59.
See
also "On Classical Studies," Modern Age (vol. XVII, 1973,
pp. 2-8), p. 4.
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why

these

modes

of

existential

orientation would

have

proven so unsettling.
If

it

is

accepted

that

aggression

is

usually

preceeded by frustration of some sort, the hostility of
the ideologist will become intelligible as a response to
two

characteristics

philosophy:

of

Christianity

and

classical

both run counter to the libido dominandi and

the longing for ultimate certainty.

Perhaps it would be

better to say that these are experiential characteristics
of the human condition or of reality itself, and not of
particular

traditions

of

symbolization,

but

we

must

account for those cases in which the experience of the
ideologist is mediated by a body of hypostatized symbols.
In any event, the fundamental alternatives are clear.

One

may respond to the tensions of the metaxy with humility
and reverence,

faith and the love of wisdom,

or one can

attempt to eliminate the tension outright by falsifying
reality

so

that

possession. 1 9
expression

the

The

love

act

of

of

wisdom

can

falsification

is

become
itself

its
an

of the will to power, but one which will also

19voegelin, science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968},
p. 42:
"Philosophy springs from the love of beingi it is
man's loving endeavor to perceive the order of being and
attune himself to it. Gnosis desires dominion over being:
in order to sieze control of being the gnostic constructs
his system." On the importance of the distinction between
love and possession of wisdom, see "On Hegel: A Study in
Sorcery" (1971), pp. 342-43; "The Meditative Origin of the
Philosophical Knowledge of Order" (1984), p. 43; In Search
of Order (1987), pp. 54-55.
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pave

the

way

for

still

more

ambitious

projects.

A

transcendent ground cannot be manipulated in pursuance of
immanent objectives, and Plato's sophon can only be loved,
not

redirected.

But when

faith

and philosophy become

gnosis, a new world filled with manipulative possibilities
is opened.
The new world which is opened in the speculation of
the

ideologist

Philosophy

will

cannot

necessarily

become

be

gnosis

a

truncated world.

unless

the

realm

of

transcendent experience is cast adrift from the immanent
sphere

of

life,

and

ideologist

will

give

immanentism.

Once

thus

the personal

rise

the

to

a

closure

stubborn

intramundane

has

of

the

theoretical
eclipsed

the

divine, the order of the world can, at least conveivably,
be known with certainty.

If an immanent counterpart to

the transcendent ground can be located (as for instance in
productive relations or racial composition or scientific
rationality),

it will then become possible not only to

fully understand reality but to manipulate it to one's
liking.

The drive for certainty and the will to power

will both have gotten their way, simultaneously, through
the single act which Voegelin called "the decapitation of
being" or the "murder of God. 11 20
The speculative murder of God can be accomplished
20voegelin, Science,
p. 54.

Politics and Gnosticism (1968),
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in

a

more

or

less

subtle

manner,

but

it

must

be

accomplished if man is to emerge as the measure of all
things.

Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx and Nietzsche are fairly

explicit about their intentions,
the feat indirectly.

whereas others perform

Thinkers such as Bacon and Descartes

do not mount a frontal assault, but push the transcendent
ground out of the back door by isolating nature as a selfWhen nature is declared to

contained object of inquiry.
be

nothing

but

matter-in-motion,

devoid

of design

and

purpose, God can be reduced to the status of a hypothesis
and

relegated

philoso-phers

to
can

theologians
get

on

so

with

that
the

scientists

real

enhancing human power and longevity.21

business

and
of

Hobbes abolished

the tension between love of self and love of God in an
equally efficient way. 22
such

Finis

ultimus

By stating that "there is no

(utmost

ayme)

nor

Summum

Bonum,

(greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old
21see Francis Bacon,
The Great Instauration
(Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1980), pp.
15-17; Rene Descartes, "Discourse on the Method of Rightly
Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Field of
Science," in Discourse on Method and Meditations
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), pp. 44-47.
22voegelin wrote that st. Augustine's analysis of
this tension (which is roughly equivalent to voegelin's
characterization of the tension of existence in the
metaxy) is "philosophically perfect. 11 See st. Augustine,
Expositions on the Book of Psalms, Psalm No. LXIV, and
Voegelin, "Configurations of History," in Paul G. Kuntz,
ed., The Concept of Order (Seattle:
University of
Washington Press, 1968, pp. 23-42), p. 33; The New Science
of Politics: An Introduction (1952), pp. 178-184.
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Morall

Philoso-phers, " 23

Hobbes

center

of

Voltaire

the

person.

makes

the

simply

passions

the

exchanges

the

transcendental pneuma of Christ for an intramundane esprit
numain as the object of general history, and the change of
heart

is

replaced

enlightened

by

a

progress

Helvetius

opinions.24

traditional

toward

ever

more

discards

the

understanding of the growth of the soul as an

internal process which is nourished by communication with
transcendent reality in favor of the formation of conduct
through

external

legislator. 25
spiritual

by

Saint-simon
to

a

an
and

bygone

enlightened
Comte

phase

relegate
of

human

with the obvious implication that those who

order

experiences

their

are

rationality.26
what

Turgot,

experience

immaturity,
still

management

Voegelin

psychologism,

existence

unfit

for

Finally
called

by

reference

to

such

the new age of positivistic

(or at least most recently),

the

ideologies

of

biologism

in
and

the direction in which the realissimum of

23 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Harmondsworth, Middlesex,
England: Penguin, 1968), Book I, ch. xi, P. 160.
24voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975),
p. 10.
25 L.:!_.
b'd

I

P• 700

26 on Turgot see Voegelin, "Philosophies of History:
An Interview with Eric Voegelin, 11 New Orleans Review (vol.
II, 1973), pp. 135-36; From Enlightenment to Revolution
(1975), pp. 135-36.
On Saint-Simon and Comte see Ibid.,
pp. 136-94.
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existence

is

transcendent

to

realm

conditioning. 27

be

sought

is

inverted

to

genetic

coding

or

from

the

psychological

Voegelin characterized this sequence of

deformations as a
.•. movement of intramundane religious sentiments,
pressing the interpretation of history and politics
downward from the spirit to the animal basis of
existence. Neither the "model" of the secular "sacred
history," .nor the dogmatic symbols on the level of the
"thesis of generality" remain constant; they change
continuously in accordance with the stratum of human
nature that commands the attention of the time and
becomes the object of the process of deification. The
rapid descent from reason, through technical and
planning intellect, to the economic, psychological and
biological levels of human nature, as the dominants in
the image of man, is a strong contrast to the imposing
stability of the Christian anthropology through
eighteen centuries. Once the transcendental anchorage
is surrendered, the descent from the rational to the
animal nature, so it seems, is inevitable.28
In each of the cases discussed above the thinker
has, according to Voegelin, defined nature or humanity in
such

a

way

that

the

transcendent

experience is eclipsed.

ground

of

spiritual

For Voegelin this equivalence on

the level of results arose from a deeper equivalence at
the

level

projects

of
was

motivating

experiences.

engendered

by

an

Each

inordinate

of
drive

these
for

certainty and power, and thus Voegelin could argue for an
27rbid., p. 69. Voegelin did not deny that these are
important factors in human nature; biology and psychology
become biologism and psychologism only when these factors
are said to be all there is to human nature. See "Reason:
The Classic Experience," in Anamnesis (1978), pp. 113-15.
28voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (1975),
p. 13.
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intelligible

unity

among

these

efforts,

despite

phenotypical

differences.

Yet

there

also

rather more

obvious commonality which runs

is

their

another,

through the

All of these thinkers understood

writings in question.

themselves as scientists, regardless of what we might have
to say about the value of their work as science.

We must

be wary of mistaking overenthusiasm or simple errors in
judgment for a murderous will to replace God.
point

does

science

shade

over

into

a

At what

scientism which

bespeaks a pneumapathological disorder?
In

an

important

article

published

in

1948,

entitled, "The Origins of Scientism," Voegelin set forth a
characterization of the ideological nature of scientism
which

is

strikingly

consistent

with

expressing some forty years hence.

the

views

he

was

Voegelin associated

three principal dogmas with the scientistic creed:

(1)

the assumption that the mathematized science of natural
phenomena is a model to which all other sciences ought to
conform;

(2)

that all realms of being are accessible to

the methods of the sciences of phenomena; and (3) that all
reality

which

is

not

accessible

to

phenomena is either irrelevant or,

the

sciences

of

in the more radical

form of the dogma, illusionary.29

Voegelin held that the

creed implies two great denials:

"it denies the dignity

29voegelin,
"The Origins of Scientism,"
Research (vol. XV, 1948, pp. 462-94), p. 462.
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of science to the quest for substance in nature,

in man

and society, as well as in transcendental reality; and, in
the

more

radical

substance. 1130

form,

it

denies

the

reality

of

Scientism was defined as "the attempt to

treat substance (including man and society and history) as
if it were phenomenon .••• n31

Its origins, according to

voegelin,
began in a fascination with the new science to the
point of underrating and neglecting concern for
experiences of the spirit; they developed into the
assumption that the new science could create a world
view that would substitute for the religious order of
the soul; and they culminated, in the nineteenth
century, in the dictatorial prohibition, on the part
of scientistic thinkers, against asking questions of a
metaphysical nature.32
In

contrast

to

his

definition

of

scientism,

Voegelin once defined science in the following manner:
Science is a search for truth concerning the nature of
30Ibid., pp. 462-63.
31Ibid., pp. 463-64.
32Ibid., p. 462.
Voegelin treated these as three
distinct phases in the development of scientism as an
intellectual movement.
The first he traced to the second
half of the sixteenth century, the second to the middle of
the seventeenth century, and the third to the First
Lecture of Comte's Cours de philosophie positive in 1830.
With regard to Comte's prohibition of metaphysical
questioning, Voegelin presumably had in mind a passage
where Comte describes the positive philosophy, "whose
leading characteristic it is to regard as interdicted to
human reason those sublime mysteries which theology
explains •••. Theologians and metaphysicians may imagine and
refine about such questions; but positive philosophy
rejects them."
Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy
(tr. Abrahams. Blumberg) (New York: AMS Press, 1974), pp.
27 I 29 •
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the various realms of being.
Relevant in science is
whatever contributes to the success of this search.
Facts are relevant in so far as their knowledge
contributes to the study of essence, while methods are
adequate in so far as they can be effectively used as
means for this end.
Different objects require
different methods •..• If the adequacy of a method is
not measured by its usefulness to the purpose of
science, if on the contrary the use of a method is
made the criterion of science, then the meaning of
science as the orientation of man in his world, and as
the great instrument for man's understanding of his
own position in the universe is lost.33
scientism is the ideological perversion of science through
reduction to a single method, a method which does indeed
have much to offer in the way of enhanced certainty and
power--but

which

legitimate

mode

also,
of

if

declared

inquiry,

to

entraps

be

the

the

only

practitioner

within the closed and flattened world of an ideology.
the

architechts

of

scientism

this

unfortunate side effect of rigor.

closure

was

not

For
an

Rather, it is precisely

because the ideologists of science sought refuge from the
tensions and mysteries of an open consciousness that an
immanentist method was enshrined.
Scientism

is

thus

an

ideology

or

type

of

pneumapathological consciousness in its own right, as well
as

an

undercurrent

ideologies.

On

the

which
basis

runs

through

of Voegelin' s

most

modern

analysis,

one

could say either that scientism is a form of ideology or
that ideologies are forms of scientism.

This does not

33voegelin, The New Science of Politics:
duction (1952), pp. 4-5.
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mean,

h oWeve r '

inquiries

to

that those in our day who confine their
the
We

pneumapaths.

methods
can

of

the

observe

natural

that

work

sciences
within

are

these

methods, which for one such as Comte was a shield against
the tensions of open existence, may at the other extreme
be nothing more momentous than a job which pays the bills.
The

clear

implication

of

Voegelin's

"The

Origins

of

scientism" is that the rank and file of modern science are
not the active agents of a pneumapathological scientism
but, rather, its victims.34
voegelin
origins,

was

argued

the

that

offshoot

scientism,

from

its

very

of an obsession with power.

This is apparent enough in Bacon's declaration that
am laboring to lay the foundation,

11

•••

I

not of any sect or

34voegelin, "The Origins of Scientism" (1948), p.
491:
"The spreading belief [that human existence can be
oriented in an absolute sense through the truth of
science] has had the result that the magnificent advance
of science in western civilization is paralleled by an
unspeakable advance of mass ignorance with regard to the
problems which are existentially the important
ones ...• Once the scientistic pathos has penetrated the
educational institutions of a society, it has become a
social force which cannot easily be broken, if it can be
broken at all.
The problem is no longer one of mere
ignorance; if the belief in the self-sufficient ordering
of existence through science is socially entrenched, it
has become a force which actively prevents the cultivation
of human substance and corrodes the surviving elements of
7ultural tradition still further.
The spiritual desire,
in the Platonic sense, must be very strong in a young man
of our time to overcome the obstacles which social
pressure puts in the way of its cultivation."
The
bracketed passage is interpolated from the preceeding
Page.
For Voegelin's views on contemporary universities,
see "On Classical Studies" (1973), passim.
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doctrine,
Descartes'
ourselves

but

of

human

utility

and

power,n35

and

in

praise of the method by which we will "make
masters

and

possessors

of

nature.n36

Yet

voegelin held that the idea of power through science is
neither intrinsically pathological nor exclusively modern:
The idea of power through science has a rational core:
if we have knowledge of causal relations we can form
means-ends relations; if we have the means we can
achieve the end; hence knowledge in this sense is
eminently useful.
The rational, utilitarian core in
itself is of necessity present in all human existence,
both personal and social; utilitarian rationality
determines a segment of life in primitive as well as
advanced civilizations; in itself it is not the
specific determinant of any particular society. Under
the impact of the modern advance of science, however,
this core has acquired the characteristics of a
cancerous growth. The rational-utilitarian segment is
expanding so strongly in our civilization that the
social realization of other values is noticeably
weakened. This expansion is carried by the mass creed
that the utilitarian domination over nature through
science should and will become the exclusive
preoccupation of man, as well as the exclusive
determinant for the structure of society.
In the
nineteenth century this idea of utilitarian
exclusiveness crystalized in the belief that the
dominion of man over man would be replaced by the
dominion of man over nature, and that the government
of men would be replaced by the administration of
things •••. Here we can see in the raw the fascination
with power that exudes from the new science: it is so
overwhelming that it blunts one's awareness of the
elementary problems of human existence; science
becomes an idol that will magically cure the evils of
existence and transform the nature of man.37
35Bacon, The Great Instauration, op. cit., p. 16.
36oescartes, "Discourse on the Method of Rightly
Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Field of
Science," op. cit., p. 45.
37voegelin,
486-87.

"The Origins of Scientism"

(1948),

pp.
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It is the obsession with power, the yearning for a magical
cure

for

the

evils

of

existence,

and

the

desire

to

transform human nature which stand as equivalences on the
level

of consciousness among

ideologies

(and,

for that

matter, among ideology and metastatic faith, prometheanism
and parousiasm).
These projects of magical transformation cannot, of
course, be effected until the realm of human nature and
society can be brought within the grasp of the methods of
the

natural

sciences.

ostensibly disclaimed any
Comte,

among others,

Although

Bacon

and

Descartes

intention to take this step,

was clear about

its necessity and

desirability:
This general revolution of the human mind is nearly
accomplished.
We have only to complete the Positive
Philosophy by bringing Social phenomena within its
comprehension, and afterward consolidating the whole
into one body of homogenous doctrine ..•• When it has
become complete,
its supremacy will take place
spontaneously, and will re-establish order through
society ...• All our fundamental conceptions having
become homogeneous, the Positive state will be fully
established. It can never again change its character,
though it will be for ever in course of development by
additions of new knowledge.38
Although

Comte's

distinctly

millennialist

hopes

for

a

positivistic science of society were to take root most
dramatically

in totalitarian movements,

Voegelin argued

that they continue to find expression in Western social

38comte, The Positive Philosophy, op. cit., pp.
36.

30,
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science

and

in

movements. 1139

"the

so-called

Here

the

liberal

obsession

with

and

progressive

power

and

the

longing for a transformed existence takes the form of the
belief

that

the

calamities which accompany the

age of

science must be cured by still more science.

The argument

runs

over

that,

since

we

have

gained

dominion

nature

through science, we must avoid the misuse of this power by
gaining

control

corresponding

over

our

advancement
such

social
of
a

environment

social
project

through

science.40
as

a

While

voegelin

regarded

impossible

on

principle,

he found more than a simple misconception of

science operating within this movement:
Scientists of more social prestige than human wisdom
stand up before large audiences and tell them in all
seriousness that social scientists will have to
emulate the natural scientists and do their share in
order to realize the perfect society.
There seems to
be no suspicion that the effects of natural science,
both beneficial and destructive, are not due to the
genius of scientists but to the objective structure of
the realm of phenomena which permits the introduction
of human action into the chain of cause and effect
once the law of the chain has been discovered; [there
is] no suspicion that this objective structure does
not prevail in the realm of substance •.•• The knowledge
of phenomena is certainly the key to their utilitarian
mastery, but the understanding of human substance is
not the key to the mastery of society and history.
The expansion of the will to power from the realm of
phenomena to that of substance, or the attempt to
operate in the realm of substance as if it were the
realm of phenomena--that is the definition of magic.41
3 9 voegelin, "The Origins of Scientism" ( 1948), p. 487.
40rbid.
4lrbid., pp. 487-88.

166

It would certainly be incorrect to state that all
(or even many)
the

of those who foresee fruitful avenues for

application

sciences
sorcerer.

have

of

quantitative

fallen

prey

methods

to the

in

the

social

consciousness of the

Indeed, behavioralists in the social sciences

are more vulnerable to the charge that their researches
are irrelevant to questions of substance than that they
have mishandled such questions.42

The grandiose claims of

the 1940s and 50s seem to have

fallen by the wayside,

largely
movement

due
as

to

the

one

self-correcting

which

sought

not

character
only

of

the

progressivist

objectives but also analytic rigor.43

human

Nevertheless,

if the heyday of scientism

in the

sciences

passed,

of

has

the

great

prestige

the

methods of the natural sciences has not, and thus it would
be premature to discount Voegelin' s

observations.

His

principal fear in the late 1940s was not that scientistic
42voegelin shifted his criticism in this direction
only four years after the publication of "The Origins of
Scientism. 11
See The New Science of Politics:
An Introduction (1952), pp. 1-13.
43The more grotesque forms of scientism have been
pushed into relatively insignificant private institutes
for "futuristic studies."
On occasion one hears talk of
immortality through cryonics or cloning from certain
quarters in the academic community, but by and large
science as magic has fallen to writers of science fiction.
This genre of "literature" is surely significant, as it
preserves scientistic consciousness within the popular
imagination, but it has failed to eclipse older sources of
disorientation such as communal romanticism, astrology,
apocalypticism, or popularized forms of Oriental mysticism.
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projects

would

infatuation

with

work,

but

rather

the

natural

that

sciences

the

would

general
lead

to

atrophy in the historical and philosophical sciences to
the

extent

reorientation

that

traditional

would

be

lost

sources
to

of

Western

sobriety

and

civilization. 44

Although this danger has yet to pass, Voegelin found cause
for optimism even before the end of the 1950s.

As he

moved beyond his early studies in the history of political
ideas and into other disciplines, he was led to state that
"we

are

living

today

in

a

period

of

progress

in

the

historical and philosophical sciences that hardly has a
parallel in the history of mankind: 11 45
The enormous enlargement of our historical horizon
through archaeological discoveries, critical editions
of texts, and a flood of monographic interpretation is
so well known a fact that elaboration is superfluous.
The sources are already at hand; and the convergent
interpretations by orientalists and semitologists, by
classical philologists and historians of antiquity, by
theologians and medievalists, facilitate and invite
the attempt to use the primary sources as the basis
for a philosophical study of order .••• We have gained a
44see "The Origins of Scientism" (1948), pp. 489-94.
45voegelin, "Autobiographical Memoir" (1973), quoted
in Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution:
A Biographical Introduction, p. 82. For evidence that Voegelin
found cause for such optimism even in the early 1950s see
The New Science of Politics: An Introduction (1952), pp.
2-4.
In these pages Voegelin identified three parallel
periods of progress, each of which arose as a response to
crisis:
"On the largest scale of Western history three
such epochs occurred. The foundation of political science
through Plato and Aristotle marked the Hellenic crisis;
St. Augustine's civitas Dei marked the crisis of Rome and
Christianity; and Hegel's philosophy of law and history
marked the first major earthquake of the Western crisis."
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new freedom in science, and it is a joy to use it.46
While

we

might

question

whether

this

renaissance

has

become an important force among the general public,

or

even within the academic community, the optimism of this
passage

stands

in

stark

contrast

to

the

pessimism

expressed by Voegelin in 1948:
.•• (A] s a consequence of the interlocking of science
and social power,
the political tentacles of
scientistic civilization reach into every nook and
corner of an industrialized society,
and with
increasing effectiveness they stretch over the whole
globe.
There exist only differences, though very
important ones, in the various regions of the global
asylum with regard to the possibility of personal
escape into the freedom of the spirit.
What is left
is hope--but hope should not obscure the realistic
insight that we who are living today shall never
experience freedom of the spirit in society.47
Yet we should not make too much of the finding of a shift
around

1950

future

course

from

pessimism

of

scientism,

to

optimism

regarding

the

for these passages do not

adequately convey the extent to which Voegelin expressed
both sentiments before and after this time.

We shall have

occasion in the following chapter to examine Voegelin's
prognoses from the 1970s and 80s,

but here it will be

helpful to note that in the same article from which the
preceding

quotation

was

drawn

he

implied

that

the

civilization would survive scientism and that historians
46voegelin,

Israel and Revelation

( 1956),

pp.

xii-

xiii.
47voegelin, "The Origins of Scientism" (1948), p. 494.
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would survive to view it in retrospect:
.•. [I]n retrospect the age of science will appear as
the greatest power orgy in the history of
mankind; ... at the bottom of this orgy the historian
will find a gigantic outburst of magic imagination
after the breakdown of the intellectual and spiritual
form of medieval high-civilization.
The climax of
this outburst is the magic dream of creating the
superman, the man-made being that will succeed the
sorry creature of God's making .••• 48
This passage provides us with a point of transition
to the last issue to be treated in this chapter.

Having

seen the grounds on which Voegelin could argue for an
essential equivalence among modern ideologies at the level
of consciousness,

we

must

now

(and

also

in

the

final

chapter} ask whether this equivalence can be extended to
earlier

manifestations

of

pneumapathological

dis-

orientation.

Was it legitimate for Voegelin to speak of

scientism

the

sorcery?

in

modern

world

in

terms

and

Is it really the

case that "the prophetic conception of a
constitution of being"
of

magic

Can modern ideologies be intelligibly connected

to Gnosticism, hermeticism and alchemy?

root

of

our

(metastatic

contemporary beliefs

faith)

change in the
"lies at the

in the perfection of

society .•• 11 ? 49
The first thing that must be said in response to
these questions is that voegelin has simply not provided
48Ibid., pp. 488-89.
49voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xiii.
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us with a

sufficient amount of material upon which to

conclusively decide the issue in his favor.

In fairness

it should be noted that Voegelin never presumed to have
settled the issue in such a way that any rational person
would be convinced, although it had certainly been settled
to his own satisfaction.

Nevertheless,

the fact remains

that one can do much more in the way of corroborating
voegelin' s basic thesis if the analysis is conducted at
the level of patterns in consciousness than at the level
of specific traditions and movements in history.
Despite the importance of the concept of gnosticism
in

his

work,

Voegelin's

discussions

of

the

historical

Gnostics and their writings do not amount to more than a
few

pages.

Late

in

life

Voegelin

attributed

great

importance to magic, hermeticism and alchemy, and yet he
provided

virtually

no

explicit

treatment

of

these

traditions or of their specific points of connection to
modern

ideology.

His

account of metastatic

faith

was

developed from a description of one event involving one
prophet, and we were not told why Voegelin did not choose
to interpret Isaiah's actions as prompted by God in this
one instance when he was willing to do so in others.
regard

to

the

phenomena

we

have

termed

With

prometheanism,

Voegelin argued from a more fully articulated foundation
by dint of his analyses of Homer, Aeschylus, Thucydides,
Plato and Aristotle.

Yet his

references to a

similar
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diagnosis of the nosos of the psyche by the Stoics and
cicero are, at least as far as I have been able to follow
them,

disappointing.

What

little

Voegelin

wrote

on

parousiasm was completed in the 1940s and has yet to be
published.
of

Politics

Aside from a brief section in The New Science
on

the

radical

Puritans

Revolutions of the 17th Century,

in

the

English

Voegelin' s writings in

this area are largely confined to a chapter entitled "The
People of God"
ideas.

from the abandoned history of political

Although this chapter, which has been consulted in

the course of the

present study,

provides a

number of

interesting insights, one must still turn to a work like
Cohn's

The

Pursuit

of

the

Millennium

for

connections to modern political movements. 50

explicit
In brief,

those who may wish to establish connections between modern
ideological consciousness and specific traditions from the
past will not only discover that they will have to move
beyond Voegelin's accounts to the original sources,

but

also beyond the materials mentioned by him.51
50see esp. the concluding chapter to the first
edition, published by Secker and Warburg (London) in 1957.
5 1 It is entirely possible that several of these gaps
are filled in Voegelin's unpublished papers and correspondence, which have recently been made available
through the archives of the Hoover Institution. As cases
in point, Voegelin's correspondence with Hans Jonas and
Gilles Quispel may help to fill out his view of the
relationship between ideologists and the historical
Gnostics, and the manuscript of the final three volumes
written under the original projection of Order and History
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But
opinion
greatest

with

that

all

Voegelin

importance

ideological

of

this
has

for

movements--a

said,

made
our

I

a

am

still

of

the

contribution

of

the

understanding

contribution

of

which

modern
can

moreover, quite persuasive if properly understood.

be,
It is

at least conceivable that, if enough monographic studies
were performed in support of Voegelin's project, we might
one day be able to connect ideological consciousness with
earlier

forms

comparative

of

disorientation

study of literature.

in

the

manner

Several

of

the

such studies

have already been published and others are forthcoming.52
Yet, as I interpret Voegelin, the key to the discovery and
confirmation of continuities in the history of disordered
consciousness is to find such continuities at the level of
experiences rather than literary expressions. 53

Stated

(see Israel and Revelation, p. x} will almost surely
include analyses of parousiastic writings.
Much of this
material will be published in the coming years by
Louisiana State University Press.
52E.g., David Walsh, The Mysticism of Innerworldly
Fulfillment:
A Study of Jacob Boehme (Gainesville:
University Presses of Florida, 1983}; Stephen A. McKnight,
11
The Renaissance Magus and the Modern Messiah," Religious
Studies Review (vol. V, 1979, pp. 81-88) ; "Understanding
Modernity:
A Reappraisal of the Gnostic Element,"
Intercollegiate Review (vol. XIV, 1979, pp. 107-17), and
McKnight's book on hermeticism, alchemy and magic in the
Renaissance, forthcoming from Louisiana State University
Press.
53The issue is not quite this simple, and an example
is in order. One such continuity at the level of literary
expression would be the symbol of history as a sequence of
three ages, of which the third age is the final and
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differently,

one who wished to establish the essential

equivalence

of,

say,

ideological

consciousness

and

medieval millenarianism would do better to articulate and
compare

the

general

ideological

and

parousiastic

experiences than to attempt a direct comparison of texts.
To

pursue

parousiast' s

this

example,

symbol

of

the

one

can

°Kingdom

only
of

connect

God"

with

the
the

ultimate fulfillment of an underlying design or
progressive process.
As examples of this symbol Voegelin
mentioned Joachim of Flora's conception of history as the
ages of the Father, Son, and Spirit; Turgot's and Comte's
theory of a sequence of theological, metaphysical, and
scientific phases; Hegel's dialectic of the three stages
of freedom and self-reflective spiritual fulfillment; the
Marxian dialectic of the three stages of primitive
communism,
class society, and final communism; the
National Socialist symbol of the Third Realm; and the
identification of Moscow as the Third Rome.
It would be
extraordinarily difficult, if not simply impossible, to
ever demonstrate that the symbols which appeared later in
time were the result of influences exerted by earlier
symbolizations, or that the identification of three stages
in each case was not a matter only of coincidence.
For
instance, Marx speaks of five historical stages in The
German Ideology (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1976, pp.
38-44) and of only two in A Contribution to the Critique
of Political Economy (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1970,
pp. 20-22).
While it may therefore be fruitless to
attempt to demonstrate an equivalence among these
particular symbols, it is possible to provide a plausible
explanation for the continued appearance of the basic
symbol by reference to engendering experiences (such as
the desire to understand one's efforts as transcendentally
significant or one's era as that of final -victory or
enlightenment, which are in turn engendered by the
experiences of uncertainty and the senselessness of
mundane events in history).
This point is by no means
intended to depreciate the efforts of those who are
applying the principles of Voegelin 's diagnostic project
to particular texts,
however,
since the important
experiences can only be articulated by reference to the
symbols in which they are expressed.
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Marxist

"realm

of

freedom"

by

showing

that

both

were

engendered by an alienated dissatisfaction with worldly
conditions and an inordinate longing for a perfected realm
which would be, strictly speaking, "otherworldly."

Those

who anticipate a revolution of the saints are anticipating
something

very

different

than

revolution of proletarians,
that

both

condition

types
in

of

the

those

anticipate

a

but it is entirely possible

speculation

soul.

who

The

arise

from

student

of

a

similar

comparative

literature is likely to object if we attempt to draw a
literary

connection

between

these

two

types

of

revolutionary texts; the historian, on the other hand, may
find Voegelin's experiential analysis extremely helpful as
he

struggles

to

understand

the

relationship

between

movements which are so similar and yet so different.
What is certain is that the historian will also
object if we do not disaggregate Voegelin's concept of
gnosticism

so

that

we

can

account

for

the

very

real

differences in patterns of spiritual disorder in history.
The problem here is not that the extent of the literary
influences

exerted

by

the

historical

Gnostics

will

be

doubted, for as I have argued, that was not what Voegelin
was

driving

at

when

modern thinkers.5 4

speaking of gnostic tendencies

in

The real problem is that, if we can do

54see p. 33 above.
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no better than to refer to those such as Marx and Muntzer
with only one concept, we invite an unwarranted degree of
skepticism because we obscure the line between common and
distinct

elements.

It

was

one

of

Voegelin's

great

achievements to have highlighted the former; it is a minor
and

correctable

flaw

that

his terminology does not do

justice to the latter.SS
Since it was Voegelin's intention to draw lines of
continuity between patterns of consciousness rather than
genres of literature, the lack of extended treatments by
voegelin of writings that would correspond to certain of
the patterns is less problematic than it might seem.

For

example, while we would be in a much better position to
evaluate

his

comments

on

the

enduring

significance

of

metastatic faith if he had cited evidence of its presence
in other prophets and provided a more elaborate treatment
of the case of Isaiah, we have little reason to believe
that no priest or prophet or soothsayer in the ancient
world ever thought it possible to invoke divine powers in

SSThe typology set forth in the first chapter is
intended as a first step toward a solution for this
problem.
Any such solution must necessarily accomplish
three distinct objectives:
(1) differentiate between
those types of spiritual disorientation which are marked
either by a desire to perfect or flee the world, (2)
account
for
the decisive catalytic effects of
Christianity,
and (3)
embrace all of the resulting
varieties of disorientation under a generic concept which,
like Voegelin's concept of gnosticism, can reflect their
underlying commonalities and perennial appearances.
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order to win worldly struggles or transform the conditions
of life.

We can have reason to doubt that metastatic

faith existed in Isaiah without having reason to doubt
that it existed at all.

If we have cause to believe that

millenialism has existed in the ancient, the medieval and
the modern world, we also have cause to welcome a project
such

as

Voegelin' s

which

attempts

to

account

for

continuity through an analysis of consciousness.

this
If it

turns out that this continuity can be persuasively traced
to certain experiences of the human condition which also
help to account for the character of ideological thought
and activity,

then the political scientist in particular

has cause to welcome such a project.
In conclusion, Voegelin's analysis of consciousness
is

not

only

instructive

for

an

understanding

of

the

underlying commonalities among ideologies, but also for an
understanding of the patterns

of continuity within the

general history of pneumapathological disorientation.

In

fact, the very experiences which Voegelin found essential
in making the

first

type of

connection are also those

which permitted him to make the second type.
the

experiences

alienation,

along

absoluteness,

final

of
with

contingency,
the

certainty

uncertainty

corresponding
and

These are

control.

and

longings

for

It

the

is

hubristic revolt against the human condition and the will
to power in a

transfigured reality which unites modern
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ideologies--and

which

unites

ideological

consciousness

with metastatic faith, prometheanism and parousiasm.

v

CHAPrER

BEYOND THE AGE OF IDEOLOGY
It was noted at the outset of the first chapter
that Eric Voegelin's career as a political scientist can
be described as a search for the wellsprings of the crisis
of his time,

for the analytical tools required to render

it intelligible,
Given

the

and for appropriate sources of therapy.

extraordinary

Voegelin's writings,
career

in

a

variety

complexity

one could,
of

equally

and

of course,

breadth

of

describe his

legitimate

ways.

One

objection which could be levelled against my description
(and this study as a whole)
emphasized

the

importance

of

would be that I
Voegelin's

have over-

diagnostic

and

therapeutic projects, or that Voegelin's quest was first a
search for psychic order and only secondarily an attempt
to understand and resist the forces of disorder.
Inasmuch as constraints of space have required that
this analysis be restricted to Voegelin' s diagnostic and
therapeutic efforts,

it must indeed be acknowledged that

this study cannot provide a representative overview of the
full extent of his life's work.

Nevertheless,

it would

certainly be incorrect to state that Voegelin's search for
order can be rightly understood

if treated as distinct

from his analysis of psychic disorder.

Such a statement

would not only run contrary to Voegelin' s reflections on
178
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his

own

philosophical

activity 1

but

also

to

his

understanding of philosophy per se:
I have spoken of remedies against the disorder of the
time.
One of these remedies is philosophical inquiry
itself .•.. Philosophy is the love of being through love
of divine Being as the source of its order. The Logos
of being is the object proper of philosophical
inquiry; and the search for truth concerning the order
of being cannot be conducted without diagnosing the
modes of existence in untruth. The truth of order has
to be gained and regained in the perpetual struggle
against the fall from it; and the movement toward the
truth starts from a man's awareness of his existence
in untruth.
The diagnostic and therapeutic functions
are inseparable in philosophy as a form of existence.
And ever since Plato, in the disorder of his time,
discovered the connection, philosophical inquiry has
been one of the means of establishing islands of order
in the disorder of the age.
Order and History is a
philosophical inquiry concerning the order of human
existence in society and history.
Perhaps it will
have its remedial effect--in the modest measure that,
in the passionate course of events, is allowed to
Philosophy. 2
These lines,

which conclude Voegelin's "Preface" to the

first volume of Order and History, indicate the centrality
of his diagnostic/therapeutic project within his work as a
whole.
What is not made clear in these lines, or for that
l 11 It is not simply an academic problem, or a problem
in the history of opinion and so on, that evokes my
interest in this or that issue in the theory of
consciousness, but the very practical problem of mass
murder
in
the
twentieth
century."
Voegelin,
"Autobiographical Statement at Age Eighty-Two," in
Frederick Lawrence, ed. , The Beginning and the Beyond:
Papers from the Gadamer and Voegelin Conferences,
Supplementary Issue of Lonergan Workshop (vol. IV, Chico,
California:
Scholar's Press, 1984, pp. 97-131), p. 117.
See also Anamnesis (1978), p. 3.
2voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xiv.
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matter

in

any

writings, 3
11

is

of

the pertinent passages

what he had

remedy 11 or "therapy."

in mind when

in Voegelin' s
speaking of

a

This is quite surprising in light

of Voegelin's stated intentions for Order and History and
in light of the remark in Science, Politics and Gnosticism
that "our presentation of the phenomenon [of the spiritual
crisis of a

society],

therefore,

will at the same time

furnish the remedy for it through therapeutic analysis. 11 4
The bracketed section here, which is interpolated from the
preceding sentence in the text, would seem to suggest that
Voegelin was considering the possibility of a remedy which
might

prove

effective

against

disorientation and social crisis.

both

individual

Yet, when read in its

entirety, the passage could also suggest that a society in
disorder cannot be "cured" but only escaped through an

3The most important of these pertinent passages would
include, "Nietzsche, the Crisis and the War," Journal of
Politics (vol. VI, 1944, pp. 177-212), p. 195; "The
Origins of Scientism" (1948), p. 488; Science, Politics
and Gnosticism
(1958), pp.
22-23;
"On Readiness to
Rational Discussion" ( 1961), pp. 283-84; "On Debate and
Existence, 11 Intercollegiate Review (vol. III, 1967, pp.
143-52), p. 152; "The Gospel and Culture" (1971), p. 101;
"On Hegel:
A Study in Sorcery" (1971), p. 349; Anamnesis
(1978),
p.
188; The Ecumenic Age
(1974),
p.
184;
"Autobiographical Statement at Age Eighty-Two" (1984), p.
118; In Search of Order (1987), p. 39.
4voegelin,
p. 23.

Science,

Politics and Gnosticism (1968),
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individual reordering.5
This reading seems to receive decisive support from
statements such as the following:
Nobody can heal the spiritual disorder of an "age". A
philosopher can do no more than work himself free from
the rubble of the idols which, under the name of an
"age", threatens to cripple and bury him; and he can
hope that the example of his efforts will be of help
to others who find th ems elves in the same situation
and experience the same desire to gain their humanity
under God.6
The issue cannot, however, be settled so easily.

Voegelin

repeatedly suggested that certain types of philosophical
activity

could

individuals,

provide

a

remedy

for

disoriented

and since he never broke from the Platonic

"anthropological principle" that the order of a society is
a

function

citizens,

of

the

order

in the

souls

of

its

leading

it is entirely possible that even if Voegelin

11 • • • the
5The passage runs as follows:
spiritual
disorder of our time, the civilizational crisis of which
everyone so readily speaks, does not by any means have to
be borne as an inevitable fate; ••• on the contrary,
everyone possesses the means of overcoming it in his own
life.
And our effort would not only indicate the means,
but also show how to employ them.
No one is obliged to
take part in the spiritual crisis of a society; on the
contrary, everyone is obliged to avoid this folly and live
his life in order.
Our presentation of the phenomenon,
therefore, will at the same time furnish the remedy for it
through therapeutic analysis." Ibid., pp. 22-23.

6 voegelin, "On Hegel: A study in Sorcery" (1971), p.
349.
Lest it be thought that Voegelin was being so blunt
in the first sentence of this quotation'because he thought
that an "age 11 could not be spiritually disordered, it
might be noted that Voegelin once referred to his own time
as "a diseased age. 11 See 11 History and Gnosis" (1969), p.
81.
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discounted

the

nonetheless

for

an

a

"social

individual

remedy"

remedy

that

he

searched

could prove

This possibility raises another:

socially effective.
disoriented

of

idea

individuals

can

be

reoriented,

If

including

individuals that are situated in such a way that order
might be restored to an entire society,

is it possible

that the history of pneumapathological consciousness might
one day come to an end?
Voegelin's references to "remedies" and "therapies"
are

often

puzzling,

possibility

it

can

but
be

with

said

regard

with

to

this

confidence

that

last
he

rejected the notion that spiritual disorder could ever be
done away with.

This rejection was tacit rather than

explicit, since Voegelin never wrote on the issue, but the
implication of his analysis
reason.

To

be more

is no

pointed,

less clear for that

if we

accept Voegelin's

argument that pneuma-pathological consciousness is rooted
in reactions to the most basic experiences of the human
condition

(which are unaffected by the accoutrements of

social change or technological progress), we would have to
conclude that the very expectation of an era free from
spiritual disorientation would itself be an expression of
spiritual disorientation.
To use a pair of current phrases, we could say that
whenever an

"End of Ideology"

might come to pass,

and

whatever a "post-modern era" might be like, an absence of

r
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pneumapathological

consciousness

characteristics.

Paradoxical as

will

not

be

among

it may seem,

there

its
is

reason to doubt that Voegelin would have thought such an
absence

to

possible.

be

desirable

even

if

he

had

thought

it

This is explained by the further paradox that

well-ordered and disordered consciousness spring from the
same

sources

in

human

experience.

Both

patterns

of

consciousness, according to Voegelin, arise in response to
a

condition

of

imperfection.

contingency,
Although

uncertainty,

these

mortality

experiences

supply

and
the

background for either a revolt against such a condition or
an attempt to escape it into a transfigured paradise, they
also

stand

as

essential

preconditions which

permit the

differentiation of the transcendent from the mundane realm
of existence.
revel t

A humanity which lost the capacity for a

against the ground of being would simultaneously

lose the philosophical or religious capacity for "turningtoward" the ground.

To complicate matters further, it is

not as though balanced and imbalanced consciousness share
only their moment of origin and then go their separate
ways.7

For Voegelin,

it was rather the case that every

7voegelin, "The Gospel and Culture" (1971), pp. 100101:
"· .. [T]he structural possibility of the derailment
is present whenever the existential Movement of
differentiating the Unknown God from the intra-cosmic gods
has begun .... Though the possibility of the Gnostic
derailment is inherent to the Movement from its beginning,
only the full differentiation of the truth of existence
under the Unknown God through his Son has created the

184
advance

in the historical process of differentiation of

the transcendent from the immanent realm will tend to make
the

point

of

balance

in

the

metaxy

that

much

more

precarious:
The differentiating experience, either noetic or
pneumatic, can be so intensive that the man to whom it
occurs feels transformed into a new being.
The new
image of the world resulting from the experience can
be misunderstood as a new world; and the process of
change itself can be extrapolated into the future. As
that changeability mutates into images of a changeable
reality comprising the poles of participation, we have
the roots of the phenomenona of metastatic beliefs:
The gradualistic idea of infinite progress in the time
of the world,
the apocalyptic visions of the
catastrophe of an old world and its metastasis into a
new one resulting from divine intervention; the
revolutionary ideas of a metastasis manipulated by
human action; and so on.8
As the cosmological "world full of gods" gives way to a
transcendent

realm beyond

objective knowledge

(but

not

beyond experience), the uncertainties of our condition are
multiplied even as the truth of existence is discovered;
the

apprehension

of

our

contingency

deepens

as

the

absolute status of the source of order is sensed, and our
mortality and imperfection become ever more difficult to
bear as the immortality and perfection of the divine is
revealed.
The

process

which

Voegelin

called

the

"de-

divinization" of the world is the source of disorder as
cultural field in which the extra-cosmic contraction of
existence is an equally radical possibility."
Bvoegelin, Anamnesis (1978), p. 166.
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well

as

order

progressively

in

the

revealed

soul.9

as

A

ground

transcendent

will

which

is

require

a

progressively greater opening of the soul, which in turn
will

exacerbate
The

closure.
intellectual

the

stimuli

leading

closing

of

the

soul

can

be

error

that

to

existential

is

no

more

an

corrected

by

means

of

instruction than the opening of the soul is a condition
which

results

history

of

voegelin)

from

following

spiritual

of

formula.lo

experience

has not witnessed a

inflamation

a

disorders

of

(at

least

Since
as

read

the
by

diminution but rather an
the

soul,

and

since

the

essential sources of spiritual disorder are rooted in the
very structure of human life, there is precisely no reason
to

expect

that

pneumapathological

consciousness

can

be

relegated to the past.
This bracing insight need not issue in quietism or
pessimism,
for

effective

sensed
and

a

avenues

symbiotic

disorder.

uprooted,
back.

as was evinced by Voegelin's continued search
of

reorientation

after

he

first

relationship between differentiation
Spiritual

disorientation

cannot

be

but it does not follow that it cannot be cut
Indications

of

a

hopefulness

concerning

the

remedial capacity of philosophy as a response to social
9see Voegelin, The New Science
Introduction (1952), pp. 100-110.

of

Politics:

lOsee Voegelin, In Search of Order (1987), p ..39.

An
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disorder can be found in Voegelin's writings at least up
until

the

late

1960s.

However,

it

would

be

grossly

misleading to suggest that Voegelin was simply hopeful;
his

response

to

the

political crisis

of modernity was

tempered, almost from the start, by a clear perception of
the

enormity

of

the

obstacles

which

philosophical attempt to reorder a society.
well

that

philosophers

have

not

confront

a

Voegelin knew
established

particularly impressive record on this score.

a

In 1948

voegelin wrote that, "no wisdom of a Plato could prevent
the suicide of Athens and no climactic synthesis of a st.
Thomas the end of imperial Christianity. 11 11

We might add

that the efforts of the Hebrew prophets, of Irenaeus and
Augustine, of Hooker and Hobbes, and of Baur, Neander and
Matter met with no greater success.12
A
individual

review

of

therapy

Voegelin's
shows

no

comments
discernable

on

social

trend

and

toward

llvoegelin, "The origins of Scientism" ( 1948) , p. 488.
12For Voegelin's fascinating account of Richard
Hooker's analysis of the Puritans see The New Science of
Politics:
An Introduction (1953), pp. 134-44.
On
resistance to parousiasm as a fundamental motivation in
Hobbes see Ibid., pp. 152-62, 179-84.
Voegelin credits
Ferdinand Christian Baur (Die christliche Gnosis, 1835),
Johann August Neander
(Genetische Entwicklung der
vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme, 1818), and Jacques Matter
(Historie critigue du Gnosticisme et de son influence sur
les sectes religieuses et philosophigues des six premiers
siecles de l'eere chretienne, 1928) with having been among
the first to call attention to gnostic tendencies in the
Enlightenment and German idealism.
See Science, Politics
gnd Gnosticism (1968), pp. 3-5.
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greater

or

lesser

optimism

in

the

thirty

years

which

passed between the publication of Political Religions and
Anamnesis.
conclude

Such
that

a

he

review
was

could

downright

indeed

lead

one

inconsistent,

to

since

voegelin seems to rise to the challenge of reform in one
piece

and

philosophy

deny
is

in
even

the

next

that

possible.

reform

by means

Nevertheless,

it

of
is

difficult to believe that Voegelin was simply inept in his
treatment of the problem or that his temperament was so
uneven as to fluctuate according to the events of the day.
I believe that the apparent inconsistency in his views is
best explained by a striking, seemingly autobiographical
passage from 1944:
Platonism in politics is the attempt, perhaps hopeless
and futile, to regenerate a disintegrating society
spiritually by creating the model of a true order of
values ••.• The position of Santayana implies the
resignation, probably quite justified, that such an
attempt at the present juncture would be vain.
But
resignation cannot be achieved by everybody; the man
with the Platonic temper will try the impossible.13
It was Nietzsche that Voegelin went on to identify as a
man with the Platonic temper,

but it seems indisputable

that Voegelin also fit the pattern.14
13voegelin,
(1944) I P• 195.

"Nietzsche,

the

Undaunted by his

Crisis

and

the

War"

14This is not to say that Voegelin can easily be
labelled a Platonist (or anything else, for that matter),
since he frequently stressed Plato's limitations and
included the label among those with which he had
incorrectly been saddled:
"On my religious 'position', I
have been classified as a Protestant, a Catholic, as anti-
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early awareness of the difficulties surrounding an effort
to

provide

a

socially

effective

remedy

by

means

of

spiritual analysis and evocation, Voegelin did indeed try
the impossible.
Of course,

it was not entirely clear in 1944 that

the task could not be successfully carried out, since much
remained to be done on the diagnostic front.

Voegelin

knew that, by following Thucydides and Plato in adopting
the medicinal model of diagnosis and prescription, he was
obligated to let the latter be dictated by the former.
since his diagnostic work continued to develop and deepen
over

the

course

of

the

next

twenty-five

years,

the

therapeutic project was often mentioned but always left in
abeyance.

No

extended

analysis

of

therapeutic

possibilities was ever published because, by the time that
his mature diagnosis had taken shape, the diagnosis itself
indicated that any social remedy would almost surely be
unworkable.

Disappointing as this outcome may be, it is

semitic and as a typical Jew; politically, as a Liberal, a
Fascist, a National Socialist and a Conservative; and on
my theoretical position,
as a Platonist,
a NeoAugustinian,
a Thomist,
a disciple of Hegel,
an
existentialist, a historical relativist and an empirical
sceptic; in recent years the suspicion has frequently been
voiced that I am a Christian.
All these classifications
have been made by university professors and people with
academic degrees.
They give ample food for thought
regarding the state of our universities."
Voegelin, "On
Readiness to Rational Discussion" (1961), p. 280.
Pages
89-93 of Plato and Aristotle (1957) are highly suggestive
of the parallels which run through the attitudes of
Voegelin and Plato on questions of political reform.
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still the case that Voegelin, like Plato before him, has
bequeathed

to

us

a

profound

set

of

insights

into

the

intractability of spiritual crisis when it has penetrated
the order of a society.
It would appear that Voegelin' s

early reading in

Plato provided instruction on which paths to reform would
most

likely

prove

to

be

fruitless.

It

is

perhaps

surprising that Voegelin, who always referred to politics
as his field of study, would never have entertained the
possibility of institutional remedies against the crisis
which provided the motivation for his choice of scholarly
discipline.

Mention of issues of form or procedure or

policy are conspicuous by their absence from his works.
Voegelin was persuaded that Plato was correct in regarding
institutional problems as epiphenomenal manifestations of
an underlying loss of spiritual orientation, and his view
seems to correspond to that which we saw him ascribe to
Socrates in the second chapter:
... [H)e roundly refuses to go into details, not only
of customs and mores, but even of civil, commercial,
and criminal law, because such matters will take care
of themselves if only the souls of the legislative
rulers are in good order.
Moreover, he restrains
himself deliberately at this point in order not to
give the false impression that good order in a polis
can be created through institutional devices.
He
considers it, on the contrary, a symptom of disease in
a polis when the citizens are feverishly active with
patching up this or that gap in the law, but do not
dare to touch the well-known source of the multitude
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of minor evils.15
In The New Science of Politics, Voegelin expressed this
same

fear

that

a

preoccupation

with

form

instead

of

spiritual substance would deflect attention from the root
causes of social disorder:

"The more fervently all human

energies are thrown into the great enterprise of salvation
through

world-immanent

action,

the

farther

the

human

beings who engage in this enterprise move away from the
life of the spirit. 11 16
Voegelin could not indulge in the notion that an
institutional

reordering

could

effect

a

spiritual

reordering for the simple reason that he did not share the
Enlightenment view that human behavior is
institutional environment.

a

product of

He accepted the perspective of

Plato and Aristotle that a human nature exists, that it is
comprised of a complex set of competing forces which can
be arranged in a variety of hierarchical orders, and that
a

social

outcome

order can
of

this

exert a

competition

limited
but

influence upon the

cannot

impose at will a preconceived hierarchy.
the

classical

insight

that

certain

abolish

it

or

He also accepted
institutional

arrangements are better than others (insofar as they may
15voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 87.
It
bears pointing out that Voegelin' s formal training, and
most of his early articles, were in the area of public law.
16voegelin, The New Science of Politics:
duction (1952), p. 131.

An Intro-
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tend to encourage the flourishing of those elements such
as wisdom and moderation which permit a healthy ordering
of other elements and forces), but that no institutional
patterns exists which cannot be perverted so as to hinder
the proper formation of character and encourage the social
ascendancy of infirm character types.
case

for

Voegelin

environments

have

that

Indeed it was the

institutions

greater

potential,

and
owing

cultural
to

the

peculiarities of the process of character development, for
generalizing

a

pattern

of

personal

disorder

nourishing a healthy order in individual souls.

than

for

Since a

healthy personal order is in large part the outgrowth of
an orientation by reference to the transcendent aspects of
human experience,

and since these experiences are either

granted by grace to individuals or are evoked through a
non-volitional responsiveness to symbols which articulate
the experiences of others, it is not possible for society
to mechanically call

forth a citizenry characterized by

the balance of consciousness.

By contrast, societies can

exert pressures that are quite effective in muting human
responsiveness to transcendent experiences or restricting
the avenues through which the resulting orientation can
find expression in public activity.
fact

for

Voegelin

that

the

Thus it was a sad

development

of

personal

disorder can be a social or political phenomenon whereas
the engineering of balanced consciousness cannot.
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Given this perspective,

it is understandable that

voegelin's therapeutic speculation would have gravitated
toward the possibilities of personal resistance toward a
corrupting

environment

reorienting others.
such

an

act

of

and

individualized

methods

for

He described his own work as just
personal

resistance,17

and

devoted

considerable attention to the question of whether rational
discussion

and

debate

pneumapathological
scrupulousness

in

can

prove

effective

consciousness.
permitting

his

Here

against

again,

diagnostic

work

his
to

dictate his conclusions on the possibility of therapy led
to findings that are less than comforting.
Voegelin's diagnostic analysis is premised upon the
observation

that

ideological

and

pneumapathological

closure is not a matter of ignorance or intellectual error
but,

rather,

this

implies

of experience and reaction.
that

the

extent

of

a

On one hand,

disorder

such

as

ideological consciousness may be rather less widespread
than we might expect
ideologies

as

from the number and

identified

by Voegelin.

It

influence of
is

entirely

possible to be hoodwinked by a Marx or a Comte for reason
of insufficient experience or study without engaging in a
self-conscious revolt against the conditions of existence.
17 See Voegelin I "On Hegel:
A study in Sorcery"
(1971), pp. 336-37; Anamnesis (1978), pp. 3-4, 9-10; "The
Meditative Origin of the Philosophical Knowledge of Order"
(1984), pp. 43-44.
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Yet,

on

the

consciousness
positivism

other
within

is

hand,
a

less

since

Second
a

genuine

Reality

result

of

ideological

like
the

Marxism or

intellectual

attractiveness of the doctrine than of its capacity for
dulling

the

tensions

of

open

existence,

a

rational

critique of the particulars of the doctrine is likely to
be of no avail in such cases.18
Voegelin

argued

that

ideologies

have

long

since

been "torn to pieces" through scholarly criticism, yet we
can observe that they continue to find adherents.19

This

fact might be difficult to explain for one who understood
ideologies simply as defective structures of opinion, but
against the backdrop of Voegelin's diagnosis the epigonal
afterlife
understood.

of

an

ideology

such

as

Marxism

is

easily

Since the passage of two millennia has not

extinguished the phenomenon of parousiasm, and since the
18Thus, from the 1940s onward, Voegelin ceased to
engage in the detailed criticism of ideologies which
characterized much of his early work.
Examples of the
earlier form of response would be Die Rassenidee in der
Geistesgeschichte von Ray bis Carus (Berlin:
Junker &
Duennhaupt, 1933); Rasse und Staat (Tuebingen:
J. c. B.
Mohr, 1933), and "The Growth of the Race Idea," Review of
Politics (vol. II, 1940, pp. 283-317).
The chapters on
Marx from the abandoned History were the last occasions on
which Voegelin deigned even to discuss the doctrinal
principles of an ideology, and here the shift from the
analysis of doctrine to engendering consciousness is
already quite apparent.
See From Enlightenment to
Revolution (1975), pp. 240-302 and p. 25 supra.
19voegelin, Conversations with Eric Voegelin (1980),
pp. 15-19. See also "The Eclipse of Reality" (1970), pp.
188-89.
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Marxist faith conforms to a similar pattern in consciousness,

it is not surprising that the continual failure of

communist revolutions to deliver on their promises has not
proven fatal to the appeal of the doctrine.
analysis

suggests

that

the

provision

of

Voegelin's
a

plausible

account of the world is only a secondary project within
the con-struction of an ideological Second Reality, and by
the

same

token

it

would

appear

that

adherence

to

an

ideology is first a matter of faith--followed by a more or
less

elaborate

project

of

circumventing

the

dissonance

between the First and Second Realities.20
If ideological consciousness involves a misplaced
faith in a misplaced, immanentized ground of being, is it
possible

that

a

reintroduction

to

genuine

faith

transcendent ground would provide the remedy
Voegelin

was

looking?

Voegelin's

own

in

a

for which

resistance

to

ideological disorder--as well as his search for adequate
representations

of

order--led

him

to

the

study

of

classical Greek philosophy and Judeo-Christian revelation,
but his analysis of the dynamics of existential closure

20voegelin, "The Eclipse of Reality" (1970), p. 190:
"When conflicts with reality compel revisions with some
frequency over a period, the activity of projecting can
pass from a phase of comparatively naive indulgence to one
of a more critical occupation with the standards of
projects.
For a Second Reality must, on the one hand,
satisfy the requirements of the contracted self and, on
the other hand, contain enough uneclipsed reality not to
be ignored as a crackpot scheme by the contemporaries."
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would seem to undercut the possibility of simply directing
others toward the same path.
stated

simply:

balanced

exposure

consciousness

The basic problem can be

to

in the

the

"heal thy"

metaxy is

tension

not

of

likely to

reorient the closed soul, for it was exposure to precisely
this

tension

closure.

which

first

prompted

pneumapathological

Whether a person has eclipsed one of the poles

of participation in reality because of an inability to
endure either the corruption of the world or the shadow
cast by divinity, a reintroduction to the tension of the
metaxy will bring but another, perhaps stronger, dose of
the same.
The

uncertainty

from which

escape

was

initially

sought will not be alleviated by a spiritual tradition if
it is used as an antidote
symbolization

of

mysterious reality.
scaling

down

the

in the authentic form of a

participation

in

an

essentially

This problem might be circumvented by
spiritual

demands

of

the

tradition

through the fundamentalist tactic of reducing it to a set
of

dogmatic propositions,

but Voegelin

recognized

that

this expedient is only temporary and can produce the most
undesirable of unintended results:
The symbolism providing an answer to (the basic
questions of existence] is of secondary importance to
the philosopher. That, however, is not to say that it
does not have an important function in protecting the
order of existence in both man and society.
For the
development of an answering construct, even if it
should have to be revised in the light of a later,
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more penetrating analysis of existence, will at least
guard for a time against error concerning the truth of
existence. But only for a time. For the structure of
existence is complicated; it is not known once for
all.
If it be forgotten that the answer depends for
its truth on the understanding of existence that has
motivated it; if it be erected into an idol valid for
all time; its effect will be the very opposite of
protection.
For the sensed, if not clearly known,
invalidity of the symbol at a later point in history
will be extended by the critics of the symbol to the
truth nevertheless contained in it.
An obsolete
symbol may have the effect of destro~ing the order of
existence it was created to protect.2
The symbols of an authentic spiritual tradition are
overwhelmingly likely to be misunderstood or rejected out
of hand by the subject of a remedial course in religion or
philosophy,

primarily

consciousness

is

because

initiated

by

a

pneumapathological
renunciation

of

experiences which the symbols are intended to convey.

the
It

is true that an ideologist or pneumapath will at least
have had certain of these experiences but, in the wake of
the subsequent revolt against the attendant implications
of the experiences, there may be nothing left upon which
to rebuild.

For example, we saw in the preceding chapter

that the experience of contingency had been impressed upon
Marx with great forcefulness.
cannot
itself,

be

an

and

autonomous
that

all

contradict this notion.

He understood that humanity

species unless

the

evidences

of

it has

created

practical

life

If Marx had remained open to the

possibility that the basic conditions of our existence are
21voegelin, "On Debate and Existence'' (1967), p. 147.
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beyond our control, and had simply set out to investigate
the extent to which we can contribute to an improvement of
the terms of everyday life,
subsequent
experience.

work

would

not

it is conceivable that his
have

eclipsed

the

original

Yet his work was motivated not by a desire to

understand the world but rather to change it,

and since

fundamental change is impossible unless human contingency
be obliterated, Marx was driven not only to depart from
his own experience but also to attempt to drive the idea
of creation from the minds of the people as well.
One can well imagine the outcome of an effort to
reform

the Marx of the

metaphysics or theology.

1860s by means

of a

primer on

Voegelin had no illusions about

the probable result of attempts to use theory as a form of
therapy:
••. [T]heory as an explication of certain experiences
is intelligible only to those in whom the explication
will stir up parallel experiences as the empirical
basis for testing the truth of theory.
Unless a
theoretical exposition activates the corresponding
experiences at least to a degree, it will create the
impression of empty talk or will perhaps be rejected
as an irrelevant expression of subjective opinions. A
theoretical debate can be conducted only among
spoudaioi in the Aristotelian sense; theory has no
argument against a man who feels, or pretends to feel,
unable of re-enacting the experience.22
22voegelin, The New Science of Politics:
An Introduction (1952), pp. 64-65.
For Voegelin's most detailed
account of the obstacles which confront the possibility of
intellectual debate serving as a method of reorientation
see "On Readiness to Rational Discussion" (1961), .12.assim.
See also "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme:
A
Meditation" (1981), pp. 260-61.
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If

theoretical

debate

is

only

useful

in

debate

among

spoudaioi, who may benefit as a result but are certainly
not

the

intended

subjects

of

Voegelin's

therapeutic

project, we must ask whether Voegelin did not come around
to the view that as a man with the Platonic temper he had
indeed tried the impossible.
As we shall see momentarily, there are indications
that

this

was

in

therapeutic project.

fact

Voegelin's

final

view

on

the

First it will be helpful to suggest

why he may have thought that the impossible must be tried.
The preceding quotation from 1952 shows that Voegelin knew
that debate would be futile, but in 1967 he was to write
that it is, nevertheless, a matter of obligation:
Only if we know, for the purpose of comparison, what
the conditions of rational discourse are, shall we
find our bearings in the contemporary clash with
second Realities. The best point of departure for the
comparative analysis of the problem will be St.
Thomas' Summa Contra Gentiles .•.. It was written in a
period of intellectual turmoil through the contacts
with Islam and Aristotelian philosophy, comparable in
many respects to our own, with the important
difference however that a rational debate with the
opponent was still possible or--we should say more
cautiously--seemed still possible to Aquinas ..•• It is
a situation and an obligation that must be faced in
our twentieth century as much as Thomas had to face it
in his thirteenth.
Hence, if the sapiens shuns the
situation of debate, especially if he avoids the
crucial intellectual issues threatening the beleagured
city, he becomes derilect in his duties to God and
man,
his attitude is spiritually, morally and
politically indefensible.23
It might seem that Voegelin painted himself into a corner
23voegelin, "On Debate and Existence" (1967), p. 144.
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by arguing that debate is a matter of obligation while
also

maintaining

that

it

is

futile,

but

he

found

an

interesting (if not wholly satisfying) way out.
Returning to the situation faced by St. Thomas for
comparison, Voegelin stated that our present situation is
much more difficult for reason of the absence of a common
ground upon which a debate might be profitably conducted.
st. Thomas could hope that the Summa Contra Gentiles would
fulfill

his

objectives

shared with Jews,

because

the

Old

Testament

was

the New Testament with heretics,

and

natural reason with pagans and Mohammedans.

But in the

twentieth century, Voegelin continued,
we must say that we cannot argue by the Old Testament,
nor by the New Testament, nor by Reason.
Not even by
Reason, because rational argument presupposes the
community of true existence.24
Since ideological consciousness is a self-conscious revolt
against the community of true existence, the opponent is
beyond rational persuasion and must, Voegelin was later to
argue, be regarded not as a partner in debate but rather
as

an

"object

surprisingly

of

enough,

scientific
Voegelin

research. 11 25
continued

debate is a philosophical duty.26

to

And

yet,

insist

that

What resulted from this

24rbid., p. 152.
25voegelin, "Autobiographical Memoir" (1977), quoted
in Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution:
A Biographical Introduction (1981), p. 87.
26see The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 184.
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apparent

paradox

is

an

(admittedly)

odd

conception

of

debate:
... [W]e are forced one step further down to cope with
the opponent (even the word "debate" is difficult to
apply) on the level of existential truth.
The
speculations of classic and scholastic metaphysics are
edifices of reason erected on the experiential basis
of existence in truth; they are useless in a meeting
with edifices of reason erected on a different
experiential basis.
Nevertheless, we cannot withdraw
into the edifices and let the world go by, for in that
case we would be remiss in our duty of "debate." The
"debate" has, therefore, to assume the forms of (1) a
careful analysis of the noetic structure of existence
and (2) an analysis of Second Realities, with regard
both to their constructs and the motivating structure
of existence in untruth.
"Debate" in this form is
hardly a matter of reasoning (though it remains one of
the Intellect), but rather of the analysis of
existence preceding rational constructions; it is
medical in character in that it has to diagnose the
syndromes of untrue existence and by their noetic
structure to initiate,
if possible,
a healing
process.27
This passage would seem to suggest that, although Voegelin
never renounced his therapeutic intentions, he ultimately
came to drop the notion of a distinct therapeutic project
in

the

hope

that

his

diagnosis

could

itself

have

a

remedial effect.
The only indication provided by Voegelin of how a
diagnosis could also serve as a therapy is to be found in
Anamnesis:
The nihilistic rebellion cannot be overcome on its own
level of experiences and symbols, for instance, by
means of criticism of ideology, culture, or the times,
as attempted by intellectuals who no longer feel easy
in their situation. Such attempts can lead only to a
27voegelin, "On Debate and Existence" (1967); p. 152.
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confused stirring around in the nothingness of lost
reality.
The non-noetic thought about order of the
kind that rebellion produces offers no point of
contact to the noesis.
This formulation of the
problem seems to show the way to a solution: Whoever
has had enough of rebellion against the ground and
wishes again to think rationally needs only to turn
around and toward that reality against which the
symbols of rebellion aggress.
It seems that the
rebellion itself can become the guideline for the
seeker, inasmuch as that against which it rebels is
precisely that which he is seeking. The turning away
and turning around is indeed the sine .Q.Y..9. non for
finding the way from rebellion to reality; the
periagoge must in any case be performed.28
Unfortunately, this formulation of the problem only shows
the way to a solution for the seeker--not the pneumapath.
The potential effectiveness of the solution presupposes
that its subject is not ensnared within a Second Reality
but,

on

the

contrary,

has

rebellion against the ground.

already

had

enough

of

the

The statement that a remedy

will necessarily entail the periagoge is true,

but as a

piece of advice to one who is actively engaged in the
revolt

it

is

a

bit

like

advising

those

with

obses-

sive/compulsive tendencies to stop washing their hands or
biting their fingernails.

It would seem that the result

of Voegelin's search for a form of therapy ended in the
observation that for an act of personal revolt to end, the
person in question must stop revel ting. 2 9

Once again,

28voegelin, Anamnesis (1978), p. 188.
29The following exchange appears in "Philosophies of
History:
An Interview with Eric Voegelin:" New Orleans
Review: "Let me ask you a question which you may not wish
to answer.
Your work has always been brilliantly and
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this

is

quite true,

but as

the conclusion of a

thinker it cannot but disappoint.
the

measure

of

the

greatness

great

Nevertheless, part of
of

a

thinker

is

the

unwillingness to be cowed by the perception of crisis into
finding a solution where none exists.
The situation can still not be hopeless, since we
know of cases in which individuals have found their way
out of ideological Second Realities as well as the other
types of disorientation.
from

Leninism

extremes

of

to

If a Berdyaev could make his way

mysticism,

worldliness

or

and

an

Augustine

other-worldliness

community between the Cities of God and Man,
reorientation

must

exist.

But

the

from

the

to

the

avenues of

implication

of

Voegelin' s analysis seems to be that only rarely can an
individual (much less an entire society)

be led to these

avenues; either they appear mysteriously, as if by grace,
or

are

found

in

the

course

of

a

search

for

more

satisfactory representations of one's experience than are
provided by Second Realities.

We can make the hopeful

observation that it is often the most sensitive souls that

objectively descriptive.
Would you undertake in any way
to make prescriptive suggestions to impede the traumatic
deculturalization of our own times?"
Voegelin:
"Well,
the prescription is already contained in the description.
People have to recover contact with reality, which has
been lost in imaginary contacts with imaginary realities."
New Orleans Review (vol. II, 1973, pp. 135-39), p. 138.
The discussion turns to other subjects immediately after
this exchange.
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take

flight

from the metaxy,

rather than those who are

simply dull to its tensions.

Although Voegelin does not

make this point, we could venture to say on the basis of
his analysis that the soul

in revolt may have more in

common with prophets and philosophers, at least in terms
of spiritual sensitivity and experiential background, than
with

the

general

disoriented

soul

run

of humanity.

may

not,

at

The

some

sensitive but

point,

be

able

to

suppress the experiences of falsity and moral bankrupcy
within a Second Reality, which itself exists in a tension
with the enduring First Reality.JO
inevitably

intrudes

ideological system,

upon

the

The one, true reality
closed

world

of

an

and although the tensions imposed by

this reality will be no less acute the second time around,
there are limits beyond which ideologies fail to provide
insulation against the types of experience which can pave
the way for a reorientation.31
30For personal accounts of the failure of communist
ideology in this sense see Aurthur Koestler, Igazio
Silone, Righard Wright, Andre Gide, Louis Fischer and
Stephen Spender, The God that Failed (Richard Crossman,
ed.) {New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.)
31These would be the type of events or moments of
reflection that Karl Jaspers referred to as "border
experiences" or "ultimate situations."
The classic
example is the apprehension of death, and there is reason
to question whether an ideology can provide any guidance
whatsoever when this apprehension is presented to
consciousness.
For instance, the only reference to death
of which I am aware in the writings of Marx runs as
follows:
"Death appears as the harsh victory of the
species over the particular individual and seems to
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In 1 ight of the observation that the disoriented
soul bears a certain resemblance to the well-ordered soul,
we must ask whether Voegelin was justified in identifying
ideological and proto-ideological figures as "spiritually
diseased."

This actually involves a series of questions

which will be taken up in order in the concluding section
which follows:

First, has Voegelin provided a foundation

that is sufficient to elevate the designation of spiritual
disease from mere invective to the status of a theoretical
classification?

Second,

term

to

prompt

us

capacity for empathy?

should the very use of such a

question
Third,

Voegelin's

tolerance

or

can spiritual disease be

identified as an important component within each of the
movements that Voegelin identified as ideological?
finally,
finding

And,

do we have good reason to follow Voegelin in
an

essential

sameness

between

modern

and

pre-

modern varieties of spiritual disease?
With regard to the first question,
Voegelin

would

certainly

have

been

it seems that

vulnerable

to

the

charge that he had no foundation from which to diagnose
spiritual disease

in others

if he had not provided an

contradict their unity; but the particular individual is
only a determinate species being and thus mortal." Marx,
"Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844," in David
McLellan, ed., Karl Marx:
Selected Writings (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 91.
see Jaspers,
Philosophy of Existence (Philadelphia:
University of
Pennsylvania Press,
1971), pp. 76-88,
and Voegelin,
Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), pp. 109-114.
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elaborately

articulated conception of spiritual

health.

It is one thing to search historical materials for bizarre
doctrines or movements and then say that sick people were
involved,

but

quite

another

to

develop

and

propose

critical standards for the designation of manifestations
of

spiritual

heal th

and

unheal th.

As

the

foregoing

accounts have hopefully shown, Voegelin pursued the latter
tack in great detail through an extraordinary range of
historical

settings

and,

in virtually every case,

with

explicit analysis of the written evidence that backed a
diagnosis of pneuma-pathological consciousness.
Of

course,

one

who

is

left

unpersuaded

by

voegelin's description of healthy consciousness will have
little regard for his diagnostic analyses.

If there is no

transcendent ground of being there can be no spiritual
revolt against such a ground,

and Voegel in' s concept of

psychic imbalance is premised upon the validity of his
notion of balanced consciousness within the tensions of
the

metaxy.

To

some

extent,

the

evaluation

of

the

foundation from which Voegelin diagnosed spiritual disease
must

therefore

be

made

foolish

to

by

the

reader,

pronounce

on

as

such

it

would

obviously

be

topics

in

passing.

Su ff ice it to say that Voegelin was at least

thorough enough, by dint of having clearly indicated his
own premises on spiritual order, to permit those who are
willing to examine his diagnoses to develop an informed

r
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evaluation.
A more approachable part of this issue is whether
voegelin's

identifications

of

spiritual

disease

were

theoretical diagnoses or mere attacks against those who
ran

afoul

of

his

characterization.

legendary

capacity

for

unflattering

Here we have a common-sense standard at

Since Voegelin was a writer who minced no

our disposal.

words, one has little difficulty in discerning whether a
historical figure was or was not held in favor by him.
Thus we can ask, were the standards of spiritual health
and

unhealth

evenhanded

just mentioned

and

dispassionate

applied by Voegelin
manner?

An

in an

affirmative

answer is suggested by the fact that Voegelin followed his
self-set standards to very harsh observations on a number
of figures for whom he had the greatest respect, including
Isaiah,

Aristotle

and

st.

Pau1.32

This

resolute

faithfulness to theoretical standards can also be seen in
Voegelin's

willingness

to

emphasize

the

deformative

as

well as the formative effects of every differentiation of
32on Isaiah see Israel and Revelation (1956), pp.
476-501:
The
Ecumenic Age
(1974),
pp.
25-27:
"Autobiographical Memoir" (1981), quoted in Ellis Sandoz,
The Voegelinian Revolution:
A Biographical Introduction,
pp.
134-35.
On Aristotle and the "derailment" of
philosophy see Plato and Aristotle (1957), pp. 276-79,
332-36: Anamnesis (1978), pp. 159-66.
On "gnostic"
tendencies in St. Paul see The New Science of Poli tics:
An Introduction (1952), p. 126; The Ecumenic Age (1974),
pp. 239-71, and David Walsh, "Voegelin's Response to the
Disorder of the Age," Review of Politics (vol. XLVI, 1984,
pp. 266-87), pp. 273-75.
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truth, including the Christian.

Conversely, Voegelin did

not become so embroiled in his resistance to ideologists
and pneumapaths as to be incapable of recognizing merit
within their thought or activity. 33
critical

remarks

can

be

Although Voegelin's

shockingly

(and

perhaps

needlessly) acrimonious, they rarely bear the markings of
a mere attack.
Nevertheless,

the

very

use

of

the

concept

of

spiritual disease carries a certain volatility in an era
when tolerance is a candidate for the status of the prime
academic virtue.

Since Voegelin's main diagnostic works

appeared at a time when the majority of the members of his
discipline were loath even to speak of things as good, his
willingness to speak of evil and sickness in politics was
sure to draw fire. 34
from
work.

authors

who

were

Dante Germino,

Not all of the criticism has come
unsympathetic

toward

Voegelin's

one of the more distinguished of

33see Voegelin, "History and Gnosis" (1969), pp. 65,
82-83; "The Eclipse of Reality" (1970), pp. 189-190; "On
Hegel:
A Study in Sorcery" (1971), pp. 343-44; From
Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), pp. 299-301.
34cf.,
e.g., Robert A.
Dahl,
"The Science of
Politics:
New and Old," World Politics (vol. VII, 1955,
pp. 479-89); Aurthur W. H. Adkins, "Review:
Plato and
Aristotle and the World of the Polis," Journal of Hellenic
Studies (vol. LXXXI, 1961, pp. 192-93). It might be noted
that one of the great costs imposed by a "value-free"
methodology is an inability to come to grips with
manifestations of evil, however elusive that term may be.
There would surely be something pathetically hollow about
an account of concentration camps and gas chambers that
was limited to the judgment that they are "dysfunctional."
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voegelin's commentators, has written that:
one problem is to distinguish between "error and the
person who errs," as John XXIII expressed it.
Voegelin frequently seems to suggest that not only the
ideas of Hegel, Marx, and the rest of the "Gnostics"
are erroneous, but that the thinkers are spiritually
diseased as persons. I must confess that I still find
it difficult to accept this latter judgment and wonder
if it is necessary to condemn these thinkers as whole
persons in the way, again, that Voegelin appears to
argue.
[Emphasis in original.]35
charitable as these remarks are, it may be that Germino's
tolerance
degree

is misplaced.

that

ideological

I

would

suggest that,

systematizers

have

to the

knowingly

falsified reality for purposes of enlisting others in a
ruinous project of world transformation, it

~

necessary

for Voegelin to invoke the concept of spiritual disease;
the

real

problem

is

that

many

of

those

who

are

subsequently enlisted in one or another way will not have
partaken

of

the

experiences

which

motivated

the

ideological patriarch, and thus would presumably not have
fallen prey to the same disorder. 36

To expand upon a

point made earlier, it is entirely possible to be swindled
by an ideologist or a paraclete for reason of insufficient
35oante Germino,
"Eric Voegelin's Framework for
Political Evaluation in His Recently Published Work,"
American Political Science Review (vol. LXXII, 1978, pp.
110-121), p. 118, 29n. The tentative tone of the passage
is puzzling, since Voegelin explicitly used the term
"spiritual disease" with great frequency.
36voegelin made a similar point (though clearly not
with the intention of excusing the rank and file) in From
Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), pp. 242-49.

209
experience or study, or to be enlisted in a mass movement
due to pressures from a corrupt regime or peers or simple
boredom,

without

engaging

in

a

self-conscious

revolt

against the conditions of existence.
It is the question of whether an individual has
knowingly

falsified

reality

and

engaged

in

a

self-

conscious revolt that should determine where we draw the
line between spiritual disease and lesser disorders.
seems

that

distinction,

Voegelin

did

especially

in

not
his

always
later

years,3 7

Voegelin's tolerance is to be questioned,
this is the appropriate ground.

respect

It
this

and

if

I believe that

Returning to Germino 1 s

argument, it would seem that Voegelin has left little room
for

a

distinction between

ideologists and their ideas.

The premise of his late work (which is characterized by
the

shift

after

1950

from intellectual

history to the

37For example, in the following comment with regard
to the inability of his work on the race idea and that of
Kant on the idea of evolution to affect ideological
conflicts on these topics, Voegelin seems to confuse
stupidity with self-conscious closure or the "refusal to
apperceive":
"One should not think, however, that once
this analysis is made, it has any influnce on anybody. It
does not.
Neither did Kant have any influence on anybody
in this respect, nor did my analysis of the race idea have
any influence in this respect ••.. [T)here is still the same
level of stupidity as you find in the 1920s and the same
level of stupidity as you find in the the time of Kant in
the eighteenth century.
So nothing happens in practice,
even when the problem gets analyzed. One must not expect
a rational analysis to make people intelligent all of a
sudden.
They remain as stupid as they were before. 11
Voegelin, "Autobiographical Statement at Age Eighty-Two"
(1984) I P• 118.
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theory of consciousness)

is that ideas are epiphenomenal

manifestations of the experiences which set the pattern of
an individual soul and its activity.

With regard to Hegel

and Marx, the thinkers mentioned by Germino, the salient
experiences
existence,

are

will

murders of God) ,
culminate

in

alienation
to

power

(to

from

the

conditions

the

extent

of

of

attempted

and a hubristic desire to make history

their

own

efforts.

Their

simply erroneous; on the contrary,

ideas

are

not

they are ingeniously

orchestrated according to the inner logic of a spiritual
rebellion which seeks popular acceptance.

If Voegelin was

correct in arguing that both were well aware of what they
were doing,

it is difficult to understand why criticism

should be restricted to the level of ideas.38
Nevertheless,

Germino's

reservations

on

the

question of whether "the rest of the 'Gnostics'" should be
regarded

as

spiritually

being

"gnostic"

or

ideological

founded.

This point must be made cautiously, given the

by

movements

of

one

Voegelin's

many

reason

of

of

the

(for

partisans

brevity

of

diseased

Voegelin)

treatments

of

identified

as

seem quite well

most

of

these

38on the intentionality of the Hegelian and Marxism
deformations of reality see Science,
Politics and
Gnosticism (1968), pp. 23-28, 34-46; "On Hegel:
A Study
in Sorcery" (1971), passim; The Ecumenic Age (1974), pp.
262-66; Anamnesis (1978), pp. 3-4.
On the general issue
of intentionality in pneumapathological consciousness see
esp. "The Eclipse of Reality" (1970).
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movements, but it must be made nonetheless for this very
reason.

Of the fourteen ideologies listed on p. 14 of the

first chapter, Voegelin has left us with extended analyses
only of Hegelianism,

Marxism,

anarchism,

last

with

the

scientism,

two

being

positivism and

restricted

to

the

positivism of Comte and the anarchism of Bakunin.
remainder

of

these

ideologies

were

either

peripherally or simply mentioned in passing.

The

treated

Thus we must

be cautious and not reject the possibility that Voegelin
could have provided grounds for concluding that spiritual
disease

was

indeed

an

important factor

within each

of

these movements, but we must be still more cautious before
arriving

at

the

conclusion

that

an

individual

is

spiritually diseased on account of being, say, a liberal
or an existentialist (and before concluding that liberals
and Marxists
conclusions

can be placed on the same plane).
would

represent,

I

believe,

a

such

misuse

of

Voegelin's work, although it must be admitted that one who
wished

to

condemnations

use

his

could

work

plausibly

as

support

point

to

for

blanket

passages

where

Voegelin seems to have done exactly that himself .39
In light of the severity of the charge involved in

39see Voegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. xii:
.Science, Politics and Gnosticism (1968), pp. 4-5: From
Enlightenment to Revolution (1975), p. 69; Anamnesis
(1978), pp. 3-7, 145-46; "Wisdom and the Magic of the
Extreme: A Meditation" (1981), p. 240.
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the

concept

emphasize

of

why

spiritual
it

circumspection.

must

disease,

be

it

utilized

is

important

with

the

The concepts of spiritual

to

greatest

disease and

pneumapathological consciousness refer to an existential
state that is distinct from neuro-physiological disorders,
criminal impulses, or intellectual deficiencies.

However,

in concrete cases, it may be very difficult to distinguish
between

these variegated phenomena.

consciousness can be expressed
intellectual weaknesses,

Pneumapathological

in criminal

behavior or

but mere stupidity or "simple"

homicidal mania in an individual could be confused with
pneumapathological

consciousness

if

they

under the aegis of an ideological movement.
will

frequently happen that,

are

observed

Moreover, it

when an ideological system

becomes the foundation for a widespread intellectual or
political movement,

many individuals will

encounter the

system only in part or in a diluted form and will accept
it for reasons quite different than those which led to its
construction.

Thus

it

is essential

that diagnoses

of

spiritual disease be restricted to individual cases, and
indeed to those cases where a sufficient body of evidence
is

available

himself

for

recognized)

the
to

spurious
be

factors

dismissed and

(which Voegelin
for

the

self-
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consciousness of a

revolt to be established. 40

On one

hand, it is perhaps absurd to demand more of a scholar who
was as productive as Voegelin but, on the other hand, it
could be argued that it is incumbent upon one who would
speak of spiritual disease to provide clear distinctions
on what does and does not constitute such disease,

and

moreover to refrain from using the term in reference to
groups

of

unnamed

illegitimate to
group,

and

individuals.41

It

is

probably

use the term in reference to any such
it

is

certainly

meaningless

and

counterproductive to speak of a "diseased age. 11 42
There may also be reason to fault Voegelin for not
having

drawn

distinctions

between

the

groups

and

40voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A
Mediatation" (1981), p. 236: "I am speaking cautiously of
a suspension of consciousness because it is frequently
difficult, if not impossible, to determine in the case of
an individual activist whether the suspension is an act of
intellectual fraud or persuasive self-deception, whether
it is a case of plain illiteracy or of the more
sophisticated illiteracy imposed by an educational system,
whether it is caused by a degree of spiritual and
intellectual insensitivity that comes under the head of
stupidity, or whether it is due to various combinations of
these and other factors such as the desire to attract
public attention and make a career." Parenthetically, it
might be noted that this passage, which was also quoted in
the first chapter, shows that Voegelin was not in the
habit of equating pneumapathological consciousness with
stupidity, as might be wrongly assumed from the passage
quoted in note 37 above.
41For examples see the passages cited in note 39 to
this chapter.
42voegelin's words from "History and Gnosis"
p. 81. See also The Ecumenic Age (1974}, p. 266.

(1969),
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intellectual schools to which he referred as ideological
or gnostic movements.

One can find Voegelin's arguments

for the presence of ideological elements within each of
these movements persuasive and yet resist the notion that,
say,

liberalism

and

existentialism belong

plane with Marxism and fascism. 43
differ

both

in

kind

and

in

on

the

same

Since these elements

relative

prominence

from

movement to movement, it would seem that Voegelin should
have provided caveats which would lead readers away from
the

conclusion

piece.44

that

these

movements

are

all

of

one

In light of one hundred and fifty years of what

43rn the case of a varied tradition such as
existentialism this problem can be aggrivated by a lack of
analysis at the individual level.
For example, Voegelin
presumably had no desire to condemn existentialists per
se,
for while he stridently criticized Sartre and
Heidigger he found much to praise in Jaspers and Camus.
on Sartre see "The Eclipse of Reality" (1970), pp. 185,
190; The Ecumenic Age (1974), p. 228.
on Heidigger see
Science, Politics and Gnosticism {1968), pp.
46-49;
"History and Gnosis" (1969), pp. 65, 69, 81-83.
on
Jaspers see "Autobiographical Statement at Age Eighty-Two"
(1984), pp. 113, 121. On Camus see Anamnesis {1978), pp.
170-72, 189-90; Conversations with Eric Voegelin {1980),
pp. 18, 26.
44The one passage that I am aware of where Voegelin
alludes to the possibility of his writings being misused
or misunderstood does not shed much light on the question
of whether he was either resigned to this fate or actively
sought to guard against it,
but is interesting
nonetheless:
"Every
analysis ••• can
lead to
misunderstanding if it falls into hands of people who
aren't very bright. Absolutely, the non-brightness of the
people who might read you is a fact you have to face. We
just have to put up with the fact that there are people
who are not sufficiently literate to handle the problems
with which we have to deal.
I have always had to explain
to the students at the beginning of my seminars a-11 my
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Voegelin called the
conflict,

it

is

commonalities

"dogmatomachy"

true

which

that

of

inter-ideological

Voegelin's

characterize

the

analysis
various

of

the

movements

represented a more important task than that of stressing
their

differences,

but

this

latter

task

would

have

complimented the former and helped to protect it against
For example,

misunderstandings.
that

there

is

liberalism,45
article)

that

a
he
it

"gnostic"
also

gave

should

although Voegelin wrote

component

to

indications

probably

not

be
(in

be

found
the

in

same

considered

a

gnostic movement in the sense that he usually used the
In his view liberalism posed

term.

less

itself than the danger of creating a
through

secularism,

that

could

permit

a

danger

in

spiritual vacuum,
the

victory

of

ideologies like Marxism or fascism which can exploit the
human

penchant

one's actions.46

for

attaching

ultimate

significance

to

If there is something faintly metastatic

life:
there is no such thing as a right to be stupid;
there is no such thing as a right to be illiterate; there
is no such thing as a right to be incompetent.
It is
usually taken for granted that you have a right to be all
of these things, and will still be regarded as a wonderful
person." Voegelin, "Responses at the Panel Discussion of
'The Beginning of the Beginning" in Fred Lawrence, ed.,
The Beginning and the Beyond: Papers from the Gadamer and
Voegelin Conferences
(Supplementary issue of Lonergan
Workshop, vol. IV, Chico, California:
Scholar's Press,
1984, pp. 97-110), p. 100.
45voegelin, "Liberalism and its History" (translation
of "Der Liberalismus und seine Geschichte," 1960), Review
of Politics (vol. XXXVII, 1974, pp. 504-20), p. 512.
4 6Ibid., pp. 512, 517-18.
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about the assumption that "actions undertaken in rational,
anticipatory self-interest will lead to harmonious order
in society, "4 7 it must be remembered that this 1 iberal
hope

was

premised upon

the sober assumption that

most

human beings are incapable of giving themselves over to
the

community

without

thought

for

their

own

narrow

interests (and would not acquire this capability even if a
harmonious order were to result from liberal social and
economic institutions).48

One would be hard pressed to

find talk of "new men" in the classics of liberalism, and
indeed

certain

liberals

were

apprehensive

about

the

effects that liberal institutions would have upon the men
of their day.49
this

one

Although we should not make too much of

example,

it

seems

impossible

to

avoid

the

conclusion that the prominence of pneumapathological and
47rb'd
__1_.' p. 515 .
48cf.,
e.g., John Locke,
Second Treatise of
Government (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1980), pp. 12-13, 6566; Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The
Federalist (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), papers 6, 10
and 51, pp. 27-33, 53-62, 335-41.
49Tocqueville's fears regarding the effects of
equality of conditions are well known.
See Democracy in
America (New York:
Anchor, 1969), pp. 9-20, 53-57, 18995, 231-45, 254-61. Less well known are the fears of Adam
Smith:
"[The workman in industry] generally becomes as
stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature
to become .... [T]he nobler parts of the human character may
be, in great measure, obliterated and extinguished in the
great body of the people."
Quoted in Robert L.
Heilbronner, Marxism: For and Against (New York: Norton,
1980), pp. 130-31.
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ideological con-sciousness varies widely among the set of
movements in question, and Voegelin's work is poorer for
the lack of distinctions which could do justice to the
extent of this variation.
With regard to the last of our concluding issues,
which

involves

the

question

of

whether

Voegelin

was

successful in demonstrating continuities at the level of
consciousness
spiritual

between

modern

disorientation,

we

and
must

pre-modern

forms

first

that

note

of
his

thesis could never be "established" to the satisfaction of
one

who

was

unwilling

to

accept

his

basic

theory

of

experience and symbolization--and not without difficulty
even for those who find the theory valuable. 50

In the

last analysis, the confirmation of Voegelin's basic thesis
on

the

historical

continuity

of

pneumapathological

consciousness depends upon the possibility of establishing
the existence of a common layer of experience beneath the
various symbolisms developed throughout history for the
expression

of

"existence-in-revolt."

This

type

of

interpretation is rather more susceptible to controversy

50For the most helpful presentations of the theory
see Voegelin, "Immortality: Experience and Symbol" (1967)
and "Equivalences of Experience and Symbolization in
History" (1970).
Two outstanding secondary analyses can
be found in Russell Nieli, "From Myth to Philosophy: Eric
Voegelin's Theory of Experience and Symbolization," Ph.D.
Dissertation, Princeton University,· 1979, and Eugene Webb,
Eric Voegelin:
Philosopher of History
(Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1981), pp. 52-151.
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than

the

less

daunting

tasks

of

placing

a

text

in

historical context or arguing for a certain relationship
among

its

parts,

ultimately

but

inasmuch

involves

the

as

all

attempt

to

intentions of the author, Voegel in' s
is not all that unusual.
of

the

case

interpretation,

that

interpretation
understand

the

interpretive method

Nevertheless, it is the nature

exception

can

be

taken

with

any

and when one undertakes to establish an

essential unity among as varied a set of texts across as
vast a span of time as did Voegelin, strenuous objections
are sure to be invited.
Although it would take us too far afield to make
the

point

by

way

of

exhaustive

comparisons,

I

would

venture to say that Voegelin' s was the most daring and
broadly-based

of

the

many

attempts

in this

century to

analyze the nature of the so-called Age of Ideology.

If

one compares Voegelin's analysis to the already ambitious
attempts of scholars like J. L. Talmon and Norman Cohn to
trace the lineage of ideological movements beyond this Age
(into

romanticism

and

medieval

millenarianism,

respectively), Voegelin's effort to extend the connections
to the ancient world and the human condition itself must
be seen as
unfair

to

an extraordinary undertaking.
expect

"demonstrations,"
from

much

less

such
which

an

effort

cannot

grandiose

to

issue

really
forms

It would be

of

be

in

rigorous

expected

even

historical

and
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philosophical analysis.

This does not mean, however, that

we can do no better than to admire Voegelin's boldness and
leave others to assess the results of his work.
We

can

first

ask

whether

Voegelin

was

able

to

substantiate the assertion from the first volume of order
and History that "the continuum of metastatic movements
has never been broken. 1151

In retrospect we can say that

voegelin was unable to establish any such continuum at the
level of "movements," but that he was able to provide very
good reason for believing that ideological consciousness
is

intimately

related

disorientation which

to

can be

a

broader

observed on

level well before the modern period.

pattern

the

of

individual

The problems at the

first level have less to do with dissimilarities among the
movements that Voegelin investigated than with two other
factors:

first,

the paucity of historical materials (and

the thinness or absence of analyses by Voegelin) for many
eras

and

particular

movements,

and

second,

the

difficulties associated with using the concept of personal
spiritual revolt as an explanation of popular movements.
There
among

the

is

one

movements,

important
namely,

problem
that

of

dissimilarity

which

distinguishes

5lvoegelin, Israel and Revelation (1956), p. 454. It
will be recalled that Voegelin seems to have been using
the term, "metastatic faith" at this time in much the same
generic sense in which he often spoke of gnosticism.
See
p. 58 supra.
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those movements which sought a transformation of existence
through transcendent forces from ones which conceived of
the

transformation

Although

this

as

a

purely

human

was

blurred

distinction

accomplishment.
in

Voegelin's

generic usage of the term "gnosticism," that usage was
still valid insofar as he was able to show that both types
of movements originate from an inability to endure the
tensions of existence in the metaxy.

Since the problem of

a blurring can largely be overcome through simple changes
in

terminology,

and

since

the

concept

of

pneumapathological consciousness can alleviate much of the
confusion

between

"gnosticism,"

historical

it

would

Gnosticism

seem

that

and

more

psychic
imposing

difficulties for the "continuum of movements" thesis are
presented by the other two factors.
As

was

maintained

preceding chapter,
continuity

in

Voegelin' s

between

modern

the

conclusion

to

the

argument for an essential
and

pre-modern

forms

of

spiritual revolt cannot be "confirmed" in any very solid
way because of a lack of more extended treatments of the
Hebrew prophets, the historical Gnostics, the Hermeticists
and Alchemists,
Middle Ages.

and the many millennial ist sects of the

Although it was also mentioned that Voegelin

has inspired a number of studies which can help to fill
these

gaps,

possible

his
to

late work suggests
find

evidence

of

that

it

should be

pneumapathological
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disorientation wherever the process of differentiating a
divine Beyond from the immanent realm of existence was
begun.52
of

his

This means, in effect, that a full confirmation
thesis

would

require an analysis of historical

materials not only from Western civilization but also from
the Orient and from primitive civilizations throughout the
world.
the

In his last years Voegelin began this work through

investigation

of

ancient

Chinese

texts

and

the

symbolisms of neo- and paleolithic civilizations in Malta,
the Yucatan, France and England,5 3 but it is obvious that
a body of evidence sufficient to "demonstrate" Voegelin's
thesis

will

not

future--if ever.

be

available

within

the

foreseeable

Thus it is more sensible to approach

Voegel in' s diagnostic work as a set of hypotheses to be
considered where

they prove helpful

in understanding a

particular case rather than as a completed theory to be
proven or disproven.
52voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A
Meditation"
(1981),
pp.
267-68:
"Existential
consciousness
does
not have to be
noetically
differentiated in order to suffer the trials of
deformation. In the crisis of the Egyptian Old Empire, in
the third millennium B.C.,
a rich literature of
deformative rebellion and of resistance to deformation
conducts the existential debate in the language of the
cosmological myth."
53For analysis of Chinese texts see The Ecumenic Age
(1974), pp. 272-99, 306-13.
For accounts of Voegelin's
work on neo- and paleolithic symbolisms see Conversations
with Eric Voegelin (1980), pp. 85-94; "Autobiographical
Statement at Age Eighty-Two" (1984), pp. 122-31.
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In general, these hypotheses will probably tend to
prove more helpful in investigations of individual cases
as opposed to movements.
consciousness of a
phenomenon
mystic,

than

there

explaining

spiritual

is

the

must

events

Since the pneumapathological
is

no more a group

transcendent

always

such

rebel

be

as

a

wars,

experience

presumption
revolutions,

of

a

against
or

even

intellectual trends in the terms of Voegelin's diagnosis
(even though the pneumapath can, like the mystic, affect
the consciousness of others}.

It is difficult to see how

the conditions which must be met for a valid diagnosis of
spiritual

disease

could

ever

investigation of such events,
difficult

to

support

be

satisfied

in

an

and thus it would also be

Voegelin's

early

finding

of

an

unbroken chain of "metastatic" movements.54
This having been said, we can nevertheless propose
the conclusion that Voegelin's diagnostic studies stand as
a contribution of singular importance for understanding
the nature of ideological thought.
beneath

the

intellectual

inner workings of the

history

To have penetrated
of

ideologies

to

the

ideological mind was one of his

greatest achievements, and,

54Indeed, the first
suspect, since Voegelin's
developed from an analysis
prophet, and as such does
movement at all.

by developing an analysis of

link in the proposed chain is
concept of metastatic faith was
of only one event involving one
not stem from an analysis of a
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ideological consciousness which can encounter it on the
deepest

levels

provided the
phenomenon

of

first

of

human

experience,

Voegelin may have

truly philosophical

ideology.

He

has

approach to the

made

it

possible

to

account for the specifically modern aspects of ideologies
(by identifying their undercurrent of scientistic reaction
against

the

opaque

Christianity)

symbols

of

a

doctrinalized

while also accounting for their perennial

elements of alienation, closure, chiliasm,
will

to

power.

Voegelin

has

taken

and hubristic

us

beyond

the

conception of our era as a novel "Age of Ideology" through
his restorative application of the classical concepts of
morbus

animi,

hybris,

aspernatio

pleonexia,

rationis,

polypragmosyne,

antihuman self-assertiveness.
that

In

libido
and

dominandi,

antidivine

addition,

by

and

showing

ideological consciousness originates from the same

experiences

of

tension

which

can

give

rise

to

an

orientation toward transcendence, Voegelin was also able
to

provide

those

a

precise

and

sophisticated

explanation

of

similarities between

ideology and

religion which

have led a generation of analysts to conceive of ideology
as a

"quasi-religious" mode of thought. 55

One of the

55E.g., Karl Lowith, Meaning in History:
The
Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1949); Raymond
Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals (New York:
Norton,
1962); Eric Hoffer, The True Believer:
Thoughts on the
Nature of Mass Movements (New York:
Time Inc., 1963);
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principal merits of this explanation is that it permits an
understanding of the resemblance between ideological and
religious patterns of disorientation without implying that
religion

is

itself a

form of disorientation.

Voegelin

showed that a differentiated religious tradition does not
provide a "solution" for the tensions imposed by the human
condition but, rather, a heightened sensitivity to tension
which

may

lead

either

to balanced consciousness

or to

millenarian escapism, closure within doctrine, and violent
intolerance of competing doctrines; thus,

he was able to

provide a wealth of original insights into the similarity
of

ideological

and

religious

fanaticism

while

simultaneously maintaining a clear distinction between an
authentically religious consciousness and a fanaticism of
either variety.
If Voegelin did not leave us with a remedy for the
fanaticism

which

can

arise

from

pneumapathological

consciousness, he did at least enable us to understand the
nature and history of psychic disorder by reference to a
parallel history of spiritual order.
Voegelin's

work

began

as

a

response

We have seen that
to

the

political

crisis of modernity, and that he characterized philosophy

Henri de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism (Cleveland:
World Publishing, 1963); Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents
of Marxism: Its Origin, Growth and Dissolution (New York:
Oxford University Press, 3 vols., 1981), vol. III, pp.
525-26.
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as "an act of resistance illuminated by conceptual understanding. 1156

The success of such a struggle can never be

complete or permanent,

since the wellsprings of disorder

flow from the human condition itself,

but one can still

speak of successes in a philosopher's act of resistance:
Philosophy is not a doctrine of right order, but the
light of wisdom that falls on the struggle; and help
is not a piece of information about truth, but the
arduous effort to locate the forces of evil and
identify their nature.
For half the battle is won
when the soul can recognize the shape of the enemy
and, consequently, knows that the way it must follow
leads in the opposite direction.57

56voegelin, Plato and Aristotle (1957), p. 68.
57rbid., pp. 62-63.
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